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To those who struggle, 
whose pain is the very reason for my efforts. 
  
To my family and friends, 





Local governments—of large cities especially—enact policies that crucially affect the daily 
life of immigrants. Migration policy-making has proliferated across cities of the Global 
North—and so did its own contestation. The urban environment is, in fact, a fertile breed-
ing ground for the flourishing of activist networks by and in solidarity with immigrants. Yet, 
research on social movement outcomes in the field of migration has been lagging behind. 
This thesis is aimed to theorize how and under what conditions pro-immigrant activists 
can affect policy-making at the city-level and beyond. By adopting a strategic-interaction 
and mechanisms-based approach to the study of contentious politics, the research con-
tends and demonstrates that movements can rely on strategic leverages within three arenas 
of interaction. First, brokerage mechanisms are essential to the emergence of a social 
movement in the civil society arena. The peculiar qualities of urban spaces—notably, the 
availability of dense relational networks extended over an array of geographical scales—
allow immigrants to create bonds of solidarity, craft alliances, and ultimately turn into vo-
cal political subjects. Second, alliance-building mechanisms in the city politics arena have to 
be activated. Within a propitious political environment (e.g., ideologically sympathetic po-
litical elites) activists are able to build potent pro-immigrant coalitions. Once crafted, these 
alliances can activate upscaling mechanisms to shape policy-making in the multi-level govern-
ance arena. Such mechanisms reinforce and concatenate with one another in recurrent fash-
ions, producing policy outcomes far beyond the immediate local contexts in which mobi-
lization occurs. Yet, a plethora of dilemmas and contradictions are likely to arise, too. The 
study compares three contentious policy realms—exclusionary policies, policies in support 
of undocumented immigrants, and asylum policies—so as to assess similarities and dis-
similarities across social movement outcomes. Empirically, it focuses on policies enacted 
in two large South European cities, Milan and Barcelona. Results are drawn from fieldwork 
carried out in 2017-19 and entailing 57 interviews. In addition, policy documents, media 
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Introduction: Global cities, local govern-
ments, and social movement outcomes 
 
 
«The city is the dumping side for anxieties and apprehensions generated by globally 
induced uncertainty and insecurity; but the city is as well the training ground where 
the means to placate and disperse that uncertainty and insecurity can be experimented 
with, tried out and eventually learned and adopted. It is in the city that the strangers 
who in the global space confront each other as hostile states, inimical civilizations or 
military adversaries, meet as individual human beings, watch each other at close quar-
ters, talk to each other, learn each other’s ways, negotiate the rules of life in common, 
cooperate and, sooner or later, get used to each other’s presence and, on an increasing 
number of occasions, find pleasure in sharing company». 




Inherent to the notion of global city coined by Saskia Sassen (1995) is the manifestation 
of worldwide phenomena within the urban environment. Migration counts among these 
societal changes, as a global-scale phenomenon that powerfully erupts within specific ter-
ritories. City-dwellers have to cope with such far-reaching transformations, which affect 
their communities and yet lie beyond the full jurisdiction of local administrations. In face 
of these constraints, local policy-making aimed at either integrating or marginalizing resi-
dent immigrants proliferated across the Global North—and so did its own contestation. 
The contentious politics of citizenship and ethnicity has escalated over the last decades, 
with protests by, in solidarity with, and against migrants diffusing across cities of transit and 
settlement. Surprisingly, however, the consequences of collective action for migration pol-
icy-making received little scholarly attention thus far. 
 The aim of this research is precisely to address such lacunae. Theoretically, it draws 
on migration studies, social movement studies, and urban studies—bridging them in a 
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systematic, coherent fashion. Empirically, the investigation focuses on two large South 
European cities, Milan and Barcelona, where both the governance and the contestation of 
immigration have unfolded as crucial, transformative phenomena. Their respective na-
tional contexts—the Italian and the Spanish ones—, as well as the supra-national frame-
work of the European Union (EU), are subject to in-depth examination, too. Methodo-
logically, the research lies in the tradition of case study research, but also borrows from 
strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approaches to the study of contentious poli-
tics. Results are drawn from extensive fieldwork carried out in 2017-19 and entailing 57 
semi-structured interviews with public officials, movement spokespersons, other civil so-
ciety actors, and experts. The study aims to offer generalizable comparative insights that 
transcend the immediate contexts of analysis. Migration is used as an entry point to pose 
broader questions on how cities respond to global-scale transformations and how civil 
society can revitalize liberal democracies. 
 This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The next section (Section 1.2) 
is aimed to highlight the relevance of this research. It reflects on how global transfor-
mations—including migration—land in urban environments, as well as on the rooms to 
maneuver of city governments and social movements in coping with them. Subsequently, 
Section 1.3 intends to show why this research is necessary. It briefly reviews different 
scholarly contributions so as to identify their major gaps and the opportunities for cross-
fertilization. The research questions guiding the study are then formulated. The termino-
logical, geographical, and temporal boundaries of the research are traced in Section 1.4. 
Finally, Section 1.5 presents the outline of the manuscript. 
1.2 Why is this research relevant? Global migration, local governments, 
and social movements 
Understanding cities is essential for understanding society and politics at large. As most of 
the global population is nowadays settled in urban settings, critical collective problems of 
our time originate, reproduce, and are challenged by agents operating therein. 
What defines a city as such is the geographical concentration of numerous and 
diverse people in restricted areas (Wirth 1938). In densely populated spaces, societal 
change tends to be more rapid, abrupt, profound, and—ultimately—difficult to govern. 
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Contemporary globalization has possibly accentuated the vulnerability of cities because 
worldwide phenomena first become manifest within the urban environment. Global cities 
tend to cluster economic activities within their territories, with dramatic consequences in 
terms of social inequalities, both between and within cities. The case of immigrants seeking 
employment and/or protection is emblematic. The postindustrial restructuring of cities—
in the Global North especially—has worked as a magnet for both high- and low- skilled 
workers of the service economy (Schiller & Çağlar 2009), thereby breeding spatial segre-
gation, social exclusion, and humanitarian crises.  
 However, the chaotic, seemingly ungovernable character of urban societies does 
not only depend on global-market forces: political processes also play a decisive role. The 
complexity of urban governance is indeed magnified by the multiple tiers of government 
and spheres of power that in cities are conflated. First, policy problems arise at different 
territorial scales, therefore «issues of jurisdictional design are fractal» (Hooghe & Marks 
2003: 234). The multi-level governance concept—first crafted in the field of EU studies—
reflects this concern for proliferating, interdependent jurisdictions (Bache and Flinders 
2004). Moreover, interactions among governmental players at various levels do not unfold 
on an even field. City governments are constitutionally inferior to, and dependent on, na-
tion-states (Kübler & Pagano 2012), thus local governments are keen to select policy al-
ternatives that are deemed compatible with supra-local provisions (Liu et al. 2010). As a 
consequence of these power asymmetries, when higher tiers of government are unable or 
unwilling to tackle emerging public problems, their solution ultimately depends on the 
agency of local actors. 
Cities, however, are not condemned to be passive receivers of social changes and 
political conditions imposed at a higher scale. On the contrary, local policy matters, even 
within extremely complex metropolitan environments (Le Galès & Vitale 2013).  Thanks 
to the peculiar qualities of urban politics, city governments can convert the conditions 
constraining their prerogatives into opportunities for policy change. Cities are, in fact, po-
litical hubs that cluster large constituencies of voters, powerful economic elites, commu-
nities of experts and intellectuals, and grassroots activists. All these are often tied to trans-
national networks. Local political leaders—mayors especially—can tap into such dense 
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webs of relationships to pursue their policy objectives (Sapotichne & Smith 2012). Draw-
ing on their visibility and credibility as political figures, they are able to shape the public 
agenda nationwide and beyond, enacting strategies of issue definition, conflict expansion, 
and venue-shopping (Baumgartner & Jones 2010). These possibilities also indicate that 
urban governance is not only a matter of formal competencies. City governments, alt-
hough legally subordinated, have a strategic toolbox at their disposal for shaping policies 
in line with their vision and interest. Policy-makers at various territorial tiers thus engage 
in complex relations based on cooperation, antagonism, and mutual dependency (Le Galès 
& Harding 1998). 
 Immigration is a case in point when it comes to these multi-level dynamics. While 
constrained in many respects, city governments enact policies that crucially affect the lives 
of immigrants (de Graauw & Vermeulen 2016). Room to maneuver is large because ab-
stract, sometimes ambiguous legislative prescriptions are translated into concrete admin-
istrative practices by urban policy-makers (Mayer 2018: 235). Urgent problems force them 
to act fast and innovations may arise during these phases of acceleration. This is why cities 
are often ‘avant-gardes’ whose experiments may travel toward other localities or levels of 
governments (Caponio 2018). Far from being ‘policy takers’ at the bottom of a multi-level 
hierarchy, urban actors can set their own local agenda, identifying «‘local’ problems in need 
of clear ‘local’ solutions» (Scholten 2013: 220). Since priorities may differ across levels of 
government, policy-making may become ‘decoupled’, i.e., governmental players are poorly 
coordinated and possibly in conflict with one another. Specialists on European immigra-
tion point to the divergence between national policies, generally restrictive and security-
oriented, and local practices of inclusion—even though local exclusionary policies mush-
roomed in recent years, too (e.g., Ambrosini 2018). Not only partisanship, but also prag-
matic rationales (e.g., maintenance of public order, cohesion of communities) drive the 
preference for progressive policies (Mayer 2018). 
 Relatedly, migration to western societies has become increasingly politicized dur-
ing the last two decades (van der Brug et al. 2015). This is the result of multiple actors’ 
mobilizations, within both the electoral and the protest arena, either opposing or support-
ing migrants, diversity, and multiculturalism. Subsequently, social movements by, in solidar-
ity with, and against immigrants have emerged across the Global North. What is their role 
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in local migration policy-making? Being located at the periphery of power relations, protest 
groups usually have limited chances of changing policies. Those seeking to advance immi-
grant rights appear especially weak, even more so if compared to anti-immigrant ones. As 
Steil and Vasi put it,  
 
«[w]hen we think abstractly about movements and countermovements, we generally 
assume that they confront each other on an even playing field. But the playing field 
itself can be as uneven as the resources that opposing movements bring to it. The 
difference between the proactive immigrants’ rights movement and the reactive im-
migration restrictionist movement is the difference between a movement seeking 
rights for a minority excluded from the political process and a movement positioning 
itself under the culturally resonant banner of law and order, with the commonsense 
refrain that ‘illegal is illegal’» (Steil & Vasi 2014: 1145). 
 
Yet, the urban environment may facilitate the success of these marginalized groups. 
Thanks to cities’ relational density, immigrant activists can weave networks of solidarity 
that enhance the viability of their claims (Nicholls 2016). Classic studies on protests in US 
cities similarly emphasize the role of local sympathetic elites that work as transmission 
belts between demand-makers and powerholders (e.g., Lipsky 1970; Eisinger 1973; Schu-
maker 1975). Networking endeavors even allow activists to scale up and out—that is, to 
strategically extend beyond their location of origin and access other geographical arenas. 
Hence, the city works for social movements «as a relational incubator, facilitating complex 
relational exchanges that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operating 
at a variety of spatial scales» (Nicholls 2008: 842, italics in original). 
Finally, given the critical role of local governments in the global governance of mi-
gration, as well as the escalation of the contentious politics in this realm, it is worth asking 
how and under what conditions social movements exert their influence on local migration policy-making. 
Nonetheless, «research on the consequences of social movements in the field of immigra-
tion has been lagging behind» (Eggert & Giugni 2015: 168). Arguably, these major lacunae 
owe to the lack of cross-disciplinary dialogue between distinct but overlapped strands of 
literature, namely migration, social movement, and urban studies. This PhD dissertation 
aims to fill this gap. 
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1.3 Why is this research necessary? An inter-disciplinary endeavor    
Over the last two decades, migration studies have gone through a ‘local turn’, meaning 
that research has paid growing attention to the local dimension of migration policy-making 
(e.g., Rogers & Tillie 2001; Penninx et al. 2004; Caponio & Borkert 2010). Departing from 
early studies focused on national citizenship regimes and models of incorporation (e.g., 
Soysal 1994; Zincone 1992), students have increasingly detected patterns of divergence 
across localities, even within the same national polity, and have thus recognized how au-
tonomous are local governments in crafting policies aimed at the integration or marginal-
ization of foreign-born residents (e.g., Koopmans 2004; Penninx & Martiniello 2004). This 
autonomy owes, on the one hand, to the peculiarities of urban societies, which provide 
migrants with concrete opportunities for developing interethnic relationships, regardless 
of the xenophobic discourses which may spread in the public sphere (Pratsinakis et al. 
2017). On the other hand, local governments have gained importance in many policy areas 
(including migration) due to the trends of welfare fragmentation and decentralization oc-
curred in western countries (Catalano et al. 2015). 
 More recently, migration studies have embraced multi-level governance perspec-
tives (Scholten & Penninx 2016; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017; Caponio & Jones-Correa 2018) 
so as to account for the vast array of state and non-state actors located at different terri-
torial scales shaping migration policies (cf. Bache & Flinders 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2003; 
Piattoni 2010; Schmitter 2004). Importantly, the multi-level governance character of these 
policies is likely to breed controversy among those having a stake in this realm. To support 
this argument, Scholten (2013) resorts to the concept of ‘intractable controversy’: 
 
«Rein and Schön define ‘intractable controversies’ as those situations that are charac-
terized by a multiplicity of frames or ‘multiple social realities’ (1994: 4). This type of 
policy problems would be ‘intractable’ as they seem to defy resolution and obstruct 
critical debates about a problem situation, because the involved actors not only have 
different ideas about the issue involved, but also disagree about the very issue at stake. 
This can pose a specific challenge to governance in multi-level settings. When the 
framing of policies differs between levels, it can be expected that interaction and the 
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coordination of policy efforts between levels will be complicated» (Scholten 2013: 
219). 
 
In a nutshell, specialists on migration emphasize the importance of local contexts, multi-
level governance, and contestation for migration dynamics. The role of social movements, 
however, has been seldom considered by this strand of literature. 
On the other hand, social movement studies have paid increasing attention to im-
migrant solidarity activism (for a state-of-the-art, see della Porta 2018). These instances of 
collective action have spread in western societies over the last two decades, initiating «a 
new era of protest» (Ataç et al. 2016) and «a new form of activism on the global stage» 
(Caraus 2018). The burgeoning literature on this topic has sought to understand how ac-
tors at the margins of society can turn into vociferous political subjects. In fact, immigrants 
are unlikely protestors «given the limited resources, enormous heterogeneity, precarious 
legal status, ban on free mobility, restricted participation rights and the high fluctuation 
among movement members» (Mayer 2018: 13). These mobilizations might then appear 
‘anomalous’ in so far as they «contrast with a dominant portrayal of marginalized migrants 
as either passive, needy and ideally grateful objects of government or civil society human-
itarianism or stigmatized outsiders and intruders in a national order» (Steinhilper 2018: iii). 
 To solve this puzzle, early research points at the role of political opportunity struc-
tures (e.g., Morales & Giugni 2011; Koopmans 2004), whereas more recent studies look 
at the role of threats—rather than opportunities—as drivers of mobilization (cf. della 
Porta 2018: 9). For instance, tightening migration policies «can transform a latent sense of 
group membership among unconventional protest organizers (e.g., immigrant soccer 
league members and ethnic small business owners) into a willingness to take action» 
(Zepeda-Millán 2016: 269). Nicholls (2014b), too, refines the notion of political opportu-
nities and introduce the one of  ‘niche-opening.’ In face of hostile political environments, 
mobilization is an option only for narrow segments of the migrant population, i.e., those 
having cultural, legal, and economic attributes deemed compatible with the values of na-
tionally-defined polities. This poses a complex dilemma, as «niche-openings provide the 
only path to legal status for some, but they can also differentiate (discursively and legally) 
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between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ undocumented immigrants» (ibid.: 23)—thus fur-
ther stratifying the immigrant population and deepening the adverse conditions faced by 
the lower strata. 
Scholars also point at the role of allies, sometimes defined as ‘supporters’ or ‘pro-
beneficiaries’ (e.g., della Porta 2018; Steinhilper 2019; Nicholls & Uitermark 2016; Ataç et 
al. 2016; Agustín & Jørgensen 2016; Rosenberg & Winkler 2014). These networks of sol-
idarity are essential for providing resource-poor groups with the necessary mobilizing 
structures. Yet these coalitions are normally very fragile and likely to suffer from internal 
controversies. In fact, positional differences ingrained in society at large are proved to be 
reproduced, on a smaller scale, within cross-movement alliances. The preferences of par-
ticipants having a lower status thus risk to be disregarded, with negative consequences for 
mobilization (Beamish & Luebbers 2009; Dixon et al. 2013). Also, solidarity might be 
driven by paternalistic attitudes (Cappiali 2016; Fadaee 2015). Altruism can victimize im-
migrants rather than facilitate their self-determination as political subjects, then implicitly 
validating the dynamics that generated oppression in the first place (Rosenberg & Winkler 
2014; Mayer 2018). Hence, the same conditions that galvanize players into building alli-
ances can, at a later time, sow discord by sharpening pre-existing power unbalances. 
Combining social movement and critical citizenship studies, scholars also empha-
sized the importance of ‘acts of citizenship’, i.e., practices through which immigrants in 
precarious conditions transform themselves into citizens without the need to be formally 
‘authorized’ and without legally belonging to a certain national polity (Ataç et al. 2016: 532, 
see also Isin 2008; Caraus 2018). Other studies focus on the cultural outcomes of these 
mobilizations, highlighting how immigrant activism redefines the limits of the legal order 
within a territory (Monforte & Dufour 2011; 2013). In such processes of politicization, 
the role of emotions is decisive for converting personal stigma into a sense of pride (e.g., 
Nicholls 2016), as well as for re-interpreting individual blames in terms of collective re-
sponsibilities (della Porta 2018: 5). 
 All in all, extant literature on immigrant rights movements seeks to explain how 
groups at the margins of society engage in contentious politics «against all evident odds» 
(Steinhilper 2019: 1). Surprisingly, however, the question of political outcomes has been 
largely overlooked. Mobilization is investigated as a phenomenon to be explained rather 
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than as a potential causal force. Although the literature on the biographical, cultural, and 
political consequences of collective action has grown considerably (e.g., Soule & King 
2006; Amenta et al. 2019; Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005; den Hond et al. 2014; for a com-
prehensive review, see Bosi et al. 2016), contributions are virtually non-existing in the field 
of migration. 
 The study of  Steil and Vasi (2014) on US localities is a remarkable exception. The 
structural changes produced by new waves of immigration to the US has gone hand in 
hand with the dramatic spread of local immigration policy-making, aimed at either expand-
ing or restricting immigrant rights. Both progressive and conservative social movements 
have mobilized around such issues, making worth to ask whether they have influenced 
local policy-making processes. Such developments set a perfect ground for the study of 
social movement outcomes, as they allow us to examine, simultaneously, the consequences 
of collective actors on both sides of the ideological spectrum. As the authors put it, 
 
«[s]ome cities have passed laws aimed at driving out undocumented immigrants, while 
other cities have enacted policies trying to support foreign-born residents regardless 
of their immigration status. […] Because active social movements on both sides of 
this issue have mobilized for the introduction of these ordinances, we can also use 
them to advance our understanding of social movement outcomes» (Steil & Vasi 2014: 
1105). 
 
Their results show how proactive and reactive movements respond to different 
sets of opportunities and constraints. On the one hand, the adoption of pro-immigrant 
laws is facilitated by the mobilization of progressive movements, whose influence is how-
ever contingent upon the presence of sympathetic political elites in the local government. 
Such access points are defined as ‘municipal opportunity structures.’ On the other hand, 
anti-immigrant ordinances are more likely to be approved where local powerholders frame 
migration-related structural changes as threats for native-born residents. In other words, 
progressive movements are able to access friendly powerholders for promoting inclusive 
policies, whereas reactive movements more hardly have such an influence in pushing for 
restrictive policies. 
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Departing from these insights, my research will seek to advance the study of social 
movement outcomes in the field of migration. By adopting a strategic-interaction and 
mechanisms-based approach to the study of contentious politics (Bosi et al. 2016: 11-12), 
I will contend and demonstrate that pro-immigrant activists are able to exert an influence 
on policy-making by means of their strategic leverages within three arenas of interaction. 
First, brokerage mechanisms are essential to the emergence of a social movement 
in the civil society arena. The peculiar qualities of urban spaces—notably, the availability of 
dense relational networks extended over an array of geographical scales—allow immi-
grants to create bonds of solidarity, craft alliances, and ultimately turn into vocal political 
subjects. Second, alliance-building mechanisms in the city politics arena have to be activated. 
Within a propitious political environment—e.g., ideologically sympathetic political 
elites—activists are able to build potent pro-immigrant coalitions at the city-level. Once 
crafted, these alliances can activate upscaling mechanisms to shape policy-making in the 
multi-level governance arena. Such mechanisms reinforce and concatenate with one another in 
recurrent fashions, producing policy outcomes at various spatial scales, far beyond the 
immediate local contexts in which mobilization occurs. Yet, a plethora of dilemmas and 
contradictions are likely to arise, too. The empirical study will compare three highly con-
tentious policy realms—exclusionary policies, policies in support of undocumented immi-
grants, and asylum policies—to assess similarities and dissimilarities across social move-
ment outcomes. 
The concept of ‘contentious migration policies’—which gives the title to this PhD 
dissertation—draws on the seminal work by Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney 
Tarrow (2001). The adjective ‘contentious’ denotes the contested character of policy 
realms in which the interests of claimants are at stake. Also, it allows researchers to move 
beyond narrow movement-centered perspectives by considering broader patterns of in-
teraction between claim-makers, elites, opponents, and the state (see also Ataç et al. 2016: 
536). As argued by van der Brug and his colleagues,  
 
«[…] there are several instances of ‘grievances’ (migration, globalization, welfare states 
reconfigurations, etc.) that contemporary societies are confronted with; grievances 
that transform social cohesion into a contentious domain. It is contentious, because 
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social actors claim different, and in some cases contrasting, conceptions of social co-
hesion. Some of these actors promise a conception of social cohesion that strengthens 
their identity, and that fosters the closeness of communities within themselves, 
whereas other groups embrace a more inclusive and not ‘identity-based’ cohesiveness. 
Of course, such claims do not occur in a vacuum but are embedded in a specific con-
text that can offer opportunities and constraints to social actors. And, in their turn 
social actors themselves may have an impact on the context, depending on their ability 
to mobilize their interest» (van der Brug et al. 2015: xiv). 
 
 Overall, my research will seek to solve two main conundrums. First, I will investi-
gate if and how immigrants—a section of the population normally located at the periphery 
of power relations—can surpass their own marginality to affect the political process. Sec-
ond, I will investigate how cities of the Global North can cope with global-scale transfor-
mations that cannot be fully governed through the levers of local government. These 
propositions can be converted into a set of research questions guiding the investigation: 
What are the main characteristics of local migration policy-making when the contentious 
politics of migration escalates? What are the main actors participating at these processes? 
How and under what conditions are pro-immigrant movements able to affect them? Be-
fore moving ahead, it is necessary to specify the terminological, geographical, and temporal 
boundaries of the study. 
1.4 Research boundaries 
Scope of the study and terminological notes 
In line with the most recent trends in migration studies, this study refers to ‘migrants’ as 
an encompassing category that include any person who changes his or her country of usual 
residence (UN DESA 1998). This terminological clarification is essential to escape ‘cate-
gorical fetishism.’ As Crawley & Skleparis (2018) put it, 
 
«[t]he use of the categories ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ to differentiate between those on 
the move and the legitimacy, or otherwise, of their claims to international protection 
has featured strongly during Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ and has been used to justify 
policies of exclusion and containment. […] [These] dominant categories fail to capture 
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adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of 
migration or their shifting significance for individuals over time and space» (Crawley 
& Skleparis 2018: 48). 
 
Otherwise put, in a highly politicized landscape, the migrant-refugee dichotomy 
implies a distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ migrants, in terms of both 
public discourses and policies. Such a distinction is empirically misleading, because the 
boundary between ‘having’ versus ‘choosing’ to move is extremely blurred and unstable 
(McMahon & Sigona 2018). In fact, Carling (2015) argues, 
 
«[d]etermining refugee status can be a messy and unpredictable process. Caseworkers 
who handle applications for asylum frequently lack the resources or information to 
make decisions with confidence and the applicants often dispute the outcome. Many 
asylum seekers are denied protection in Europe, but still have a genuine fear of return-
ing to their own country. […] The ‘two kinds of people’ argument is further under-
mined by the drawn-out trajectories of many current migrants. A Nigerian arriving in 
Italy might have left Nigeria for reasons other than a fear of persecution, but ended 
up fleeing extreme danger in Libya. Conversely, a Syrian might have crossed into Jor-
dan and found safety from the war, but been prompted by the bleak prospects of 
indeterminate camp life to make the onward journey to Europe. Regardless of the 
legal status that each one obtains in Europe, they are both migrants who have made 
difficult decisions, who deserve our compassion, and whose rights need to be ensured» 
(Carling 2015).  
 
 In this research, the term ‘refugee’ will be used only to describe migrants that have 
successfully claimed the right to refugee status—most often under the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention—thus obtaining some forms of international protection in the country of asylum 
(Hatton 2009). Of course, national authorities have the power to make the procedures for 
status determination more or less tight over time—another element that shed light on the 
political nature of categorical boundaries, which are only partly related to immigrants’ bi-
ography. On the same vein, the study will resort to the term ‘asylum-seeker’ to describe 
migrants who have submitted a protection request or intend to do so, whereas ‘forced 
migrant’ is deemed the most appropriate definition to describe a person who migrates «to 
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escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological deg-
radation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or livelihood» (International 
Organization of Migration 2000: 8, cited by Steinhilper 2018: 7). When fitting, the study 
will interchangeably use the adjectives ‘undocumented’ and ‘irregular’ for referring to «mi-
grants who enter a country illegally, either by crossing a border undetected, using false 
documents or having entered a country legally and then fallen out of legal status or letting 
their legal status lapse» (Kaufmann 2019: 3). 
 This study will focus on pro-immigrant social movements, whose constituency 
consists of both immigrants and their supporters, i.e., social movements by and in solidarity 
with migrants (Eggert & Giugni 2015). The activists of such groups ‘do not oppose dis-
criminatory discourses and practices, but also attempt to improve the fate of immigrants 
in the countries of residence’ (van der Brug et al. 2015: 14). Anti-immigrant movements, 
instead, will not be systematically scrutinized, although their role will be taken into account 
if relevant to unravel movement-countermovement dynamics. In general terms, by social 
movement I will refer to conflict-oriented networks of informal relationships between 
individuals and groups/organizations, based on collective identities, shared beliefs, and 
solidarity, through the frequent use of various forms of protest (cf. della Porta & Diani 
2020). Also, with Schumaker (1975), the term ‘protest groups’ will describe «groups of 
citizens who do not normally interact with governmental officials, but who, under certain 
conditions [...], organize on an informal, issue-specific basis to make demands on public 
officials through pressure processes» (ibid.: 490). 
 From this angle, pro-immigrant movements are classified as such when they pose 
a sustained challenge to powerholders (cf. Tarrow 2011), and thus have to be distinguished 
from other civil society actors—such as service providers and philanthropic organiza-
tions—that interact with state authorities without having non-institutional forms of de-
mand-making at the core of their agency. It should be noted, however, that recent studies 
emphasize how volunteers in the field of migration tend to understand their humanitarian 
actions as politically loaded (Zamponi 2018), and then to blur the boundaries between 
activism and volunteering (della Porta 2020). 
 When appropriate, the study will also resort to the notion of urban social move-
ments. Although the scholarly debate around these actors is heated (cf. Pickvance 2003; 
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Mayer 2003; della Porta & Subirats 2019), I will follow Andretta et al. (2015) in simply 
defining them as social movements mobilized around urban issues, e.g., related to collec-
tive consumption and urban planning (Pruijt 2007: 5115)—issues that, in fact, often inter-
sect with migration affairs. From this perspective, the urban context is the most suitable 
for studying the outcomes of pro-immigrant movements, as it is where such actors tend 
to originate and proliferate, tapping on networks of allies and engaging in contentious 
interactions with elites, authorities, and opponents (cf. Nicholls 2016).  
 As for migration governance, the study will focus on three contentious realms of 
policy-making, namely exclusionary policies, policies in support of undocumented immi-
grants, and asylum policies. Local exclusionary policies aim to exclude specific, highly po-
liticized sections of the immigrant population from various rights and benefits. They often 
go hand in hand with fear-mongering discourses and punitive measures against lawbreak-
ers. Examples include bans from collective goods, policing in public spaces for deporta-
tion purposes, and evictions from unauthorized camps. On the other side of the spectrum, 
policies can support undocumented immigrants, either by granting them access to gener-
alist services or through specific provisions. Importantly, the targets of these policies are 
deemed ‘illegal’ from the perspective of the nation-state. Last, asylum policies are aimed 
to support migrants who are either settled in, or in transit through, a locality and who are 
seeking protection. Local governments can enact these provisions within the framework 
of national policies or by means of ‘transgressive’ actions, as in the case of decisions to 
locally suspend bans on mobility. Hence, the study will focus on policies shaped by mu-
nicipal governments regardless of their jurisdictional competences. 
 Overall, these policies are aimed to either enlarge or restrict the civil, political, and 
social rights of immigrants. While local authorities in the context of the Keynesian state 
used to merely deliver national social policies (e.g., Béal 2011; Le Galès 2002), nowadays 
welfare systems are much more localized than in the past (Heidenreich & Graziano 2014). 
This shift has been driven by trends of decentralization (Catalano et al. 2015), the increas-
ing fragmentation and heterogeneity of social needs, and the more general retrenchment 
of social spending—especially following the Great Recession (Andreotti & Mingione 
2014; Bifulco 2016). It can be expected that contention over social policy is especially 
profound also because of its redistributive nature (Lowi 1972). When policies aim at the 
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redistribution of scarce resources, adversarial and ideologically-driven political relation-
ships are more likely to unfold (Aurich-Beerheide et al. 2015: 3). 
 
Contentious migration policies in Milan and Barcelona 
The study will compare contentious migration policies enacted in two large South 
European cities, Milan and Barcelona. This strategy for case selection is grounded on both 
substantive and methodological considerations. 
Italy and Spain have experienced both out-migration and internal migration since 
the mid-19th century and became contexts of massive settlement from abroad only in rel-
atively recent times, between the 1970s and the 1980s. The regulatory models of these two 
countries have always been characterized by relevant deficiencies. Their poor governance 
systems produce sheer numbers of undocumented immigrants, in a pendulum between 
restrictive policies and mass regularizations (e.g., González-Enríquez 2009; Caponio & 
Cappiali 2018). Such weak planning capacities and the logic of emergency that often per-
meates policy-making have put local actors at the forefront in handling immigration. Local 
governments played a decisive role not just in the delivery of basic services, but also in the 
development of innovative policy solutions then transferred at the national level (e.g., Ca-
ponio 2010a; Bruqueta-Callejo et al. 2011). Such a bottom-up perspective on migration 
policy concerns local institutions as much as civil society, which often mobilizes in collab-
oration with (or on behalf of) the state as a ‘policy-maker of last resort.’ 
 From a methodological perspective, the numerous similarities between the two 
cities—in terms of urban, national, and supranational contexts—make them ‘spontane-
ously’ apt for comparison. As ‘global’ cities, they are both relatively affluent, but also char-
acterized by severe social inequalities. In the 1800s, they have emerged as pivotal industrial 
centers and attracted vast numbers of workers from southern Italy and Spain. Since the 
late 1970s, their transition to the service economy has gone hand in hand with the rapid 
growth of the foreign population, which nowadays represent roughly one fifth of their 
total population. They also benefit of a considerable social capital, as made apparent by 
their long-standing tradition of urban social movements, voluntarism, and solidarity asso-
ciations (see Chapter 3 for an extensive justification of case selection). 
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Under the period of investigation, the local governments of the two cities were led 
by different governing coalition. Between 2006 and 2011, the Milan municipality has been 
led by conservative and anti-immigration parties, which enacted assorted exclusionary pol-
icies. These provisions were mostly dismantled starting from 2011, when a center-left co-
alition took over the city hall. Over the following years, policies in support of forced mi-
grants became one of the hallmark of Milan’s left-leaning administrations. Under the lead-
ership of a movement-party on the radical left, Barcelona’s administration also engaged 
with asylum policy-making since 2015. Policies in support of undocumented immigrants 
have been extremely relevant, too. Ultimately, this strategy for case selection will allow us 
to assess similarities and dissimilarities across social movement outcomes. 
1.5 Outline of the manuscript 
After the Introduction, Part I of this PhD dissertation offers an extensive discussion of 
the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research project. Chapter 2 presents 
intersect multiple scholarly contributions to build the theoretical framework of the study. 
Chapter 3 clarifies how the research design is constructed, how the cases are defined and 
selected, what are the sources and the methods of the investigation, and how these are 
combined with each other. Chapter 4 contextualizes the empirical analysis that will be 
presented in Part II of the manuscript. More precisely, this chapter provides a comprehen-
sive overview of Italy’s and Spain’s history of migration, governance models, structures of 
multi-level governance, as well as a snapshot of the main sociological features of Milan 
and Barcelona. Part II of this manuscript presents empirical evidence from case study re-
search. It draws on fieldwork conducted in Milan (February-September 2017, January 
2019) and Barcelona (February-July 2018). Chapter 5 focuses on Milan’s local exclusionary 
policies, Chapter 6 moves to Barcelona to analyze policies in support of undocumented 
immigrants, and Chapter 7 focuses on asylum policies adopted in both these cities. Part III 
brings the dissertation in full circle. Chapter 8 assesses the similarities and dissimilarities 
of social movement outcomes across contentious migration policies, with the purpose of 
formulating general theoretical statements. Chapter 9 clarifies the contribution of this dis-










Theory: The arenas and mechanisms of 
contentious migration policies 
 
 
«[U]rban citizenship policies may well depend on the state, but they are not entirely 
contained by it in practice. […] [C]ity governments can use their prerogatives of self-
government and the competencies gained through decentralization to set their own 
priorities, to interpret and even to disobey national policies». 
(Gebhardt 2016: 7) 
 
«The city becomes a strategic site for creating the levels of power needed to assert 
broad claims for equality. By becoming politicized in the urban trenches, outcasts like 
undocumented immigrants can position themselves in larger fights for rights, recog-
nition and equality». 





This chapter is aimed at theorizing how and under what conditions social movements can 
produce outcomes in local migration policy-making—a research field that has been lagging 
behind. It does so by reviewing and combining different scholarly contributions in the 
fields of migration studies, social movement studies, and urban studies. Specialists on mi-
gration have unpacked the black box of migration policy-making, showing how such pro-
cesses unfold in contexts of multi-level governance, within which city-level actors play a 
decisive role, possibly interfering with nationally-defined citizenship regimes (Section 2.2). 
However, this literature largely neglects the consequences of social movements for policy-
making. On the other hand, the burgeoning literature on pro-immigrant social movements 
has sought to understand how groups at the margins of society can turn into vocal political 
subjects, but overlooked how they can produce meaningful outcomes in the realm of pol-
icy-making (Section 2.3). Finally, urban studies have shed light on the role of urban actors 
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in affecting politics across various territorial scales (Section 2.4). Bridging these distinct 
but overlapped scholarly contributions and siding with strategic-interaction and mecha-
nism-based approaches to contentious politics, a comprehensive theoretical framework 
for studying the outcomes of social movements in the field of local migration policy-mak-
ing is presented (Section 2.5). Conclusive remarks are presented in the last section (Section 
2.6). 
2.2 The multi-level governance of immigration 
Multi-level governance as a contested field 
At a glance, one might easily argue that immigration is a typical policy domain handled at 
the national level. Historically, states are founded on their own capacity of claiming the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within their territory (Weber 1968). Since 
boundary-making is intrinsic to state-building, the control of borders stands out as the 
phenomenology of state power par excellence. Yet policy studies provide us with a more 
fine-grained perspective, pointing at migration as a matter of multi-level governance 
(Scholten & Penninx 2016; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017; Caponio & Jones-Correa 2018). 
 Multi-level governance is a concept that gained importance along with the process 
of Europeanization and was crafted for describing «a system of continuous negotiation 
among nested governments at several territorial tiers» (Marks 1993: 392). In its current 
use, it entails both vertical and horizontal dimensions and «reflects a shared concern with 
understanding increased complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state ac-
tors, and the related challenges to state power» (Bache & Flinders 2004: 4-5; see also 
Hooghe & Marks 2003; Piattoni 2010). A similar conceptualization is advanced by 
Schmitter, who defines multi-level governance as 
 
«an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically 
independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different 
levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/delibera-
tion/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert 
a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these level» (Schmitter 2004: 49). 
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These definitions aptly describe the fragmented, often contested character of mi-
gration governance in the EU. What, then, are its main characteristics? For sake of clarity, 
it is useful to follow the path-breaking contribution of Hammar (1985), who distinguishes 
migration policy between immigration and immigrant policy. The former deals with the con-
ditions posed to foreigners for being admitted in a national polity (e.g. visa policy, family 
reunifications, expulsions). Immigrant policy instead refers to the status of immigrants 
once settled in the national territory, i.e., the bundle of civil, political, and social rights that 
they can be entitled with. Such analytical distinction is crucial because, far from being a 
unitary issue, migration encompasses a wide array of challenges and stakes, each charac-
terized by peculiar jurisdictional ecologies.1 In Europe, both immigration and immigrant 
policies are multi-level in nature, but in very different terms. 
As for immigration policy, central governments still bear the lion’s share. EU in-
stitutions are relevant, but decision-making within them prevalently relies on the interac-
tion between domestic actors (Wallace 2000; Toshkov & De Haan 2013). This also ex-
plains its highly restrictive, security-oriented character. Guiraudon (2000) pioneered this 
scholarship by importing the US literature on policy venues (Baumgartner & Jones 2010). 
In the early 1980s, the personnel of Interior ministries were losing ground in their domes-
tic environments. Their preference for stricter controls on migration and asylum was op-
posed by ‘migrant-friendly’ actors, such as ministries of labor and social affairs, NGOs, 
and the judiciary. For circumventing such ‘liberal constraints’, law-and-order officials be-
gan to cooperate at the European level, where a new site of authority (i.e. policy venue) 
was gradually established. They could neutralize their national adversaries and eventually 
embed securitarian principles in the EU institutional design emerged in the 1990s. As 
Bonjour et al. put it, «[t]he influential metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’ reflects this intergov-
ernmentalist view of European cooperation as a means for restriction-minded member 
states to close down their external borders» (2018: 411). 
While national governments (especially their security-oriented components) dom-
inate EU immigration policy, they are relatively less important when it comes to immigrant 
                                                 
1 Based on Faist (1995), Scarpa (2015: 2) further clarifies such an analytical distinction: «[t]he whole set of immigration and 
immigrant policies is generally labelled as immigration policy regime and is deemed to form an important component of the wel-
fare state, since it delimits the categories of non-nationals who can gain entitlement to public benefits and services». 
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policies, which are often formulated and implemented at the local level (Morales & Giugni 
2011). In the last two decades specialists on migration have paid increasing attention to 
the local dimension of integration policies. Until then, studies often consisted of compar-
isons across national models of immigrant incorporation (e.g., Soysal 1994; Zincone 1992). 
Yet country-level studies proved insufficient to grasp the complexity of these phenomena, 
then pushing for a ‘local turn’ in migration studies (Caponio & Borkert 2010; Rogers & 
Tillie 2001; Penninx et al. 2004; Schiller & Çaglar 2011). The rationale behind this shift has 
to do with both the relevance of local contexts for migrants’ settlement, and the conse-
quent intervention of local governments in this realm—especially when it comes to urban 
settings.  
 The city is where migrants firstly shape their everyday interaction with the receiv-
ing societies (Pratsinakis et al. 2017). Consequently, local governments—of large cities es-
pecially—enact policies that crucially affect the daily life of migrants (Caponio and Borkert 
2010; Penninx et al. 2004; Alexander 2003; Jesuit & Mahler 2004). While constrained by 
national governments in terms of competencies and resources, they are autonomous in 
crafting their own policies. This often leads to remarkable intra-country variations in terms 
of policy outcomes, even in relatively centralized countries (Koopmans 2004; Penninx & 
Martiniello 2004). As Zincone and Caponio put it, 
 
«Local authorities and institutions play a dual role in the governance of immigrants’ 
policies. On the one hand, they are responsible for the implementation of national 
legislation, which is an adaptive process that implies more than simply executive ac-
tivities. On the other hand, they are called upon to answer to the demands of their 
local societies and to initiate new policies in order to cope with these demands». (Zin-
cone & Caponio 2006: 279-80) 
 
 Under certain circumstances, local governments are even able to interfere with 
immigration laws, thus overstepping their jurisdictional boundaries. This is especially the 
case of progressive municipalities that—amid restrictive national policies—decide to ‘row 
against the current’, overtly or covertly non-complying with supra-local provisions (for a 
recent review, cf. Kaufmann 2019). The most emblematic case is that of US sanctuary 
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cities, i.e., cities or police departments that have «passed a resolution or ordinance ex-
pressly forbidding city or law enforcement officials from inquiring into immigration status 
and/or cooperation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)» (Gonzalez 
O’Brien et al. 2019: 4; see also Huang & Liu 2018; Varsanyi 2006; Ridgley 2008).2 Similar 
dynamics have been observed also in European localities (cf. Gebhardt 2016; Kos et al. 
2016; Mayer 2018). 
Municipal governments can thus promote alternative visions of citizenship by 
which all types of resident are deemed legitimate members of the local community, re-
gardless of their administrative status (so-called jus domicili; cf. de Graauw 2014). As 
pointed out by Gebhardt (2015: 7), «urban citizenship policies may well depend on the 
state, but they are not entirely contained by it in practice» and cities are thus able «to set 
their own priorities, to interpret and even to disobey national policies». 
In short, the responses of local governments to migration and ethnic issues can 
foster, supplement, deviate, and even undermine supralocal provisions. Far from being 
‘policy takers’ at the bottom of a multilevel hierarchy, local policy-makers can set their 
own agenda, identifying «‘local’ problems in need of clear ‘local’ solutions» (Scholten 2013: 
220). These policies may be different from (and even in contradiction with) the ones of 
supralocal authorities. The leeway of local actors may thus result in decoupled policy-making, 
i.e., government levels are poorly coordinated and possibly in conflict with one another 
(Scholten and Penninx 2016: 94). In Europe, most often, decoupling dynamics have taken 
the form of a divergence between restrictive EU and national policies, on the one hand, 
and local practices of inclusion, on the other. In sum, the multi-level governance of mi-
gration is a contested field. Who, then, are the main agents and drivers in local migration 
policy-making?  
 
Actors and determinants of local migration policy-making 
 The extant literature points at elected officials—mayors especially—as the pivotal 
actors in local migration policy-making. Early research describes their behavior as driven 
                                                 
2 Such policies have spread in the 1980s to prevent the deportation of asylum-seekers from El Salvador and Guatemala, but a 
second wave of diffusion has occurred since the 2000s, when the tightening of federal immigration laws on the heels of 9/11 
led many cities to adopt sanctuary policies aimed at protecting undocumented immigrants at large. 
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by electoral panic (e.g., Mahnig 2004). Since the public opinion is often assumed to oppose 
immigration, and immigrants are usually devoid of voting rights, politicians would be keen 
to opt for restrictive policies, regardless of their ideology. In fact, they can embrace such 
decisions with little concern in terms of immigrants’ electoral response (Monogan 2013). 
Further studies refine this argument, showing that politics does make a difference for pol-
icy outcomes. In her study of Italian cities, Caponio (2010a) finds that incumbents’ ideol-
ogy determines the orientation of policies to a large extent. Progressive politicians tend to 
promote multiculturalism, thus recognizing immigrants as a resource for the receiving 
communities. Conservatives instead prefer assimilationism and usually frame migration as 
a problem. Individual immigrants may be integrated on an individual basis, providing basic 
assistance to the most vulnerable groups (e.g., refugees, asylum-seekers, trafficked women) 
while countering social deviance through the use of force (‘law-and-order’ approach to 
integration, cf. Scholten 2013: 225)3 
 Studies on US localities provide additional nuances on the political determinants 
of local migration policy-making. When it comes to exclusionary policies, scholars point 
at demographic change, partisanship, national politics, and local officials’ interpretative 
schemes as the main drivers of these policies (e.g., Ramakrishnan & Wong 2010; Gu-
lasekaram & Ramakrishnan 2015; de Graauw et al. 2013; Steil & Vasi 2014). When signif-
icant numbers of immigrants rapidly settle in a community, right-leaning entrepreneurs, 
such as Republicans seating in the municipal government, are likely to respond with ex-
clusionary measures. Yet such local dynamics unfold through the prism of national rheto-
ric (Hopkins 2010). Profiting from debates that are salient nationwide, local right-wing 
actors frame social change as a threat for their communities, so to justify hostile responses. 
 Driving forces are different in the case of inclusionary policies (cf. Steil & Vasi 
2014; de Graauw & Vermeulen 2016). Partisanship is still important, as pro-immigrant 
measures are more likely to be implemented when incumbents are left-leaning. However, 
political leaders need to sustain intense processes of coalition-building for passing such 
policies. They have to find the support of local elites and advocacy groups, possibly over-
coming the skepticism of their electorate. Scholars point, moreover, at the role of policy 
                                                 
3 Also, mainstream left parties tend to respond to the success of the extreme right by embracing more restrictive positions on 
migration-related issues (see Krause 2017; Hinnfors et al. 2012). 
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feedbacks. For instance, federal refugee resettlement policies generate feedbacks that en-
courage cities to accommodate not only refugees but immigrants more broadly (William-
son 2018). 
Whether enacting inclusionary or exclusionary policies, the role of local political 
leaders is thus decisive in setting policy frames. By drawing the perimeter of legitimate 
policy choices, they seek to build and maintain consensus over migration-related issues. 
Yet, once frames are established, they are likely to become blame avoidant so as to mini-
mize electoral risks (Caponio & Borkert 2010). Being politically hot and technically com-
plex, the governance ‘on the ground’ of migration-related issues is often in the hands of 
experts and civil servants, who are not electorally accountable. In fact, politicians are more 
likely resort to experts’ information when the issues at stake are highly politicized (Lundin 
& Öberg 2013). Bureaucrats’ expertise and discretion are thus crucial for policy-making 
and may even act as veto points throughout policy processes.  
 Non-state actors bear the lion’s share of local migration policy-making, too. On 
the grounds of their technical know-how and political legitimacy, civil society organiza-
tions participate at policy arenas and delivers services in cooperation with (or on behalf 
of) the state. Faith-based and lay NGOs, trade unions, grassroots committees, and mi-
grants’ associations are the main actors involved. They often access policy-makers through 
formal consultations, but also thanks to their personal ties with incumbents. Faith-based 
organizations are normally the privileged partners of conservative governments, whereas 
progressive politicians more likely interact with trade unions and lay cooperatives. Being 
often in charge of service delivery, the civil society is especially influential during the im-
plementation stage, after policies are formally adopted (cf. Penninx & Martiniello 2004;  
Schiller 2017).4  
 Because of their connections with local political elites, civil society actors can more 
easily mold municipal than national policies. Immigrants themselves have greater chances 
                                                 
4 Other authors (e.g. Caponio 2006) have similarly suggested a distinction between government and governance of local migration 
policy, consistently with other works in the field of urban studies. For instance, Le Galès (1995) describes the local government 
as an organized, rational, and coherent form of authority, essentially based on the power of local politicians and bureaucrats 
over policy-making. Differently, the local governance refers to fragmented, heterogeneous, and incoherent policy processes, in 
which local authorities represent only a component of a broader network. 
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for participation at the local level, beyond the formal provisions of national laws on for-
eigners’ political rights (Penninx et al. 2004; Kalandides & Vaiou 2012). The role of civil 
society is even more pronounced in countries that have traditionally experienced emigra-
tion, and where immigration has occurred only very recently and rapidly. In Italy and 
Spain, for instance, national legislations were initially unprepared to the high number of 
arrivals that started in the 1980s. The initial absence of legislative frameworks attributed—
de facto—the responsibilities of integration to local (non-state) actors, which often filled in 
for ‘policy voids.’ 
However, non-state actors do not mobilize evenly and controversial dynamics of-
ten emerge among them. NGOs, trade unions, and other social organizations are over-
whelmingly composed by natives who indirectly represent migrants’ demands. They are 
better equipped to interact with policy-makers, especially because of their organizational, 
financial, and political resources. Immigrant groups might be then ‘crowded out’ (Caponio 
2005). Such power imbalances are likely to intensify over time, as the lack of access to 
policy-makers further reinforce power asymmetries. Relatedly, while many European mu-
nicipalities established consultative institutions to include immigrant communities in pol-
icy-making (Morales & Giugni 2011), they are often prone to the cooptation of the asso-
ciations closer to, or dependent on, local incumbents (Però 2007). Organizational skills, 
financial capacities, and political autonomy then emerge as critical resources of ethnic mi-
norities for emancipating their position as political actors. This also echoes the literature 
on immigrants’ political participation, which shows how group-level resources are im-
portant for having a voice in the political process (e.g., Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Fennema & 
Tillie 2001). 
In a nutshell, elected officials are the main actors of local migration policy-making. 
By establishing frames that resonates with the values of their constituency, they seek to 
secure electoral gains while setting the principles and the boundaries of policy choices. 
Assorted civil society actors intervene to mold these policies and to deliver public services. 
Within this context, however, the outcomes of social movements for local migration pol-
icy-making have been largely overlooked. Despite the burgeoning literature on pro-immi-
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grant movements, «research on the consequences of social movements in the field of im-
migration has been lagging behind» (Eggert & Giugni 2015: 168). The next section is pre-
cisely aimed at bridging social movement studies with the scholarship on migration policy. 
2.3 Pro-immigrant activism and social movement outcomes 
The contentious politics of migration 
Migration from the Global South is producing structural changes within western countries 
as contexts of settlement. These transformations are nowadays extremely politicized, as a 
result of multiple actors’ mobilization, within both the electoral and the protest arena (Eg-
gert & Giugni 2015). Contention is not limited to material issues, such as social welfare, 
labor, and security, but it also touches upon cultural and religious aspects, especially with 
respect to the integration of immigrants with a Muslim background. 
The contentious politics of migration fits Tilly’s (1978) definition of both proactive 
and reactive movements. On the one hand, progressive movements struggle for ensuring 
rights that immigrants do not enjoy yet. On the other hand, right-wing movements seek 
to maintain the status quo, that means, to not grant the rights enjoyed by native-born 
residents to incoming groups. These mobilizations have to be intended in broad terms, 
since they are not limited to physical protest, but they also encompass softer collective 
actions, such as speech acts—consistently with the work by Koopmans & Statham (1999) 
on claim-making. The research project ‘Support and Opposition to Migration’ shows how 
claims concerning migration in western Europe have dramatically escalated in the period 
1995-2009, and how claimants are both state and non-state actors, including social move-
ments (Berkhout 2012). In sum, migration-related issues represent a field of contention 
involving movements by, in solidarity with, and against migrants. 
All else equal, raising numbers of immigrants increase the likelihood of mobilization 
by immigrants themselves, their native allies, and anti-immigration groups (e.g., Eggert & 
Giugni 2015; Caiani et al. 2012; Hutter & Kriesi 2013). Nonetheless, one of the most solid 
findings of social movement studies is that structural changes do not automatically trans-
late into agency by collective actors. At least three factors intervene in enabling mobiliza-
tion, i.e., the organizational strength of movements, the framing of collective grievances, 
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and the opening of political opportunities that incentivize the pursuit of change (cf. 
McAdam et al. 1996). This last condition—i.e., the contextual dynamics occurring outside 
the movement environment that affect their own mobilization—is now scrutinized in de-
tail, as it has proved to hold also in the field of migration. 
 
The theory of the political opportunity structure 
Scholars of social movements have attached growing importance to the political-
institutional context in which social movements develop and mobilize. Somehow, this al-
lowed researchers to move beyond classical theories of collective action that focus on 
social change, such as relative deprivation, for explaining mass activism. After all, social 
movements need sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities in order to 
be defined as such (Tarrow 2011). The concept of contentious politics point at a relational 
configuration of social movements by placing them within a broader political picture, in 
which the counter-mobilization of their opponents is also important (McAdam et al. 2001). 
Tracing neat boundaries between institutional and movement politics is thus detrimental 
(Kriesi 2015). 
The theory of the political opportunity structure (POS) has been crucial for mov-
ing beyond movement-centered perspectives, as it sheds light on movement dynamics as 
a function of the external environment in which they are inherently embedded (McAdam 
et al. 1996). The notion of POS was firstly introduced by Eisinger (1973) to describe the 
degree of openness of political systems vis-à-vis the demands of urban protesters. Several 
authors have further developed this bundle of concepts because of its worth in explaining 
collective action, especially in mature democratic regimes (for example, see Kitschelt 1986; 
Tarrow 1996; 2011; della Porta & Rucht 1991; Kriesi et al. 1995). Since activists are as-
sumed to act purposefully, they are more likely to mobilize when they perceived greater 
opportunities for successfully influencing politics. In other words, the POSs are those 
signals to social and political actors that may either encourage or discourage them to use 
their internal resources for forming social movements (Tarrow 1996). 
The conceptualizations of the POS are numerous and often vary depending on the 
tradition and the context of investigation (for a comprehensive review, see della Porta 
2013b). Overall, a distinction can be advanced based on the POS relative stability. The 
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long-lasting cleavage structure of a polity is relevant for the national development of social 
movements (Tilly 1978; Kriesi 2004). In addition, the territorial decentralization of insti-
tutional systems and the division of power between and within institutional bodies deter-
mine multiple points of access (Kitschelt 1986; della Porta 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995). When 
it comes to more contingent characteristics, the configuration of power can also affect 
social movements, because of electoral instability, elite divisions, or the availability of allies 
(e.g., Tarrow 1989). The composition of the executive and the legislative is of utmost im-
portance, as it opens an avenue for movements to form alliances with established political 
actors. In general, the more expanded are the opportunities, the more intense is collective 
action. However, protest may radicalize when points of institutional access are particularly 
closed (della Porta & Rucht 1991). 
 The POS theory has proved useful also to study immigrant activism (e.g., Morales 
& Giugni 2011; Koopmans 2004; Burciaga & Martinez 2017). This scholarship attaches 
major importance to local contextual factors. Variations in the structure of opportunity at 
the local level result in different patterns of migrants’ mobilization, although national mod-
els of integration and citizenship regimes are relevant anyway. According to Eggert and 
Giugni, 
 
«[t]he increasing salience of migration as an issue in the public domain and in conten-
tious politics goes along with an increasing organization of migrants as collective po-
litical actors. In the 1990s and 2000s, […] there has been a paradigmatic shift towards 
theories stressing the role of resources and opportunities for the political mobilization 
of migrants. This theoretical turn has come in part under the lead of students of social 
movements who became interested in collective action in the field of immigration and 
ethnic relations politics. Studies undertaken in this theoretical tradition were able to 
show how collective action by migrants follow logics similar to any other social movement as well 
as its wide cross-national variation as a result of different sets of institutional and dis-
cursive opportunities» (Eggert and Giugni 2015: 166-167, emphasis added). 
 
The literature reviewed thus far has focused on structures of political opportunity 
as potential determinants of mobilization. Yet the POS theory has looked not only at the 
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emergence, but also at the consequences of social movements in terms of political out-
comes (cf. Bosi et al. 2016). In other words, the political-institutional context is not only a 
determinant of collective action, but also a condition for the mobilization to be influential. 
The same factors that facilitate mobilization affect, in turn, the outcomes sought by move-
ments (Soule and King 2006: 1881). How can these insights be applied to the study of 
migration governance? 
 
Migration policy and social movement outcomes: The decisive role of allies 
The study of Steil & Vasi (2014) on US localities is virtually the only one engaging 
with a systematic assessment of movement outcomes in the field of migration policy-mak-
ing. The authors introduce the notion of ‘municipal opportunity structure’ (MOS), which 
refers to the availability of local political allies as access points that facilitate the adoption 
of pro-immigrant ordinances. They find that mobilizations aimed at enlarging migrants’ 
rights are more likely to succeed in influencing policy-making when local powerholders 
are ideologically sympathetic with such demands. The authors elucidates the underlying 
causal mechanisms as follows: 
 
«[…] associations and political context matter for the pro-immigrant movement be-
cause the proactive policies they seek to pass require sustained effort to craft, to win 
support, and to successfully enact. Immigrant civil society groups are essential because 
they serve as brokers, connecting two previously unconnected groups and mediating 
the relationships between the two […]. Sympathetic political elites are important be-
cause they are well positioned to build support among native-born elites for pro-im-
migrant policies and to overcome skepticism among native-born voters.» (Steil & Vasi 
2014: 1143) 
 
The burgeoning literature on immigrant activism—while rarely concerned with the 
question of policy outcomes—also emphasizes how influential supporters are essential for 
turning so-called ‘outcasts’ into legitimate political actors (e.g., della Porta 2018; Steinhilper 
2019; Nicholls 2013; Nicholls & Uitermark 2016; Ataç et al. 2016; Agustín & Jørgensen 
2016; Rosenberg & Winkler 2014). 
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Social movements often mobilize to produce political (and thus policy) change. 
Yet achieving such victories is the exception rather than the rule. In the classic definition 
provided by Lipsky (1968), protest is the political resource of powerless groups. This weak-
ness is particularly pronounced in the case of immigrant activists, being located at periph-
ery of power relations. As claimed by Piven & Cloward (1979) in their seminal study on 
the Poor People’s Movements, collective actors at the margin of society can hardly exercise 
any credible threat to institutional routines (cf. della Porta 2008b). This is often the case 
for immigrants, who are more likely to be materially deprived, socially stigmatized, and 
devoid of voting rights. Their chances of producing political reverberations are meager. 
Undocumented immigrants, being the «excluded among the excluded» (Monforte & 
Dufour 2011: 204), are those having the most meagre chances of producing political re-
verberations. 
In the light of this weakness, influential supporters allow marginalized immigrants 
to mobilize «against all evident odds» (Steinhilper 2019: 574). As della Porta puts it, 
 
«[t]he difficulty in constructing resources for mobilization of ‘poor people’ has often 
been identified as accounting for the important role played by potential allies. Social 
movement organizations are often formed by committed activists who take up the 
concerns of social constituencies to which they do not belong […], but for which they 
act out of a sense of solidarity […]. Given the lack of material and symbolic resources 
of the precarious constituency, protests on related issues often require the support of 
broad networks of different social movement organizations […]» (della Porta 2018: 
11).  
 
‘Supporters’ or ‘allies’ may include institutional actors, social organizations, activ-
ists’ groups, and individuals that «become guardians of migrants’ rights and dignity» (Ha-
gan 2008: 84). They favor the transit, the settlement and/or the integration of newcomers 
by giving material and moral relief, while possibly advocating the expansion of their rights 
(Fontanari & Ambrosini 2018). In fact, migrants’ supporters tend to understand their hu-
manitarian actions as politically loaded (Zamponi 2018), and then to blur the boundaries 
between activism and volunteering (della Porta 2020). For this reason, although these alli-
ances may reproduce dynamics of ethnic subordination and be grounded on paternalistic 
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attitudes (e.g., Cappiali 2016), they are essential to allow immigrants’ self-determination as 
political subjects. 
In short, the political outcomes of pro-immigrant movements seem contingent 
upon the existence of a dense network of supporters—with the most decisive role played 
by local elected officials. Ideological affinity indeed galvanizes activists into crafting alli-
ances with institutional actors. But why should policy-makers be responsive and cooper-
ate? 
Relevant insights come from the literature on movement-party interactions. Some 
of these studies adopt an agenda-setting perspective to explain how issues are transmitted 
from protest to institutional politics (cf. Walgrave & Vliegenthart 2012). When competing 
with each other, political parties resort to issue emphasis, i.e. they can gain strategic ad-
vantages in the electoral arena by emphasizing some issues while disregarding others. Such 
dynamics also hold at the local level and are especially pronounced when it comes to mi-
gration-related issues (Castelli Gattinara 2016). Hence, for the sake of competition, parties 
can pick up the issues raised by a social movement so as to shape the institutional agenda 
in their own favor (Hutter & Vliegenthart 2018). 
Put differently, protest is a signal sent by large sectors of the electorate about ur-
gent societal problems they care about (ibid.: 360). Elites can embrace popular causes for 
electoral opportunism, i.e. playing the role of ‘tribunes of the people’, but also guided by 
a more substantial ideological commitment (Hutter et al. 2019). Also, responsiveness can 
help parties in power to recover from a crisis of legitimacy (Holdo 2016). If large and 
persistent, protest can even represent an electoral threat, especially when many protesters 
belong to the incumbents’ voter base. Precisely because they need support from above, 
social movements seek to profit from elites’ vulnerability, trying to be perceived as poten-
tially facilitating or disruptive for institutional goals (Amenta et al. 2010). 
These are the strategic considerations that drive activists and public officials in 
their mutual interactions. When ideologically sympathetic, these actors are incentivised to 
back each other up in enacting pro-migrant policies at the local level. From this angle, the 
concept of ‘municipal opportunity structure’ is especially fruitful to connect migration 
policy and social movement studies. It allows us to capture the role of local political leaders 
as coalition-builders and consensus-seekers while engaged in migration policy-making, as 
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well as the dynamics by which pro-immigrant activists can shape policy outcomes. What 
is missing, however, is a focus on multi-level governance, which is a defining feature of 
migration policy-making. The following section draws on urban studies to incorporate this 
perspective into the study of social movement outcomes. 
2.4 Urban perspectives on migration governance and social move-
ments 
Cities and pro-immigrant movements 
Social movements have gained importance in many fields of urban governance, especially 
since the withdrawal of the state from the sphere of social reproduction (cf. Castells 1983; 
Mayer 2003; della Porta & Subirats 2019). What is the nexus between pro-immigrant 
movements and the urban space? 
Urban scholars with a focus on contentious politics have convincingly demon-
strated how cities are the most favorable settings for the emergence of pro-migrant activ-
ism. Walter Nicholls is among the pioneers of this scholarship. In his study on Californian 
cities (Nicholls 2016), for instance, he points out that the specificities of the ‘urban’ facil-
itate the agency of undocumented immigrants. Politicization is a relational process to be 
sustained over time through resources that are far more abundant in large cities. Because 
of its dense population of individuals and organizations, the urban environment works as 
a catalyst for relationships, which eventually smooth the development of trust, solidarities, 
and collective identities. 
In other words, thanks to cities’ relational density, immigrants can develop a sense 
of groupness and, then, weave networks of allies that ultimately enhance the viability of 
their claims (see also Uitermark & Nicholls 2012; Nicholls & Uitermark 2016). In Nicholls’ 
own words, 
 
«[t]he density of people and organizations combines with the diversity of activist net-
works to make cities into unique spaces facilitating the transformation of stigmatized 
immigrants into robust political groups. The city becomes a strategic site for creating 
the levels of power needed to assert broad claims for equality. By becoming politicized 
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in the urban trenches, outcasts like undocumented immigrants can position them-
selves in larger fights for rights, recognition and equality» (Nicholls 2016: 300). 
 
Scholars adopting quantitative methodologies have also embraced space-sensitive ap-
proaches in the study of migration-related mobilizations. For example, Cebotari & Vink 
(2013) find that ethnic minorities engage in more intense forms of protest behavior when 
they are territorially compressed, as they benefit from «better intra-group communication 
and stronger feelings of in-group ‘we’ identity» (ibid.: 303; see also Huang & Liu 2018: 24). 
Hence, immigrants more easily develop a sense of belonging when settled in cities, 
as it is where they benefit from concrete chances for their economic, cultural, and political 
integration (Pratsinakis et al. 2017). Even in face of extremely hostile conditions, e.g. in 
terms of administrative status and social rights, immigrants are «de facto members of the 
community—they work in the city, pay local taxes, are homeowners, tenants, or landlords 
in the city, send their children to local schools, attend city churches, shop in the city, etc»  
(de Graauw 2014: 312). 
Through their everyday agency, immigrants produce frictions in the very social 
structure constraining them. Fontanari & Ambrosini (2018) refer to such autonomous 
spaces as ‘interstices’, i.e., blurry urban spaces at the intersection of European, national, 
and local jurisdictions, within which migrants and their allies can develop a political sub-
jectivity and, ultimately, mobilize against the hostile conditions they face. Urban interstices 
thus offer strategic opportunities for immigrant activism (see also Swerts 2017; Pascucci 
2017). Monforte & Dufour (2011)—in their studies on undocumented migrants in Berlin, 
Paris, and Montréal—similarly refer to ‘borderline citizenship regimes.’ In their account, 
immigrant activism originates from the interaction of contradictory forces. Migrants, while 
suffering from various layers of exclusion, are also able to react by creating some forms 
of leeway in their day-by-day lives. Mobilization thus emerge ‘at the border’ of such con-
comitant conditions. From this perspective, then, hostile power relations generate their 
own opposition. 
 What are the implications of these urban dynamics in terms of multi-level govern-
ance? Cities are sites of dense relational networks that articulate over multiple territorial 
scales, meaning that various tiers of government and spheres of power are conflated in 
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the urban environment. When migrants engage in alliance-building, they can exploit such 
a ‘fractal’ configuration of urban societies for transcending their immediate local context. 
As Margit Mayer puts it, «[c]ities are thus more than a mere backdrop, stage or container 
for social movements; rather, they can be seen as strategic sites for activating complex 
activist networks» (2018: 5). In other words, urban contentious politics transcends its local 
scope and enable «aggrieved local actors to transform the local arena into a major front in 
national immigration battles» (Nicholls et al. 2016: 3). Again, as Nicholls puts it, 
 
«[emerging groups] will need to target different geographical arenas, create support 
among broader publics and tap into a wider variety of resources to sustain longer, 
harder, riskier and more costly projects. ‘Scaling up’ political projects will likely moti-
vate a group to reach out to potential allies, build bridges and draw on the resources 
of their broader environment. Scaling up is therefore an intensive networking process 
characterized by building relations between actors in different geo-political worlds. 
Cities are strategic arenas for enabling these kinds of connections. […] Geographic 
proximity makes it easier to connect to and sustain relations with a plethora of differ-
ent organizations and groups […] The greater availability of real and potential contacts 
makes larger cities better suited to the geographical extension of the group beyond its 
original location of origin». (2016: 304-5) 
 
In short, thanks to the relational qualities of urban environments, pro-immigrant 
movements are encouraged to strategically expand their networks with the purpose of 
scaling up and out, i.e. targeting other geographical arenas (see also Nicholls & Uitermark 
2016). It should be noted that, while mechanisms of scale shift are not new in social move-
ment studies (e.g., McAdam et al. 2011: 331), an urban lens was missing in this realm. 
 
Urban politics and policy-making: Moving upstream 
Strikingly, such dynamics of upscaling are also emphasized by scholars of urban 
politics outside the perimeter of migration and social movement studies. Many of these 
contributions concern environmental policies—another sector heavily characterized by 
multiple scales of decision-making (cf. Rootes 2013; Verhoeven 2018). For instance, Sapo-
tichne & Jones (2012) account for the strategy enacted by a coalition of city mayors to 
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counter the decision of the then-President of the US, George W. Bush, not to ratify the 
UN Kyoto Protocol. Mayors’ immediate objective was the implementation of the Proto-
col’s goals (reduction of CO2 emissions) at the city-level. Yet this also activated a longer-
term dynamic of upscaling. In fact, 
 
«[…] city-level innovation sparked federal intervention, which then facilitated and cod-
ified urban policy change—a bottom-up-top-down process, if you will. As the issue 
of climate change gained in status, policy attention and activity cascaded across the US 
federal system, resulting both in substantial federal change as well as nontrivial trans-
formations in city-level institutions» (Sapotichne & Jones 2012: 444). 
 
Reviewing various empirical studies (e.g., Shipan & Volden 2006; Sapotichne & 
Smith 2012), the authors introduce the concept of ‘vertical venue-shopping’ (Sapotichne 
& Jones 2012: 454-5), meaning that political actors—specifically, governments and interest 
groups operating at various levels—can target higher/lower tiers of government to bypass 
unreceptive political environments. For example, city-level advocacy groups can opt to 
target local governments to address national issues, and vice versa. 
Otherwise put, multi-level governance also represents a political opportunity struc-
ture, having varying degrees of accessibility depending on the layer considered (cf. Princen 
& Kerremans 2008). Multivenue policy areas—i.e., policy sectors whose governance is 
dispersed across a variety of arenas and territorial scales—are the most favorable for policy 
entrepreneurs (Sapotichne & Smith 2012). Urban policy-makers facing unfavorable envi-
ronments can access alternative policy venues, within which new actors participate, new 
rules are adopted, and new policy images are promoted (Pralle 2003: 234). It follows, more 
broadly, that multi-level governance poses both constraints on, and opportunities for, po-
litical actors at the city-level (cf. Le Galès & Harding 1998; Le Galès & Vitale 2014). As 
Kübler & Pagano (2012) put it, 
 
«[c]ity governance cannot be understood within the confines of the political institu-
tions of a municipal government and the interplay of interest group pressures and 
political party posturing within city boundaries. […] City autonomy is thought of as a 
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form of agency that is structured both by legal rules (constitutional and financial de-
centralization) and political practice (the access of local elites to higher-level arenas) 
that shape urban politics and policy, not only by posing limits, but also by providing 
opportunities» (Kübler & Pagano 2012: 114). 
 
 This line of reasoning also confirms how urban social movements can upscale their 
mobilization, possibly producing policy outcomes beyond the boundaries of local politics. 
It should be noted, in fact, that venue-shopping is a tactical option normally followed by 
«policy losers, disadvantaged groups or outsiders» (Fischer et al. 2015: 315). Activists—
being ‘outsiders’ by definition—routinely resort to venue-shopping. As Pralle puts it, «ex-
amples of such behavior are numerous and hail from a variety of causes and campaigns – 
from the environmental, to civil rights, to anti-abortion movements» (Pralle 2003: 238). 
Appealing courts, international organizations, media outlets, or the public writ large can 
be ultimately regarded as instances of (vertical) venue-shopping. From this angle, policy 
areas whose governance is dispersed across multiple authorities and geographical scales 
are particularly advantageous for social movements, as they can more easily exploit alter-
native venues and veto points (cf. Kitschelt 1986). 
 In sum, urban studies point at the city as a political space that cannot be simply 
subsumed under the heading of ‘local politics.’ Its drivers, dynamics, and implications are 
far-reaching and distinctive in many respects. Urban actors—including policy-makers and 
social-movement activists—can exploit cities’ relational qualities to mold policies at vari-
ous levels of governance, far beyond the geographical boundaries of the city. As seen, 
these might be referred as mechanisms of upscaling that, from a policy perspective, consist 
in deliberate strategies of vertical venue-shopping. It is here contended that urban actors 
participating at migration policy arenas are likely to embrace similar strategies aimed at 
rescaling political conflicts. Ultimately, the outcomes that pro-immigrant social move-
ments can produce are thus contingent upon the availability of allies—especially in mu-
nicipal governments—as well as the institutional ecology around specific migration-related 
issues. The next section will theorize the plausibility of social movements outcomes based 
on such insights. 
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2.5 Theoretical framework: The arenas and mechanisms of contentious 
migration policies 
Setting contention in motion: Epistemological perspectives on arenas of interaction and causal mechanisms 
Structuralist perspectives have become increasingly contested in the scholarly debate, es-
pecially by those advocating a relational, strategic-interaction approach to social move-
ment studies and social sciences more broadly (cf. Jasper & Duyvendak 2015; Duyvendak 
& Jasper 2015; Jasper forthcoming). The POS theory is criticized for being overly deter-
ministic, as if mobilization is a mere product of objective conditions. This would lock 
analytical endeavors into a motionless picture. As Jasper puts it, 
 
«[i]t sometimes seems, in these theories, as if the structures impose such severe con-
straints on players that they do not have decisions to make. Although we do not want 
to deny external constraints, a strategic perspective helps us observe maneuvers within 
them. These constraints are imposed by the actions and reactions of other players. We 
must picture politics as a long sequence of interactions among many players, including 
but not confined to protestors and state players» (Jasper 2015: 16). 
 
Hence, a shift of perspective from static structures and agents toward situational arenas and 
players is advanced. 
From this angle, social movement outcomes do depend on opportunities and con-
straints, but not as driving forces in and of themselves. Rather, these are «reflexively and 
strategically used and played out in the interaction between challengers and targets» (Den 
Hond et al. 2014: 11; see also Chiarello 2013; Arce 2016). Activist groups, as well as their 
allies, targets, opponents, and third parties are fundamentally interdependent in their 
moves. Choices are made in anticipation of, and response to, those of the counterparts. 
Aims are not permanent, but constantly remodeled on the interpretation of past experi-
ences and future expectations. Arenas are the sites and frameworks within which these 
streams of interactions—including interchanges, communication, bargaining, and negoti-
ation—unfold (Alimi et al. 2015). 
The focus on arenas and players also help researcher to analyze movement out-
comes regardless of the intentions behind them, in so far as actual interactions, and not 
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only purposeful ones, produce social and political change (cf. Giugni 1998). When it comes 
to public policies, this means moving beyond the concept of ‘success’ as outlined by Gam-
son (1990). As Amenta et al. (2010) put it,  
 
«[c]hallengers may fail to achieve their stated program—and thus be deemed a fail-
ure—but still win substantial new advantages for their constituents, a situation likely 
for challengers with far-reaching goals […]. There may be beneficial unintended con-
sequences […]. Challengers can do worse than fail; they can induce backlashes, such 
as repression or increased policing […]. Challengers’ constituencies may gain political 
results that challengers do not cause […]».(Amenta et al. 2010: 290). 
 
The classic dichotomy of insiders and outsiders (Tilly 1978) is also interrogated. 
Interactions among players unfold within arenas whose boundaries are fuzzy, porous, and 
overlapped, thus there is no fixed, overarching context containing social movements (cf. 
Jasper 2015). Players themselves are far from monolithic. Usually they are more or less 
fluid compounds of sub-players, united under the banner of a ‘fictional’ identity. Activ-
ists—while perhaps addressing their demands to the state as a generic entity—ultimately 
interact with specific powerholders, such as members of the executive, police officials, and 
so on. Social movements usually do not address their demands to the state as a generic 
entity, but rather target specific authorities, such as members of the executive, the police, 
and so on. Therefore, ‘breaking down the state’ in components that are analytically rele-
vant is a crucial task (Duyvendak & Jasper 2015). Relatedly, players can be also regarded 
as arenas in their own right, where cooperation and conflict coexist.  
Strikingly, such an analytical move from (macro-institutional) structures to (policy) 
arenas has been undertaken also in the specific realm of migration studies. Specialist on migration 
have increasingly shifted their focus to the processual dimension of policies, so to unveil 
the underlying mechanisms of political struggle through which state and non-state actors 
interact with each other (e.g., Zincone & Caponio 2006). This implies the investigation of 
their strategic orientation in exerting an influence on the policy process. Recognizing the 
insufficiency of national legislative frameworks in providing analytical depth, Caponio 
(2010b) introduces the concept of ‘local migration policy arena’ to depict fields of policy-
making in which multiple actors mobilize around migration-related issues, including social 
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welfare, religious diversity, and citizenship. Fontanari & Ambrosini (2018) similarly refer 
to the concept of ‘battleground’ to describe how a vast array of actors at different territorial 
scales (e.g. public authorities, civil society organizations, migrants themselves) struggle to 
either restrict or expand the rights of (forced) migrants. 
Strategic-interaction approaches are often associated—epistemologically and 
methodologically—with mechanism-based research on contentious politics (for an exten-
sive discussion, see for example Alimi et al. 2015). This strand of literature is grounded on 
the path-breaking book ‘Dynamics of Contention’ (McAdam et al. 2001), as well as subsequent 
studies by its co-authors, who define mechanisms as «a delimited class of events that alter 
relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety 
of situations» (ibid.: 24). Mechanisms thus enact causal relationships, and produce change, 
within a given arena of interaction. Also, they are recurrent, that is to say, they manifest 
and combine in a regular fashion across under various, different circumstances. McAdam 
et al. (2001: 25-26) distinguish between environmental (e.g., economic shocks), cognitive 
(e.g., legitimation), and relational (e.g., brokerage) mechanisms. Although individual mech-
anisms are driving forces in and of themselves, they are mutually reinforcing and tend to 
concatenate with one another along causal sequences, hence constituting a process. Epi-
sodes of contention—including campaigns, strikes, revolutions, wars, and other forms of 
political struggle—involve a multiplicity of these processes. 
Because of their focus on tracing causal processes, mechanism-based approaches 
have been productively applied to study the political (and policy) outcomes of social move-
ments (e.g., Kolb 2007; Andrews 2001)—possibly representing «the major progress in the 
field» (Bosi et al., 2016: 12). Accordingly, I follow this trajectory to theorize how and under 
what conditions pro-immigrant social movements exert their influence on local migration 
policy-making, i.e., to unveil the mechanisms connecting movement action to political 
outcomes. I define these processes as contentious migration policies, as the next section 
will show in detail. Strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approaches appear espe-
cially promising in the light of their analytical flexibility. In fact, «[m]echanisms and pro-
cesses form a continuum» (McAdam et al. 2001: 27), meaning that the researcher estab-
lishes the boundaries between them. Yet, these choices will be grounded on the most 
prominent contributions in the field of migration, social movement, and urban studies. 
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The arenas and mechanisms of contentious migration policies 
Drawing on the literature reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter, and siding with 
strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approaches to contentious politics, here I pro-
pose a comprehensive framework for studying the outcomes of social movements in the 
field of local migration policy-making. The concept of contentious migration policies is intro-
duced to disclose the black box linking mobilization to policy change. 
In general terms, policies can be described as «authoritative lines of action in which 
states provide goods, protections, and freedoms recurrently to specified groups in a rou-
tine fashion to all those meeting specified requirements» (Amenta et al. 2019: 452). Activist 
groups are among the several of subjects that may have an interest at stake in, and seeking 
to influence, these outcomes, which of course are not under their direct control. Conflicts 
among those bearing competing interests are more likely to surface when policies are of a 
redistributive nature—as in the case of immigrant integration programs—because they 
divert resources from certain groups for the sake of allocating them to others (Lowi 1972). 
Adversarial and ideologically-driven interaction tend to prevail in these policy arenas (Au-
rich-Beerheide et al. 2015: 3). Also, migration can be regarded as an intractable policy con-
troversy (Schön & Rein 1994) in as much as actors fundamentally disagree on the very 
issue at stake (Scholten 2013). 
The contentious politics framework allow us to capture these conflictual dynamics 
in migration policy arenas, as well as to avoid a perspective solely focused on social move-
ments, i.e., by considering broader patterns of interaction between claim-makers, elites, 
opponents, and the state (Ataç et al. 2016: 536).5 Simultaneously, the framework does not 
prevent use to scrutinize more routinized, less conflictual institutional dynamics, in so far 
as the idea of contentious politics 
 
«challenge[s] the boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics. 
[…] [T]he study of politics has too long reified the boundary between official, pre-
scribed politics and politics by other means. As an unfortunate consequence, analysts 
                                                 
5 By contentious politics, McAdam et al. (2001: 5) mean «episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and 
their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims 
would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants». 
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have neglected or misunderstood both the parallels and the interactions between the 
two». (McAdam et al. 2001: 6). 
 
In the remaining of this section, I will design three concentric arenas of interactions 
deemed relevant for the occurrence of social movement outcomes in the field of local 
migration policy-making, i.e., the civil society arena, the city politics arena, and the multi-level 
governance arena. Each of these tend to correspond to a specific causal mechanism, i.e., 
brokerage, alliance-building, and upscaling, respectively. Despite their position of relative 
weakness position vis-à-vis other players in the arenas, social movements can create a stra-
tegic leverage by means of these mechanisms, which reinforce and concatenate with one 
another (Bosi et al. 2016: 12). The mechanisms under scrutiny thus operate and yield their 
influence at the meso-level, i.e., they entail interactions among groups/organizations 
(Alimi et al. 2016). 
 
(1) The civil society arena 
This arena is populated by the vast array of non-state players at the city-level bear-
ing an interest in the expansion of immigrant rights. These include, first of all, immigrants 
themselves. Everyday city life provides them with assorted opportunities to build inter-
ethnic ties (Pratsinakis et al. 2017) and be acknowledged as legitimate community members 
(Varsanyi 2006; de Graauw 2014). These opportunities are also of a political nature. The 
peculiar qualities of urban spaces—notably, the availability of dense relational networks 
extended over an array of geographical scales—allow them to create bonds of solidarity, 
craft alliances, and ultimately turn into vocal political subjects (Nicholls 2008; 2016). Their 
supporters thus play a decisive role in smoothing such processes of politicization. These 
include structured organizations (e.g., unions, faith-based associations), radical move-
ments, spontaneous initiatives, and individuals (Fontanari & Ambrosini, 2018: 591).  
Hence, the emergence of a vocal pro-immigrant movement that seeks to pose a 
sustained challenge to powerholders is heavily based on the mechanism of brokerage, that 
is, «the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates 
their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites» (McAdam et al. 2001: 26; cf. 
Steil & Vasi 2014: 1143). While this mechanism is the bread and butter of any collective 
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action, it appears essential in the case of immigrant activists, who can hope to surpass their 
own marginality by building bridges with more influential, often native-born allies acting 
out of a sense of solidarity (della Porta 2018: 11). In various, contradictory ways, these 
civil society actors give immigrants material and moral relief, while possibly advocating 
and legitimizing their aspirations in the political agenda (e.g., Zamponi 2018). Particularly 
important is the role of NGOs that, over the last decade, have hybridized with social 
movements in terms of repertoires of action (e.g., participation in protest campaigns) and 
organizational forms (e.g., overlapping membership, cf. della Porta 2020). 
As a result, pro-immigrant movements are far from monolithic. They consists of 
constellations of heterogenous players, held together by a common commitment. By the 
same token, mobilizations by and in solidarity with immigrants are caught in a plethora of 
dilemmas and trade-offs. Aside from internal conflicts that are recurrent in activist cir-
cles—such as feuds between moderates and radicals6—they also suffer from more specific 
fragilities. Very typical is the Powerful Allies dilemma, which arises «when protest groups 
make some kind of connection with another player but often find that the other player 
twists them to its own ends rather than helping the protestors attain their own» (Jasper 
2015: 20). These power asymmetries are closely linked to race and ethnicity, with well-
resourced native organizations eager to ‘crowd out’ those led by immigrants (e.g., Caponio 
2005). Conflictual dynamics thus make pro-immigrant mobilizations intrinsically flimsy 
and volatile. A favorable political environment at the city-level, however, may represent a 
powerful incentive for even the most reluctant activist to coalesce in a common platform. 
These forces unfold in what I refer to as the ‘city politics arena.’ 
 
(2) The city politics arena 
 This arena contains the manifold urban players with a stake in migration-related 
urban affairs. Aside from those in the civil society arena, particularly important here are 
institutional actors—namely elected officials in the city hall, civil servants, and political 
                                                 
6 As brokerage mechanisms normally require the crafting of univocal frames and demands to be broadcasted to third parties 
(Alimi et al. 2015), pro-immigrant movements are likely to face internal struggles between advocates of ‘humanitarianism’ and 
those pushing for more antagonistic discourses (e.g., Fleischmann and Steinhilper 2017). 
 43 
parties—, but also anti-immigration groups, the media, and the electorate writ large. Insti-
tutional politics has a significant impact on social movement dynamics (e.g., Kitschelt 
1986; della Porta & Rucht 1991; Kriesi et al. 1995), including the realization of successful 
and meaningful outcomes (e.g., Soule & King 2006). Relatedly, immigrant integration pol-
icies are normally crafted through intense, meticulous processes of consensus-building, 
which can only thrive in a propitious political environment. Civil society groups need to 
build ties with sympathetic political elites who, in turn, are well positioned to find «the 
support of native-born elites […] and to overcome skepticism among native-born voters» 
(Steil & Vasi 2014: 1143; see also de Graauw & Vermeulen 2016). 
 Hence, the key mechanism enabling pro-immigrant activists to affect the political 
process is alliance-building, which can be described as «the creation of new, visible, and direct 
coordination of claims between two or more previously distinct actors» (Alimi et al. 2015: 
8). Political entrepreneurs have to crystalize the manifold magmatic forces in support of 
immigrants that gurgle within the urban political realm, clustering them in a potent—albeit 
variably unstable and internally contested—alliance. After all, urban governance is a pro-
cess of coordination among state and non-state actors in fragmented and uncertain envi-
ronments (Borraz & Le Galès 2010). 
Activists can engage in alliance-building on the grounds of various strategic lever-
ages. These lie, first of all, in the realm of party politics. Political parties compete in (local) 
elections (de-)emphasizing a variety of issues—including immigration (Castelli Gattinara 
2016). Left-leaning parties can thus embrace the cause of pro-immigrant advocates for the 
sake of galvanizing their egalitarian constituencies (cf. Hutter et al., 2019; Hutter & 
Vliegenthart 2018). These considerations resonate with the political mediation argument 
(Amenta et al. 2010), according to which social movements seek to affect politics by alter-
ing elites’ calculation, i.e., trying to be perceived as potentially facilitating or disruptive for 
institutional goals. Beside these ideologically-driven relationships with political parties, ac-
tivists can exert an influence on municipal bureaucrats, too. These latter can capitalize on 
their discretionary powers so as to craft policies in support of immigrants (de Graauw 
2014). For this purpose, non-state actors provide indispensable and otherwise unavailable 
resources, such as knowledge of social problems ‘on the ground’, organizational flexibility 
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in the midst of humanitarian emergencies, and legitimacy among policy target groups (e.g., 
Caponio 2010a; Mayer 2018; Rast et al. 2019; Kaufmann 2019). 
 Once again, these strategic interactions are subject to significant limits and contra-
dictions. Most notably, at the root of the struggle for immigrant rights is the refusal of 
nationally-bounded definitions of citizenship; yet, state players are also the ultimate target 
of demand-makers, who urge public officials to at least partly accommodate their claims 
(e.g., Darling & Bauder 2019: 13). Social movements may be torn between, on the one 
hand, their reform-oriented components—which will seek to gain some, perhaps marginal 
rewards by working within the system—and on the other hand their more identity-ori-
ented or militant sections. Moreover, movement influence is normally indirect and con-
tingent upon the commitment of unreliable allies. In his seminal study on the rent strike 
movement in New York City, Lipsky (1970) warn about what he defines as the ‘problem 
of the powerless’, which is «to activate third parties to enter the […] bargaining arena in 
ways favorable to protesters» (ibid.: 2, italics in original).7  
 These insights resonate with scholarly contributions on party-movement interac-
tions. Parties in power tend to move toward the center in order to appeal to the median 
voter and this can disappoint the activist base that had supported them in the first place  
(Hutter et al. 2019). In this vein, McAdam & Tarrow point out that, 
 
«[a]t first blush, the mobilized power of the movement ‘wing’ of an ascendant party 
would seem to be a wholly positive factor for those newly elected. And properly man-
aged, the presence of mobilized movement supporters can aid and abet a party in 
power. […] But there is an inherent tension between the logic of movement activism 
and the logic of electoral politics that, at times, has compromised the ability of incum-
bent parties to retain power. Electoral politics turns on a centrist, coalitional logic. 
Movements, on the other hand, tend toward narrow—sometimes extremist—views 
and an uncompromising commitment to single issues» (McAdam & Tarrow 2010: 
537). 
 
                                                 
7 More precisely, with third parties Lipsky refers to «the reference publics of protest targets» (Lipsky 1970: 2, italics in original). 
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Lastly, another limit is related to immigration politics. Even if the commitment to pro-
immigration stances seems convenient from a strategic point of view, left-leaning parties 
are often eager to chase their far-right challengers in the (often unsuccessful) attempt of 
neutralizing them (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018). 
 
 
(3) The multi-level governance arena  
This arena consists of the vast battleground in which players at different territorial 
scales (e.g., public authorities, civil society organizations, immigrants themselves) struggle 
to either restrict or expand immigrant rights (e.g., Caponio & Jones-Correa 2018; Fon-
tanari & Ambrosini 2018). Those mobilized in the civil society and the city politics arenas 
interact in the multi-level governance arena, too. The apparatus of the central state play a 
dominant role here, as it reclaims a ‘natural’ monopoly in controlling immigration and 
regulating citizenship (Varsanyi 2006; Prak 2018). Within this framework, constitutionally 
subservient local governments are only allowed to bear responsibility in integration policy-
making (Penninx et al. 2004; Spencer 2018), i.e., to entitle foreign-born residents with civil, 
political, and social rights once admitted in a national polity (cf. Hammar 1985). Immigrant 
rights are, in fact, most often stratified by and dependent on residency status as established 
under national jurisdictions (Bolderson 2011).8 Yet, cities also proved fertile breeding 
ground in stretching, countering, or circumventing such limitations. 
The key mechanism through which social movements can interfere with the multi-
level governance of immigration is upscaling. McAdam et al. (2001) describe scale shift as a 
«change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader 
contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities» (ibid.: 
331). I here refine this notion by drawing on the literature on urban politics, which points 
out how the relational density of cities allow urban actors to shape the public agenda and 
access policy arenas at various spatial scales, far beyond their immediate local realms (cf. 
Bazurli 2020). Again, while upscaling is a recurrent mechanism in processes of movement 
diffusion, they are all the more important in the case of pro-immigrant movements, which 
                                                 
8 This governance regime ultimately produces what Castles defines as a ‘hierarchy of citizenship’ (2007). 
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can «transform the local arena into a major front in national immigration battles» (Nicholls 
et al. 2016: 3). Institutional actors at the city-level, too, can surpass the limits of local poli-
tics through mechanisms of upscaling, notably through strategies of vertical venue-shop-
ping for bypassing unreceptive political environments (Sapotichne & Jones 2012: 454-5). 
To put it a nutshell, «[a]ll politics is local, but it can have very broad consequences» (Jasper 
forthcoming: 12). 
Particularly important here is the possibility for social movements and local gov-
ernments to activate upscaling mechanisms in tandem, i.e., by mobilizing as an unitary player 
(an ‘urban alliance’) that targets external players, such as supra-local institutions. These 
dynamics are well-captured by the concept of governmental activism, which refers to «gov-
ernmental players joining forces with non-governmental players in contentious actions 
against policies they want to prevent or redress» (Verhoeven & Duyvendak, 2017: 564). In 
such cooperative dynamics, partners engage in a «division of oppositional labor» (ibid.: 
567), meaning that they back each other up by combining their respective political exper-
tise. Notably, the concept of governmental activism breaks down the state into multiple 
governmental players (cf. Duyvendak & Jasper, 2015). 
As most of strategic options, governmental activism poses dilemmas for the play-
ers involved. On the one hand, governmental players are part of institutional arrangements 
that set the scope of what they can legitimately do. On the other hand, social-movement 
activists are not submitted to such institutional rationales. They are committed to a single 
issue and have greater rooms for maneuver in elaborating their strategy (Verhoeven & 
Bröer 2015), e.g., opting for civil disobedience. Otherwise put, the benefits of standing 
together inevitably come at some costs. There is an fundamental gulf between allies inside 
and outside institutions or, as Mair (2009) put it, an incompatibility between responsive-
ness and responsibility—between what governments are ‘asked’ to do by citizens and what 
governments are ‘obliged’ to do by external circumstances. 
 
Social movement outcomes, responsiveness, and policy change 
 It is here argued that the policy outcomes of pro-immigrant movements originate 
from the arenas and through the mechanisms outlined above. While such arenas and their 
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corresponding mechanisms have been distinguished from one another for analytical pur-
poses, they tend to deploy their causal efficacy unitedly, like notes of the same ‘musical 
chord.’ The three arenas of interaction are concentric, that is to say, they can be visualized 
as circles having different diameters but the same center. Players of the civil society arena 
interact in the city politics arena, whose players, in turn, interact in the multi-level govern-
ance arena. Also, the mechanisms of brokerage, alliance-building, and upscaling tend to 
concatenate, to be mutually reinforcing, and to recur in similar fashions across different 
sites of interaction. The emergence of meaningful outcomes relies on these concur-
rences—although variations in the intensity of a single mechanism and in the patterns of 
combination are commonplace. Figure 2.1 displays the overall theoretical framework of 
this study. 
 
Figure 2.1. Theoretical framework to study the policy outcomes of pro-immigrant social movements 
 
 
It can be hypothesized, for example, that players in the civil society arena intensify 
cooperative exchanges in face of a favorable shift in the city-political environment, such 
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as the electoral victory of a left-leaning coalition, thus precipitating mobilization on the 
ground of social ties that were already existent but inoperative until that moment (broker-
age). Galvanized by the prospect of affecting policy-making, this revamped social move-
ment will seek to build alliances with local political elites, such as ideologically sympathetic 
office-holders and political parties (alliance-building). While bearing different interests, these 
urban players may craft a united front aimed at opposing what they see as a common 
threat from the side of national policy-makers, such as a tightening of immigration policies, 
for instance by seeking to access alternative policy venues at the transnational level (upscal-
ing). This sequence of interaction ultimately allow social movements to influence policy-
making at various levels and in ways that are favorable to their constituencies. Importantly, 
these mechanisms and their combination can also work in reverse, thus explaining the lack 
of movement success or the production of ‘collective bads’ and losses, such as repression 
and policy setbacks (Amenta et al. 2019: 451). 
 Social movement outcomes can be studied in terms of responsiveness—which is then 
the ‘dependent variable’ of interest. Responsiveness can be defined as «the relationship 
between the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest group and the corre-
sponding actions of the political system which is the target of the protest-group demands» 
(Schumaker 1975: 494; see also Bosi et al. 2016: 14-5). The focus on responsiveness implies 
an in-depth examination of the targets of social movements, namely state authorities, with 
the purpose of understanding to what extent policy-makers are influenced by demand-mak-
ers. This analytical effort is particularly relevant because responsiveness (and the lack 
thereof) is likely to reshape opportunities and constraints for mobilization over time.  
 In order to develop a fine-grained analysis of social movement outcomes, it is nec-
essary to drawn on insights from migration and policy studies. First, attention is paid to 
the policy decisions adopted by the local government. Consistently with the research by 
Caponio (2010a) on migration policy in Italian cities, the aspects to be investigated are: (1) 
the official priorities; (2) their inherent frames, in order to assess if immigration is priori-
tized as either a resource or a problem; (3) the amount of financial resources earmarked, 
i.e. the public expenditure per resident immigrant and the share of social spending allo-
cated for immigrants’ integration; (4)  the source of financing, i.e. whether the policies are 
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financed by the municipal administration through its internal resources or by supra-local 
authorities that entrust the local ones with the process of implementation. 
 In addition, a more fine-grained assessment is carried out on the basis of the 
MIPEX Project (Huddleston et al. 2015), which compares immigrants’ integration across 
EU countries through synthetic benchmarks concerning national laws and policies. Such 
indicators are here adapted for the analysis of local policies, with respect to both official 
policy decisions and actual practices of implementation. Specifically, municipal welfare 
services are analyzed according to the following criteria: 
 
 Eligibility. It refers to the groups that are entitled with social benefits (i.e. permanent 
residents, residents on temporary work permits, residents on family reunion permits, 
asylum-seekers, and undocumented migrants), as well as the kind of coverage they are 
provided with (e.g. special guidelines and exemptions). 
 Access. The entitled groups can experience varying degrees of access depending on the 
support provided by public authorities. Targeted measures can be adopted to increase 
the effective delivery of services. Examples include financial support, campaigns, ori-
entation centers, administrative discretion and documentation, translations and cul-
tural mediation, training of the administrative staff, collection of data on migrants’ 
condition.9 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter was aimed at theorizing how and under what conditions social movements 
can produce outcomes in local migration policy-making—a research field that has been 
lagging behind. Migration studies, social movement studies, and urban studies shed light 
on multiple aspects that are crucial for this analytical endeavor. Yet, these insights need to 
be combined in a systematic, coherent fashion. Bridging these distinct but overlapped 
                                                 
9 A concrete example is the access to pre-primary education and compulsory education (cf. Huddleston et al. 2015: 30). The 
support to access provided by the state can consists in targeted measures for both increasing the participation of migrant pu-
pils (e.g. financial support, campaigns) and their successful completion of compulsory education (e.g. early school leaving / 
second chance programs). 
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strands of literature, the chapter developed an original theoretical framework for studying 
the phenomenon under scrutiny. 
 Migration studies point at migration policy as a matter of multi-level governance. 
In the EU, nation-states bear the lion’s share of immigration policies, i.e., those regulating 
the conditions for being admitted in their own territory. Power is instead more dispersed 
in the case of immigrant policies, i.e., those aimed at immigrants’ integration once admitted 
in a national territory. More precisely, local governments are legally subservient to nation-
states, but still enjoy large rooms to maneuver in autonomously crafting immigrant policies 
according to their vision and interests. Both local authorities and civil society organizations 
are pivotal players in these policy processes. As these local actors are sometimes able to 
interfere with nationally-defined citizenship regimes, conflicts across government tiers are 
likely to surface—ultimately making the multi-level governance of migration a contested 
realm. 
 Social movement studies show how pro-migrant activism is heavily dependent on 
the commitment of influential allies, often belonging to native-born social majorities. The 
configuration of power in local government is crucial for such processes of alliance-build-
ing. Mobilizations aimed at expanding migrant rights are more likely to succeed in influ-
encing policy-making when local powerholders are ideologically sympathetic to such de-
mands. On the one hand, social movements need these institutional allies to make their 
aspirations visible and legitimate in the political agenda. On the other hand, local political 
elites need the support of grassroot movements for crafting pro-immigrant policies, as 
they can provide indispensable political and cognitive resources. In short, when ideologi-
cally sympathetic, local officials and activists are incentivized to back each other up in 
enacting pro-immigrant policies at the local level. Social movement studies, however, over-
looks how these cooperative dynamics unfold in contexts of multi-level governance. 
 Urban studies underline the strategic character of cities for political agency. Capi-
talizing on the peculiar qualities of urban politics—namely, the availability of dense rela-
tional networks extended over an array of geographical scale—both municipalities and 
social movements are able to shape the public agenda and access policy arenas at various 
spatial scales. These rooms for maneuver are especially large in policy areas whose gov-
ernance is dispersed across multiple sites of authority, because urban political actors can 
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strategically upscale their mobilization and influence decision-making through ‘vertical 
venue-shopping.’ This implies, more broadly, that urban policy-making cannot be simply 
subsumed under the heading of policy-making with a local scope. The consequences of 
political agency at the city-level ultimately unfold far beyond the immediate local realms 
in which urban actors are embedded. 
 Based on these insights and siding with strategic-interaction and mechanism-based 
approaches to contentious politics, the chapter presented a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for studying the outcomes of social movements in the field of local migration 
policy-making. The concept of contentious migration policies was introduced to disclose the 
black box linking mobilization to policy change. Three concentric arenas are deemed rel-
evant for the occurrence of movement outcomes, i.e., the civil society arena, the city politics 
arena, and the multi-level governance arena. Each of these tend to correspond to a specific 
causal mechanism, i.e., brokerage, alliance-building, and upscaling, respectively. Despite 
their position of relative weakness position vis-à-vis other players in the arenas, social 
movements can create a strategic leverage by means of these mechanisms, which reinforce 
and concatenate with one another. In the next chapters this theoretical framework will be 





Methods: How to study migration policies 




«A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
the study is—at least in part—to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)». 





This chapter draws on seminal contributions in the field of social science methodology for laying 
the methodological foundations of the research project. In the next section (Section 3.2), the 
research design and the rationale behind case selection are presented. Contentious migration 
policies will be compared across two large South European cities—Milan and Barcelona. To 
justify this strategy for case selection, similarities and dissimilarities across relevant dimensions 
will be assessed in detail. Subsequently, Section 3.3 presents the sources, the methods, and the 
techniques used in thid study. Data draw on extensive fieldwork conducted in Milan and Barce-
lona in 2017-19 and entailing 57 semi-structured interviews with public officials, social move-
ment spokespersons, other relevant civil society actors, and experts. Interviews have been sub-
ject to comparative qualitative analysis and triangulated with other sources, namely policy docu-
ments, movement releases, media outlets, official statistics, and the secondary literature. 
3.2 Research design and case selection 
The theoretical arguments of this dissertation will be explored through case study research, 
which entails the rich and holistic description of a few instances of a social phenomenon (della 
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Porta 2008a). Thanks to this research method, the causal pathway connecting mobilization and 
policy change can be scrutinized in-depth, according to a plausible fashion (Gerring 2007). More-
over, the processes under investigation will be traced and compared through a mechanism-based 
research strategy (e.g. Alimi et al. 2015). The ‘episodes-processes-mechanisms’ approach to the 
study of contentious politics is, in fact, inherently tied to case study research (McAdam et al. 
2001). Ultimately, this kind of ‘black-box investigation’ is effective for carefully assessing the 
relative importance of intermediate variables and reducing the risk of spurious explanations, i.e., 
mistaking correlation for causation (Héritier 2008). This would eventually ensure external valid-
ity, that is to say, the elaboration of research findings holding beyond the immediate contexts of 
investigation.  
Migration policies enacted in the Italian city of Milan and in the Spanish city of Barcelona 
are selected as units for an intensive comparative analysis. Cross-city and cross-country compar-
ative efforts in the study of migration policy are challenging and rare, but still very promising 
and realizable through the control of crucial dimensions across different contexts (Caponio & 
Borkert 2010). Such endeavors are included also in the research agenda of urban scholars, who 
argue that the institutional frameworks of South European countries is favorable for implement-
ing comparisons across cities located in this geographical area (cf. Sapotichne & Jones 2012: 19). 
The Italian and Spanish contexts are similar in many respects that are relevant for the 
comparative study of local government, such as the recent authoritarian past and the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition (Lidström 1998). Both the countries have a ‘Southern Model’ of welfare 
systems, i.e., a state corporatist model in pensions, unemployment, and labor market policies, a 
universalistic model in education and health, and very limited provisions when it comes to social 
assistance, social care, and family support (Ferrera 1996; León & Pavolini 2014; Petmesidou & 
Guillén 2017). The institutional trends of decentralization, fragmentation, social spending re-
trenchment have further strengthen such elements of convergence (Catalano et al. 2015; Andre-
otti & Mingione 2014; Bifulco 2016; Pavolini et al. 2015). Relatedly, because of the austerity 
measures implemented during the Great Recession, the expenditure capacity of local institutions 
has been sensibly compressed, with an increasing pressure for providing public services in a 
context of shrinking resources. 
As for immigration, Italy and Spain are areas of recent settlement that have traditionally 
experienced emigration, as well as the inversion of this trend since the 1980s, when the first 
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relevant waves of foreign migration occurred. The most powerful ‘pull’ factors have been their 
geographical location, the shortage of labor force, and the initial absence of national legislations 
on immigration (e.g., Zincone 2011; González-Enríquez 2009; King et al. 1997). The two coun-
tries have thus faced similar structural changes in terms of rapid and numerous arrivals, especially 
from the Middle East and northern Africa. 
In both the countries, such structural transformations resulted in a regulatory model that 
is likely to produce undocumented immigration, in a pendulum between restrictive policies (e.g., 
residence permits are increasingly conditional on immigrants’ employment status) and frequent 
mass regularizations (e.g. Caponio & Graziano 2011; Castelli Gattinara 2016; Zincone 2011; 
González-Enríquez 2009). Such weak planning capacities and the logic of emergency that often 
permeates policy-making have put local actors at the forefront in handling immigration. This has 
generated a long-lasting legacy in migration governance, as municipalities and civil society or-
ganizations still bear the lion’s share. 
The two countries are different from a macro-institutional perspective. On the one hand, 
Italy is a relatively centralized country that, however, undertook relevant processes of decentral-
ization and institutional re-arrangement from the 1970s onwards. In the 1990s, moreover, major 
reforms10 attributed an increased fiscal and decisional autonomy to municipalities (Cotta & Ver-
zichelli 2007; Bobbio 2005). On the other hand, Spain has a decentralized structure, character-
ized by asymmetric regionalism, i.e., regions have diverse degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis the cen-
tral government. 
Aside from these general differences, similarities exist in the division of competences 
among government tiers with specific regard to immigration. The central states are almost fully re-
sponsible for immigration policy and international protection, while immigrants’ integration is 
generally planned and financed by regions, and eventually formulated and implemented at the 
municipal level (Campomori & Caponio 2017; Zincone 2011; i Cudolà 2004; Bruquetas-Callejo 
et al. 2011). As Cappiali & Triviño-Salazar point out, «Italy and Spain are two important cases 
because their high degree of decentralization leaves to the sub-national level ample attributions 
on the reception and accommodation of immigrants» (2018: 13). 
                                                 
10 Law 142/1990 and Law 81/1993 are the most important institutional reforms in this respect. 
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Within this framework, Milan and Barcelona are particularly suitable for a comparative 
investigation, being similar in terms of demography, economy, and society (key figures are sum-
marized in Table 3.1). Milan is the capital of the Lombardy region and the second largest Italian 
municipality. Its economy is strongly based on finance, fashion, and high-tech. Since the 1970s, 
the transition to the service economy went hand in hand with a rapid growth of the foreign 
population. Integration policies have been enacted since the outset of these waves of migration. 
Barcelona, capital of the Autonomous Region of Catalunya, is also the second largest city in 
Spain. Logistics, ICT, real estate, and tourism have been the sectors in greatest expansion in 
recent decades. Foreign immigration rose since the 1990s. Barcelona and Catalunya have an 
enduring legacy of integration policies and are deemed pioneers even beyond the Spanish con-
text. While affluent, the two cities experienced severe social inequalities, especially during the 
Great Recession (cf. Caponio 2014; Garces-Mascareñas 2014). 
 
Table 3.1. Socio-economic indicators of Milan and Barcelona 
 Milan Barcelona 
Population (2017) 1,380,873 1,620,809 
Foreign-born as a proportion of population (2017) 19.3% 17.6% 
GDP per capita in US$, metropolitan area (2015) 51,768 45,752 
Share of the GDP per capita (metropolitan area) 
over the national value (2015) 
156.1% 143.9% 
Population data are drawn from respective local government statistics; GDP data are drawn from OECD Regional Statistics. 
 
In terms of institutional politics, the two cities experienced relevant changes over the last 
decades. From 1993 to 2011, Milan was governed by a center-right coalition that also included 
the anti-immigrant party of the LN (Lega Nord – Northern League). Since 2011, instead, the 
local government has been led by a center-left coalition with the PD (Partito Democratico – 
Democratic Party) as the main partner. Giuliano Pisapia—city mayor from 2011 to 2016—has 
a biography rooted in leftist militancy. During his legal career he has defended many activists 
and, in 1996-2006, he served as a member of the Italian Parliament for PRC (Partito della Ri-
fondazione Comunista – Communist Refoundation Party). Large sectors of Milan’s activist or-
ganizations—ranging from progressive Christians to leftist welfare associations—supported 
Pisapia’s candidacy for mayor. Yet he won the center-left primaries and local elections as an 
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‘outsider.’ His victory was especially disruptive due to the long-standing hegemony of the Mil-
anese center-right. Migration-related issues have been among the thorniest ones during the 2011 
local electoral campaign (Castelli Gattinara 2016). Beppe Sala succeeded Pisapia in 2016. While 
having a softer leftist profile than his predecessor, Sala’s government expressed a substantial 
continuity in terms of its political personnel and agenda (Pasini & Regalia 2016).    
Remarkable shifts in local politics occurred in Barcelona, too. The first municipal elec-
tions in 1979 saw the beginning of an enduring engagement between urban movements and city 
governance. The PSC-PSOE (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya – Socialists’ Party of Catalonia), 
which uninterruptedly ruled the city until 2011, consolidated its hegemony by answering de-
mands coming from neighborhood committees—especially through the expansion of welfare 
provision and the establishment of democratic forms of policy-making. Yet this model of gov-
ernance—commonly referred to as ‘Barcelona Model’ (Blanco 2009)—gradually eroded. While 
Barcelona was emerging as a leading global city, the movements’ ties with municipal power 
weakened and eventually vanished in 2011, when the conservative CiU (Convergència i Unió – 
Convergence and Union) took over city hall. 
However, activists soon stepped back into institutional politics. Since 2015, Barcelona’s 
government has been ruled by BeC (Barcelona en Comú – Barcelona in Common), a platform 
born in 2014 upon the initiative of a small group of activists and intellectuals. It drew in sections 
of Barcelona’s social movements, mobilized around multiple issues, and crafted its policy agenda 
through a sustained process of participation (Eizaguirre et al. 2017). Left-wing parties, including 
Podemos (We Can), also joined the coalition. In the 2015 municipal elections, BeC obtained the 
biggest share of votes (25 per cent) and started ruling in a minority government (Rodon & Hierro 
2016). Ada Colau, spokesperson of the Spanish housing movement, became the city mayor 
(Blanco et al. 2019; Flesher Fominaya 2015).11 
This outcome has to be interpreted in the light of the 15M/Indignados movement, which 
emerged in 2011 and inspired similar ‘square movements’ worldwide such as Occupy Wall Street. 
Amid economic crisis and austerity, the 15M protesters demanded a deepening of democracy 
                                                 
11 This quite unique movement-party experiment is particularly relevant for the purposes of this research. To describe this local ad-
ministration, it is worth resorting to the categories of ‘institutional activists’, i.e., social movement actors having access to institutional 
power and resources and taking advantage of their positions to promote the fulfilment of movement demands (Pettinicchio 2012; 
Wald and Corey 2002; Santoro and McGuire 1997), and ‘governmental activism’, i.e., «governmental players joining forces with non-
governmental players in contentious actions against policies they want to prevent or redress» (Verhoeven and Duyvendak, 2017: 564). 
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and social justice while pointing an accusing finger at political and economic elites. The great 
intensity of Spanish anti-austerity mobilizations was mirrored in the crisis of the established party 
system, smoothing the rise of new parties (della Porta et al. 2017). On the left, this space was 
subsequently occupied by Podemos. BeC was founded precisely to funnel the aspirations of 
urban social movements into the electoral arena. As for immigration, BeC electoral program has 
been characterized by radical stances, such as the equal treatment of every resident regardless of 
their administrative status. 
Overall, this strategy for case selection allows us to hold constant numerous contextual 
factors at both the country-level (e.g., welfare systems, immigration patterns, models of migra-
tion governance) and the city-level (i.e., urban demography, economy, and society). Simultane-
ously, variations can be observed with respect to the realms of migration policy-making. Under 
the leadership of mainstream and far-right parties, Milan’s administration enacted assorted ex-
clusionary policies to criminalize sections of the immigrant populations and exclude them from 
various rights and benefits. Once in office, center-left parties dismantled most of these law-and-
order provisions. Moreover, amid the 2010s ‘refugee crisis’, the new administration also engaged 
with asylum policy-making, which became one of the hallmarks of Milan’s local government (so-
called ‘Milan Model’). Barcelona, too, played a decisive role amid the ‘refugee crisis.’ The BeC’s 
administration indeed supported growing numbers forced migrants by means of urban asylum 
policies. Also, it enacted far-reaching provisions in favor of undocumented immigrants, who 
became one of core policy targets of this radical-left administration. 
Table 3.2 summarizes this strategy for case selection. This research design thus allows us 
to unpack the causal mechanisms linking mobilization to policy change. Also, by unveiling how 
these mechanisms concatenate and recur across different contentious migration policies, the 
research will allow us to draw generalizable research findings on social movement outcomes in 
the field of migration. 
Table 3.2 Rationale for case selection 
Dimension Overall assessment 
Administrative tradition Similar 
Authoritarian past Similar 
Welfare system Similar 
Structural changes Similar 
Role of local government and civil society Similar 
Contentious migration policies Different 
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3.3 Sources, techniques, and data analysis 
The research relies on a multiplicity of sources and techniques that will be consistently combined 
in order to enhance data internal validity. The main data source of this study derives from field-
work carried out in 2017-19 and entailing 57 semi-structured interviews (25 in Milan and 32 in 
Barcelona). In the tradition of qualitative research, the sampling of interviewees have relied on 
prescribed selection criteria. Relevant actors in local migration policy arenas were identified on 
the basis of the typical combination of positional, decisional, and reputational approaches (cf. 
Knoke 1993: 29-31; Fischer et al. 2015: 317; Denzin and Lincoln 2011). Interviewees were even-
tually selected through a purposive sampling procedure (Ritchie et al. 2003) so as to represent 
multiple perspectives and milieus that symbolize those characteristics deemed relevant to the 
research topic. As provided by the reputational approach, a snowball technique was used in order 
not to miss any relevant actor, meaning that each interviewee was asked to provide the name of 
further actors that, in their perspective, played a decisive role in policy-making. In each city, the 
phase of interviewing was interrupted at the point of theoretical saturation, i.e. «when additional 
data failed to uncover any new ideas» (Bowen 2006: 17). 
 Four sets of respondents in Milan and Barcelona were included in the sample: (1) policy-
makers, i.e., elected and appointed officials and other local government employees, (2) social-
movement spokespersons and other activists covering a strategic role in their group/organiza-
tion, (3) other key civil society actors, such as NGO leaders, trade unionists, and journalists, and 
(4) experts in the fields of sociology, political science, law, and economics. All the interviewees 
had a prominent role or an expertise in migration affairs in their respective cities and beyond (cf. 
Table 3.3). To protect anonymity, interviews will be cited by referring to the first letter of the 
relevant city (M = Milan; B = Barcelona) and a number (cf. Appendix for the list of interviews). 
 
Table 3.3. Interviewes conducted in Milan and Barcelona 
 Milan Barcelona Total 
Public officials 6 7 13 
Social-movement spokespersons 7 11 18 
Other civil society actors 6 7 13 
Experts 6 7 13 
Total 25 32 57 
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Questions have been focused on the multi-level governance of migration, the structures 
of opportunity, the systems of coalition, the availability of resources, the strategic orientations, 
the cooperative and adversarial interactions, the responsiveness to external demands, and the 
outcomes of policy processes—so to develop an in-depth depiction of policy processes and 
causal mechanisms.  It is worth noting that interviewing policy-makers represents an innovative 
endeavor in the study of social movement outcomes. State authorities are the typical target of 
protesters, hence their reaction vis-à-vis movement demands can ultimately account for their 
degree of responsiveness while taking public decisions, i.e., to what extent policy-makers are influ-
enced by external demand-makers (cf. Bosi et al. 2016).12 
All the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed verbatim, in some cases with the 
support of Happy Scribe, an automatic transcription software.13 Transcripts were subsequently 
uploaded in NVivo14 and subject to qualitative data analysis. Specifically, this has been performed 
following the procedure of Cross-Case Analysis (CCA) proposed by Miles & Huberman (1994). 
This method is especially suitable for comparing similarities and differences across cases and 
using multiple sources of evidence so as to support theoretical generalizability. CCA consists of 
four and consequential analytical activities. The first two activities consists of Within-Case Anal-
ysis (WCA), meaning that each case is explored in-depth as a standalone entity to (1) describe 
what the case and what are its main components (‘what’ questions), and (2) elaborating prelimi-
nary explanations/predictions. Subsequently, CCA is performed in order to (3) explore patterns 
across cases and assess similarities and differences, and (4) order the cases by type and explain 
underlying causal relationships (‘why’ and ‘how’ questions). 
Inherent to WCA and CCA is the coding procedure, which consists in assigning mean-
ings onto data so as to gather, retrieve and organize them. In this research, coding tasks have 
been performed mainly through a deductive approach, meaning that the coding scheme has been 
first crafted based on the main concepts of the theoretical framework. Yet ‘moments of seren-
dipity’ (Schmitter 2008) have taken place in order to make sense of the discrepancies between 
                                                 
12 For such purposes, theoretical frameworks that set the analysis at the meso-level are particularly fruitful (Alimi et al. 2016), as rela-
tionships among groups/organizations can be scrutinized. 
13 See https://www.happyscribe.co/.  
14 Nvivo is a software for qualitative and mixed-method research that allows to store, organize, analyze, and visualize vast amount of 
qualitative and quantitative data. For more information, see https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo/home.  
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theoretical concepts and empirical data. To put it in a nutshell, this process has involved «an 
analytical deduction and induction for summarizing, coding, structuring, and analyzing the con-
tent» (Sotirov & Winkel 2015: 10). 
 Interviewing diverse groups of actors is essential in order to assess the validity of indi-
vidual answers. This implies «selecting these individuals carefully» as well as «monitoring the 
consistency of and argumentation behind their estimations» (Oosterwaal & Torenvlied 2011: 
206). However, interviews might be insufficient for such purposes. The study thus includes a 
wide array of additional (qualitative and quantitative) data, in order to both complement and 
triangulate the answers of interviewees with different sources (cf. Erzberger & Kelle 2003). 
 First, policy documents have been extensively analyzed. These include officials legisla-
tions of the EU as well the Italian and Spanish authorities, municipal ordinances by the city 
governments of Milan and Barcelona, and policy reports produced by both state and non-state 
actors. Various documents of this kind have been provided by the respondents before, during 
or after the interviews, either in paper or digital format. The analysis of such documents is es-
sential not only for making sense of policy-making processes, but also to disentangle jurisdic-
tional frameworks in the multilevel governance of migration. Second, social movement releases 
have been retrieved both online and during public events—e.g., demonstrations—occurred at 
the time of fieldwork. Third, local, national, and international media outlets have been analyzed 
in order to enrich the account of relevant events and processes. Fourth, the secondary literature 
on Milan and Barcelona, as well as Italy and Spain, is abundant and updated, and it has been thus 
included in the empirical analysis. References to all these materials will be included in the next 
chapters of the manuscript. 
The study will also rely on quantitative evidence drawn from officials statistics and other 
research projects. The sources are manifold. OECD national, regional, and metropolitan statis-
tics have been used to account for key demographic and economic figures of the relevant cities 
and their respective countries. Data on immigration and international protection have been 
drawn from Eurostat (especially for the study of the EU Common European Asylum System), 
UNHCR (e.g., data on international protection, sea and land arrivals), national and local govern-
ment statistics (e.g., data on immigrant population). Data on undocumented immigration have 
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been retrieved from various sources, such as the CLANDESTINO research project15 and a 
number of national research institutes (e.g., ISMU foundation, based in Milan, and the Barcelona 
Centre for International Affairs). Moreover, the study will rely on the IMPIC16 and MIPEX17 
research projects, which provide quantitative and qualitative evidence on immigrant integration 
at the country-level. The LOCALMULTIDEM research project18—a study of migrant political 
inclusion conducted in 2006 in 9 European cities, including Milan and Barcelona—will be also 
taken into account (cf. Morales & Giugni 2011). All the research outputs of the project are avail-
able on Harvard Dataverse.19 These include evidence on national and local policies, local discur-
sive environments (i.e., ‘discursive opportunity structures’, cf. Koopmans 1999; 2004), migrants’ 
social networks, individual characteristics, and political mobilization. All these sets of quantita-
tive data will be analyzed descriptively in order to make sense of local dynamics within their 
national and supranational environments, as well as to provide a solid picture of the structural 
contexts in which local migration policy arenas are located. 
                                                 
15 See http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/.  
16 See http://www.impic-project.eu/.  
17 See http://www.mipex.eu/.  
18 See https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/incite/welcome-to-the-incite-website/data/l/.  




Context: Multi-level migration politics and 





Local migration policy-making and migration-related mobilizations do not unfold in a vacuum, 
but are embedded in a political environment shaped by long-enduring historical trajectories. This 
chapter illustrates the main structural factors imposing constraints on, and creating opportunities 
for, urban migration governance and contestation in Milan and Barcelona. First, Section 4.2 
provides a snapshot of immigration toward Italy and Spain, a phenomenon that transformed 
these countries at a rapid pace and in relatively recent times. Next, the main contents and dy-
namics of migration policy-making at the national and EU levels are described in Section 4.3. A 
diachronic perspective is adopted to explore the policy-politics nexus, that is to say, to under-
stand how fluctuations in the politicization of immigration were mirrored in governance arrange-
ments. Section 4.4 then offers an overview of local governments in Italy and Spain, both in 
general terms and with specific respect to their competencies in the field of migration.  Section 
4.5 outlines some key sociological features of Milan and Barcelona. Final remarks are presented 
in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Immigration at a glance: A recent and rapid transformation 
Italy and Spain are nowadays multicultural societies, with a demography not too dissimilar to 
traditional immigration countries of north-western Europe. Yet this structural condition is the 
result of a very recent and rapid transformation. Italy’s net migration rate became positive in 
1973, after nearly a century of mass emigration towards industrialized areas, such as the Americas 
and northern Europe, as well as of internal migration from the rural South to the industrialized 
North of the country (Castelli Gattinara 2016: 54). As displayed in Figure 4.1, foreign immigration 
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began to grow at a dramatic pace in the early 1990s. The number of resident immigrants has 
increased more than tenfold in 1991-2011, shifting from 356,159 to 3.9 million (i.e. from 0.6% 
to 7% of the population). The Great Recession notwithstanding, such figures kept on growing 
in the following years, too. In 2017, foreign-born residents in Italy were more than 5 million, 
thus representing 8.3% of the total population. 
 A very similar trend occurred in Spain, which became a country of immigration in the 
mid-1980s. Until then, and for nearly a century, vast numbers of Spaniards moved from rural 
areas, such as Andalusia, Extremadura, and Galicia, to industrialized ones, either in Spain (mostly 
Catalonia, the Madrid Metropolitan Area, and the Basque Country) or abroad, especially Ger-
many, France, and Latin America (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 292). Also here, foreign immi-
gration grew steadily and considerably in the 1991-2011 period, when the immigrant population 
shifted from 360,655 to 5,751,487, i.e. from 0.91% to 12.10% of the total population (cf. Figure 
4.1). Differently from Italy, however, such figures decreased starting from 2012 as a consequence 
of the Great Recession, in conjunction with restrictive immigration laws (see below). In 2017, 
the immigrants settled in Spain were 4,572,807, thus representing almost a tenth of the total 
population. 
Figure 4.1. Foreign population in Italy (a) and Spain (b), 1981-2017 
Absolute values on the left axis; Share of the total population on the left axis. 
(a)  
(b)  


























Absolute values % of total population
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The variety of immigrants’ nationalities is an additional sign of the two countries’ multi-
cultural character. This diversity is the result of multiples waves of migration that made the phe-
nomenon deeply ingrained in society—as proven, for instance, by the growing numbers of 
women, households with children, and students among the immigrant population (cf. Menonna 
& Blangiardo 2014). Romanians constitute the most sizeable community in Italy, although their 
arrival prevalently occurred in the last fifteen years (differently from other ones, such the Chi-
nese, the Moroccan, and the Albanian, whose presence started to be significant already in the 
1990s or before). The dramatic pace of settlement from Romania is largely due to the process 
of country’s accession to the EU, accomplished in 2007 and preceded by the liberalization of 
touristic visa in 2002 (e.g., Tragaki & Rovolis 2012; Cvajner & Sciortino 2009). 
As for Spain, the largest foreign communities are nowadays the Maghrebi (foremost the 
Moroccan), the central and eastern European (particularly from new EU member states such as 
Romania and Bulgaria), as well as the ones from former Latin American colonies (also due to 
the relatively ‘friendly’ legislation and the long-lasting social networks, cf. Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 
2011: 294). EU15 citizens are also a relevant part of the immigrant population (Ros and Morales 
2015: 120), especially pensioners from more affluent countries such as the UK and Germany, as 
well as young workers from other south European countries, primarily Italy (cf. Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística 2017). 
 Such similarities in immigration patterns across the two countries are not accidental. In 
addition to ‘push’ factors in areas of origin, such as conflicts and poverty, specialists on migration 
identify a set of ‘pull’ factors that are peculiar to south European countries as contexts of recent 
and rapid settlement (e.g., King et al. 1997; Bonifazi et al. 2009; Calavita & Kitty 2005; Zincone 
2011). These are, first of all, geographical in nature, being these countries overlooking the Med-
iterranean Sea. Second, economic factors played a decisive role. From the 1950s to the 1980s, 
many native workers have been absorbed in high-productivity sectors. Immigration has then 
satisfied the demand for cheap labor in low-productivity ones, especially in the informal econ-
omy. From the 1980s onwards, the booming of the service economy dramatically punctuated 
these socioeconomic trends. Third, and relatedly, these factors are nested into political ones. 
Immigration laws were virtually non-existent when waves of foreign migration began; this made 
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South European countries an attractive destination as compared to traditional destinations in 
North-western Europe, where policies were becoming increasingly restrictive. 
The third set of (political) factors begot long-term consequences in terms of both immi-
gration and its regulation. Since the mid-1980s, along the process of European integration, both 
Italy and Spain have gradually tighten the conditions for legally accessing their national terri-
tory—yet achieving quite opposite outcomes, with irregular immigration de facto becoming a mas-
sive phenomenon and the most common way of entry. 
In Italy, the first quota system has been introduced in 1986, but it resulted largely inef-
fective. Seven mass regularizations that have been implemented in 26 years (1986-2012), regard-
less of the ideology of national incumbents. Mass amnesties—formally ‘exceptional’ but actually 
‘routinized’—activated a ‘vicious cycle’ by which immigrants with expired documents have been 
incentivized to stay for the prospect of possible future regularizations. Irregularity is indeed a 
transitory condition experienced by large numbers of newcomers that seek to settle in the long 
term (Bonifazi et al. 2009; Ambrosini 2013a). The Ministry of Interior estimated that the number 
of undocumented immigrants at the end of 2017 was approximately 490,000. 
 Very similar dynamics unfolded in Spain, where the misfit between policy prescriptions 
and social reality is apparent, too. Seven mass amnesties—implemented between the 1980s and 
the 2000s—regularized the administrative status of 1.1 million immigrants. Moreover, on the 
top of these ‘exceptional measures’, since 2004 an ordinary mechanism for individual regulari-
zation is available (the so-called arraigo, i.e., ‘rooting’) for immigrants that have been settled in 
the country for two years and have established a work relationship of at least one year (arraigo 
laboral) or settled for three years and with the prospect of entering into a work contract (arraigo 
social), cf. Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 305. In sum, the easiest and most common way to obtain 
a legal status is to enter with a tourist visa, work illegally for a while, and then get regularized 
through either exceptional or ordinary mechanisms. 
 In sum, in both the countries, immigration policy has been characterized by the use of 
extraordinary amnesties as an ordinary instrument for keeping pace with growing number of immi-
grants in society, and for immigration management more in general. Faced with the continuous, 
large-scale, unplanned arrival of immigrants since the 2000s, the central governments fluctuated 
from extraordinary regularization measures and retreat to control policies. The supposed ‘migra-
tion emergency’ has been tackled through restrictive norms on visa permits, which made foreign 
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residents more likely to become undocumented (e.g. while losing a job and seeking for another 
one), but also more prone to wait for a possible amnesty – in a pendulum between ‘zero regula-
tion’ and ‘hyper-regulation’ (cf. Zincone 2011; Gonzalez-Enríquez 2009). As residence permits 
are generally short, many regular(ized) immigrants tend to fall (back) into irregularity. In face of 
highly restrictive policies, irregular migration immigration has been de facto accepted as a common 
way of entry. This model of governance owes to multiple factors, including the weak planning 
capacities and the logic of emergency that often permeates policy-making, as well as the compli-
ance with free-market rules, especially in the vast informal economy (whose labor demand is, by 
definition, difficult to estimate). As summarized by Ambrosini (2013a), 
 
«Researchers have often spoken, in recent years, of a Mediterranean migration model […], or 
of a Southern European model, as opposed to the Northern European migration model: legal 
and regulated immigration, well placed in the formal economy and endowed with social 
rights, on the one hand, versus largely spontaneous and irregular immigration, positioned in 
the informal economy, without social protection or union rights, on the other» (Ambrosini 
2013a: 189-90). 
 
Finally, Italy and Spain share numerous similarities in terms of immigration trends (e.g., 
timing, size, drivers) and migration governance (e.g., undocumented immigration, routinized 
mass amnesties, scarce planning capacities). The following section adopts a diachronic perspec-
tive to review the key laws and policies enacted in the two countries, with a particular focus on 
the political dynamics behind these governance arrangements. 
4.3 Migration policy and politics 
1980s-1990s: from consensual policy-making to increasing contestation  
Immigration accessed the Italian political agenda in the mid-1980s, having gained some first 
visibility after the 1981 Census (Ambrosini 2013a; Sciortino & Colombo 2004). As mentioned, 
the first legislation on the issue—approved in 1986—established a quota system of entry while 
enacting the first mass regularization of undocumented immigrants.20 While being a tentative 
and incomplete policy endeavor, its contents was relatively liberal and aligned with international 
                                                 
20 Law 943/1986. 
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laws. Natives and foreigners were entitled with equal social rights and sociocultural integration 
was set as a policy principle (Zincone 2011). Yet, no funds were purposely allocated for pursuing 
these objectives, de facto attributing such responsibilities to regional and local authorities, whose 
fiscal autonomy was limited at that time. 
 Public budget—though of narrow size—was first earmarked in 1990 through the ‘Mar-
telli Law.’21 This piece of legislation was formulated as an exceptional response to emergent cru-
cial junctures, such the Albanian ‘refugee crisis’ and the growing contention unfolding in several 
urban areas (e.g., lack of housing, illegal squatting, natives’ protests, far-right violence). Equal 
welfare treatment was maintained as a policy principle and, in addition, there was an incremental 
advancement of integration policies – mostly due to bottom-up pressures from ‘pioneer’ local  
governments that were already experimenting innovative policy solutions, as in the case of social 
housing (Ponzo 2008; Zincone & Caponio 2006). More than 90% of the members of the national 
parliament voted in favor of such measures, an almost unanimous consensus that, however, has 
not persisted in the following years. 
 Conflict over migration eventually surfaced in the late 1990s. Approved in 1998 by the 
center-left Prodi I Cabinet, the Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione22 (also referred as ‘Turco-Napolitano 
Law’) represents a watershed for Italy’s migration policy and politics. This overarching legislation 
– still in force today, though severely amended and only partly implemented (Graziano & Ca-
ponio 2011) – frames migration as a permanent phenomenon and acknowledges immigrants as 
legitimate members of the Italian society. On the one hand, principles of solidarity were deep-
ened. A visa permit for job-seeking immigrants was introduced and the National Fund for Mi-
gration Policies (Fondo Nazionale per le Politiche Migratiorie) was set.  The creation of this fund also 
implied the attribution of fiscal and political autonomy to subnational governments in this policy 
area. Equal treatment was maintained for most of welfare provisions. Also, undocumented im-
migrants were entitled with the right to education and basic healthcare services (Ambrosini 
2013a). On the other hand, restrictive measures were also introduced, such as tighter patrol of 
borders and, most controversially, the establishment of CPT (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea 
– Temporary Permanence Centers) to detain undocumented migrants with identification and 
deportation purposes. 
                                                 
21 Law 39/1990. 
22 Law 40/1998, then Consolidated Act no. 286/1998. 
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In political terms, this contradictory mix of progressive and repressive measures has to 
be explained in the light of the advocacy of pro-immigrant groups (especially Catholic ones) and, 
simultaneously, the reception of supranational policy inputs in the direction of restriction, being 
Italy a sensitive component of the EU Schengen Area. Immigration finally became a heated 
political arena within which political parties, as well as their internal factions, confront each other 
(Zincone 2011). This political change followed some events that received extensive media atten-
tion, such the 1997 ‘Albanian emergency’ and numerous arrivals from former Yugoslavia in 
1999-2000, which were prevalently depicted in securitarian terms by the media (Urso 2018: 373). 
In Spain, too, migration accessed the political agenda in the mid-1980s and remained 
mostly de-politicized until the late 1990s. The first Foreigner Law was passed by the central 
parliament in 1986 (for an extensive account, see Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). The main trigger 
of policy-making was not immigration per se, as numbers were extremely limited at that time, 
but rather the access of Spain into the European Communities. Indeed, as reported by Ros & 
Morales (2015: 121-122), this first legislative framework was – to a great extent – a copy of 
immigration laws adopted in other, and socially different, European countries. Also, provisions 
were extremely meagre, mostly focused on conditions for accessing the Spanish territory and 
labor regulations, and then devoid of any recognition of rights as well as anti-discrimination 
measures. 
From this point of departure, a first policy change occurred in 1990, when the parlia-
mentary group of the IU (Izquierda Unida – United Left) advocated the regularization of un-
documented immigrants and put the issue of integration onto the institutional agenda for the 
first time. The initiative was successful. The Socialist government (Cabinet González III) imple-
mented an exceptional procedure of regularization in 1991, with the support of most relevant 
civil society organizations. The majority of the 120,000 applications submitted were accepted 
and led to the issue of residence permits. In addition, integration policies gradually gained sali-
ence in the policy agenda. Most of parliamentary groups committed to draft a comprehensive 
legislative framework, and a national strategy (Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants) was 
formulated in 1994. Social provisions were eventually introduced in 1996 as amendments to the 
1986 Foreigner Law. The large consensus of parliamentary forces on these issues is reflected, 
more broadly, on the low levels of politicization of immigration observed in Spain until the early 
2000s (cf. Ros & Morales 2015). 
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 These incremental policy changes notwithstanding, these first pieces of legislation were 
basically aimed at immigration control and management. A quota system of entry was introduced 
in 1993 and, in the light of the strict criteria posed to foreigners for settling in the country, the 
overwhelming majority of them have kept on accessing the country illegally and/or became un-
documented after the expiration of their residence permits (so-called ilegalidad sobrevenida, i.e., 
‘supervening illegality’). As pointed out by Garcés-Mascareñas (2014: 6), the law framed immi-
gration as a security-related phenomenon to be managed according to the needs of the labor 
market. This explains why most of the competences were attributed to the Ministry of the Inte-
rior and the Ministry of Labor. Mass amnesties started to be implemented as post-hoc measures 
for regulating the arrival of foreign workers and give legal status to all those (the majority) ex-
cluded by the law owing to long and complicated administrative procedures, both at the time of 
arrival and when residence permits had to be renewed. 
 All in all, at the end of the 1990s Spain had a more incomplete and security-oriented 
legislation on immigration as compared to Italy, where a comprehensive legislative framework—
that also included a vast array of welfare provisions—was adopted in 1997. Yet a number of 
similarities are also apparent. In both the countries, migration policy-making began in the mid-
1980s following to the first waves of foreign migration, and especially upon the input of Euro-
pean institutions along the process of integration. Also, migration has been barely politicized in 
both the countries, with most of the political forces sharing similar priorities and engaging in 
consensual policy-making. As it will be shown, such elements of convergence became less evi-
dent in the following decade. 
 
2000s: a securitarian escalation? 
In Italy, immigration contestation dramatically escalated since the early 2000s. The Ber-
lusconi Cabinet II (2001-2006) took office after an electoral campaign having immigration at the 
core of the competition. Subsequently, the governing center-right coalition set immigration as a 
policy priority and framed it in fiercely oppositional terms. Illegal entries and the permanent 
settlement of immigrants were discursively constructed as detrimental to social order. When 
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moving from ‘talks’ to ‘decisions’, however, such anti-immigration stances were less straightfor-
ward (Geddes 2006). The 2002 ‘Bossi-Fini Law’23—which amended the 1998 Testo Unico—is the 
main policy enacted in these years and its contents are in fact contradictory. 
 As far as integration policy is concerned, previous welfare provisions remained almost 
unmodified. In the context of a quasi-federalist reform, however, financial instruments were 
profoundly reshaped. Specifically, the National Fund for Migration Policy was incorporated in a 
larger Fondo Nazionale Sociale (National Social Fund), then disengaging social spending from spe-
cific aims of migrants’ integration. The new fund – still in place today – is allocated to regional 
governments, which are then autonomous in designing welfare provisions (Campomori & Ca-
ponio 2017). In addition, the National Social Fund has been severely downsized because of the 
austerity measures implemented after the outburst of the Great Recession (Costa & Sabatinelli 
2017). 
 The mismatch between political discourses and policy decisions is even more apparent 
when looking at immigration policy, especially in terms border controls and visa policy. The 
securitarian frame was very pronounced in this realm. The Bossi-Fini Law restricted the quota 
system of entry, tightened the patrol of borders, and augmented the number of deportations 
(Bonifazi et al. 2009). Also, visa policy became more restrictive. The possession of a job contract 
was set as a pre-condition for obtaining a residence (Contratto di Soggiorno-Lavoro, cf. Ambrosini 
2013a). The purpose was making immigrants as temporary workers rather than a permanent 
members of society – somehow importing the Northern European guest-worker model (Ca-
ponio and Graziano 2011). The same Cabinet, however, regularized 634,728 migrants. As men-
tioned before, the paradox of ‘producing’ undocumented immigration (through restrictive im-
migration policy) while regularizing it (through mass amnesties) is inherent to Italian migration 
policy. 
In a nutshell, the Italian center-right has politicized immigration in negative terms while 
both repressive and liberal principles co-exist in its policy-making. Once again, this inconsistency 
has to be explained in the light of multiple interests and advocacy groups pushing decision-
making in opposite directions (e.g., Geddes 2006; Colombo & Sciortino 2003). Welfare entitle-
                                                 
23 Law 189/2002. 
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ments remained largely untouched because of the influence yielded by Catholic groups and busi-
ness associations. The UDC (Unione Democratica di Centro – Centrist Democratic Union) was 
part of the governing coalition and played as a ‘mediator’. It mobilized the Roman Church for 
watering down the most controversial policy proposals. Moreover, business owners represented 
a significant electoral constituency of center-right parties, foremost of Forza Italia (Go Italy, i.e., 
Berlusconi’s party), and their interest was to loosen the rules for accessing the Italian territory, 
being immigration a convenient source of labor force. On the other hand, governing parties on 
the populist and/or radical right, namely the LN and AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alli-
ance) were more tenacious in maintaining their repressive electoral resolutions. 
The precarious equilibrium between such opposite forces was undermined following the 
appointment of the Cabinet Berlusconi III (2008-2011), whose opposition to undocumented 
immigration and multiculturalism was possibly harsher than before—in a sort of securitarian 
crescendo (Castelli Gattinara 2016: 63). The absence of the centrist component in the governing 
coalition was also determinant. The overlap of immigration and security issues led to the ap-
proval of two ‘Security Acts.’24 These highly contested legislations introduced a vast array of 
repressive measures, such as the introduction of the ‘clandestine crime’, the increased period of 
detentions for undocumented immigrants (from two to eighteen months), the restricted access 
to various social rights (e.g., housing), and the forced census of Roma populations living in un-
authorized camps in the outskirts of Milan, Rome, and Naples. Also, city mayors gained greater 
autonomy on law-and-order affairs as a response to alleged urban emergencies. In line with the 
measures adopted by the previous Berlusconi Cabinet, caregivers and domestic workers were 
granted with a mass amnesty in 2008. 
Similarly to the Italian case, migration has become increasingly politicized in Spain since 
the early 2000s—but to a much more limited extent. In 1999, while the conservative PP (Partido 
Popular – Popular Party) was concluding its mandate in a minority government (Cabinet Aznar 
I, 1996-2000), public debates on migration revamped. Parties converged upon the need of re-
forming the 1985 Foreigner Law in the light of new immigration trends in the country. Such 
debates led to the approval of an Organic Law on migration at the beginning of 2000.25 While 
                                                 
24 Laws 125/2008 and 94/2009. 
25 Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000. 
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not bringing major policy changes, the legislation represented an new attempt to expand inte-
gration policies. Importantly, a set of social rights—such as education and health—were granted 
to any foreigner residing in Spain, regardless of their administrative status. Anti-discrimination 
measures were also introduced, together with a set of rights to political participation (Ros & 
Morales 2015: 122). As for immigration policy, the new law was also intended to revise the quota 
system of entry so as to decrease the need for regularization procedures. 
However, shortly after, Spanish migration politics and policy went through major up-
heavals. Amid increasing arrivals to the country, episodes of contention began to mushroom. As 
reported by Ros & Morales (2015), the peak was reached when a Moroccan immigrant murdered 
a Spaniard in the village of El Ejido, in the southern region of Andalusia, in February 2000. The 
crime triggered a long and violent anti-immigration protest in that locality, a strike by Moroccan 
immigrants claiming better working and housing conditions, and a public debate on integration 
across the whole country. 
The timing of such events have coincided with the general election campaign. The PP 
won an absolute majority of seats and formed a new government (Cabinet Aznar II, 2000-2004) 
that soon reversed the liberal principles of, and the consensual approach to, migration policies 
that had been adopted until then. The government raised concerns about the allegedly too soft 
and generous approach to undocumented immigration. A new Organic Law was then adopted 
at the end of 2000,26 thus only a few months after the previous one (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 
2011: 299). Social rights for immigrants without a residence permit, as well as their opportunities 
for regularization, were sensibly restricted. Also, administrative sanctions against these immi-
grants and their ‘accomplices’ were introduced. Further restrictions were adopted in 2003.27 In-
tegration policies were sensibly tightened, too. The government approved the Programa Global de 
Regulación y Coordinación de la Inmigración en España (GRECO – Global Program of Immigration 
Regulation and Coordination in Spain), which in fact frame immigration as a temporary phe-
nomenon and thus affirm the priority of return policies. 
The PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) won 
the next general elections in 2004 and formed a new government (Cabinet Zapatero I, 2004-
2008). The most relevant initiative in the realm of migration was the development of a new 
                                                 
26 Law 8/2000 of 22 December 2000 
27 Law 14/2003 of 20 November 2003 
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regulation of the Foreigners Law, adopted at the end of 2004.28 The powers of regional and local 
governments were substantially enhanced, especially when it comes to integration policies. Many 
of these sub-national institutions often deploy such new competences for reversing the restric-
tive provisions adopted in the previous years and for developing autonomous, often progressive, 
integration policies. Also, in 2004 the ordinary mechanism for individual regularization (arraigo, 
i.e., ‘rooting’) was introduced (see above). These policy changes notwithstanding, migration was 
barely politicized during these years. A relevant exception occurred during the summer of 2006, 
when more than 18,000 thousands African immigrants reached the coasts of the Canary Islands 
by cayucos (traditional fishing boats), resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis (cf. Ros & Morales 
2015). 
Further reforms29 of Spanish migration policy were carried out in 2009 by the Cabinet 
Zapatero II (2008-2011), especially with the aim of aligning the national legislation to key deci-
sions adopted by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2007 as well to a set of new EU directives 
mostly concerned with the tightening of border controls. The Directive 2008/115/CEE was the 
one most harshly criticized by pro-migrant organizations (which renamed it as the Directive of 
Shame, i.e., Directiva de la Vergu ̈enza), as it provides—among other things—for the detention of 
undocumented immigrants up to 18 months. In 2012 the new conservative government (Cabinet 
Rajoy I, 2011-2015) restricted healthcare provisions,30 in fact excluding undocumented immi-
grants and foreigners who do not contribute to Social Security, on the basis of the alleged un-
sustainability of the health system. 
Overall, while many elements of convergence can be recognize in Italian and Spanish 
migration policies until the late 1990s, divergences became more apparent over the following 
decade. Immigration reach the core of the Italian political agenda and became a key issue of 
political competition and policy-making. Anti-immigration parties—which have governed the 
country for most of the 2010s—fueled a securitarian crescendo, by which immigration has been 
increasingly framed as a law-and-order emergency. Policy-making had a less straightforward tra-
jectory, in a sort of mix between highly repressive measures and the implementation of numer-
ous mass regularizations. Migration has been far less politicized in Spain, basically only for very 
                                                 
28 Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December 2004 
29 Ley Organica 2/2009 
30 Royal Decree-Law 16/2012 
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limited time spans, as a result of crucial junctures or humanitarian crises. During these years, 
both the scope of integration policies and the jurisdiction of local authorities have been en-
hanced, while immigration policies remained quite restrictive, especially upon the input of EU 
institutions. 
 
2010s: Italy and Spain amid the European ‘refugee crisis’ 
The 2010s has been the decade of the European ‘refugee crisis.’ During these years, sheer 
numbers of migrants from Africa and the Middle East landed in Europe or lost their lives trying 
to. The arrivals have overwhelmingly concerned Italy and Greece, which received 99 per cent of 
the migrants that reached the Southern frontier in 2014-16 (Figure 4.2). Landings in Greece fell 
after March 2016 because of the EU-Turkey agreement, which outsourced controls at the Greek 
border to the Turkish government. In February 2017, Libya’s Government of National Accord 
and the Italian executive, in cooperation with the EU, also signed deals to externalise immigra-
tion control outside the continent. The sea route from Libya to Italy has been gradually closed 
since then. Subsequently, Spain became the main port of entry in 2018. 
 
Figure 4.2. Millions of migrants arriving in Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Malta, 2014-18. 
Arrivals include sea arrivals to Italy, Cyprus and Malta, and both sea and land arrivals to Greece and Spain.  
 
Source: UNHCR, ‘Refugee situations’. Available online at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean 
 
Overall, the ‘refugee crisis’ resulted in humanitarian emergencies and fragmented pat-
terns of settlement across the continent. Far from being the by-product of a social anomaly that 
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and supranational levels played a decisive role, with their effects then flooding cascade-like to-
wards the local level. 
Among the most problematic aspects of the EU Common European Asylum System is 
the Dublin Regulation. It establishes that asylum-seekers should submit their protection request 
in the first country of arrival, which is then responsible for the procedure. Aimed at preventing 
applications in multiple jurisdictions, the rule eventually resulted in social unrest in South Euro-
pean ‘frontline’ states, where migrants have been forced to request sanctuary (Campomori 2018: 
430). In 2015 the EU launched a relocation mechanism to resettle migrants across member states 
and uncork the legislative bottleneck, yet this achieved negligible results in terms of implemen-
tation (European Commission 2018). This mostly owed to its voluntary character, that made 
numerous executives reluctant to accept their assigned quota (above all the Višegrad group). 
Scholars point at multiple but concurrent causes to explain this governance regime, in-
cluding the weak harmonization and the intensive transgovernmentalism of EU migration gov-
ernance (Guiraudon 2000; Toshkov & De Haan 2013; Scipioni 2018), the conflictual relationship 
between Member States and the EU (Caponio & Cappiali 2018), the logic of exceptionality fol-
lowed by policy-makers (Castelli Gattinara 2017; Fontanari & Ambrosini 2018), and their more 
general preference for restrictive policies (e.g. McMahon & Sigona 2018; Crawley & Skleparis 
2018). But in addition to the restrictive character of EU migration governance, the condition of 
migrants and receiving communities in Italy and Spain was further complicated by the poor 
national asylum systems. 
Although the 1948 Constitution recognizes the right of asylum,31 international protection 
played a minor role within the Italian legislative context for a long time. In the 2014-15 period, 
spurred by the rising number of asylum-seekers reaching South European shores, Italian author-
ities made some steps toward a stable and far-reaching reception system (Campomori 2019: 12-
13). This reform process culminated with the so-called ‘Reception Decree’,32 crafted on the basis 
of a previous agreement between national, regional, and local authorities,33 as well as asylum-
                                                 
31 Article 10.3. 
32 Decree Law no. 142/2015. 
33 Conferenza Unificata, July 10, 2014, see: http://www.prefettura.it/venezia/contenuti/Intesa_tra_stato_regioni_ed_enti_locali_territo-
riali_10.7.2014-156822.htm  
 76 
related EU Directives.34 The new law clarified the jurisdictional ecology of asylum-seekers re-
ception, i.e. by allocating competencies to different actors and levels of government and dividing 
the reception process into three stages (first aid and assistance, first reception, and second-line 
reception). This reform notwithstanding, however, the Italian system remained too limited in 
scope as compared to the increased number of asylum-seekers, whose overwhelming majority 
was receipt through large-sized, poorly-provided emergency accommodation centres (see Sec-
tion 7.2 for more details on Italy’s asylum policies). 
In face of these dynamics, the politicization of immigration skyrocketed in Italy (Castelli 
Gattinara 2017). The central government, while being led by centre-left coalitions in the 2013-
18 period, embraced a restrictive discourse on asylum and immigration at large. With far-right 
forces on the rise (foremost the League, led by Matteo Salvini since 2013), national incumbents 
partly conformed to the security-oriented discourse of their opponents as a defensive strategy. 
This is well-epitomized by their approach to search-and-rescue (SaR) operations in the 
Central Mediterranean. Between 2014 and 2018, 14,768 migrants lost their lives in this sea area, 
meaning that the migration route from Libya to Italy was the deadliest in the world. Following 
to the tragic events occurred on 3 October 2013, when the shipwreck of a boat caused the death 
of at least 366 migrants, the Italian government launched Mare Nostrum (‘Our Sea’), a large-scale 
search-and-rescue operation with both humanitarian and military purposes led by the Italian 
Navy. According to the Minister of the Interior Angelino Alfano (Cabinet Letta, 2013-2014, and 
Cabinet Renzi, 2014-2016), Mare Nostrum saved the life of more than 100,000 people. However, 
it was dismissed one year after and replaced by Triton, conducted by the EU agency Frontex. 
This operation had a more limited budget and a mandate focused on border control rather than 
rescue (Caponio & Cappiali 2018: 118-9).  
 Assorted NGOs then began to implement sea-and-rescue operations so as to fill in for 
the voids of European and Italian authorities, but their agency has been increasingly criminalized 
and obstructed. Marco Minniti, member of the PD and Minister of Interior of the Cabinet Gen-
tiloni (2017-2018), introduced a controversial Code of Conduct35 that imposed highly restrictive 
conditions on NGOs’ humanitarian action, including presence of armed police forces on board. 
                                                 
34 Directives 2013/32/EU and 2013/33/EU. 
35 ‘Codice di condotta per le ONG impegnate nelle operazioni di salvataggio dei migranti in mare’, see: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/de-
fault/files/codice_condotta_ong.pdf  
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This was justified on the ground of a 2017 Frontex’s document36 asserting that SaR operations 
allegedly work as a pull factor for those fleeing Libya (Campomori 2018: 433)—a thesis however 
refuted by empirical studies (Cusumano & Villa 2019; Steinhilper & Gruijters 2018). In addition, 
the Gentiloni Cabinet reached an agreement with the Libya’s Government of National Accord 
to prevent migrants’ departure from Libyan shores (see above), eliminated the right of asylum 
applicants to appeal denied requests, and extended the system of detention of undocumented 
immigrants. 
 While motivating these decisions on the ground of more ‘efficient’ immigration manage-
ment, the mainstream left has, to a large extent, incorporated the preference for security-oriented 
policies, thus chasing right-wing populist parties rather than opposing them (Castelli Gattinara 
2017: 9). For instance, in July 2017, Matteo Renzi—prime minister and leader of the Democratic 
Party in 2014-2016—declared that immigrants have to be ‘helped at home’, emulating a typical 
slogan of the Italian far-right. Anti-immigration politics reached a new peak following 2018 gen-
eral elections, which led to the formation of the Cabinet Conte I (2018-2019), supported by a 
coalition among the ideologically eclectic M5S (Movimento 5 Stelle – Five Star Movement) and 
the far-right League. As newly appointed Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini enacted hard-
line rhetoric and policies, criminalizing and stigmatizing migrants and their pro-beneficiaries, 
especially through the ‘Security Decree’37 (that drastically curtailed the already deficient national 
asylum system) and the ‘Security Decree II’38 (that introduced administrative sanctions for safe-
and-rescue operations). Since summer 2018, several NGO’s vessels were prevented from disem-
barking (cf. AIDA 2019a: 23-26), in contrast with international laws and, in some occasions, 
with national criminal laws. This approach, however, seems to deepen—rather than to change—
the policy trajectories adopted by previous center-left governments. 
In Spain, too, asylum policy has not traditionally played a substantial role in migration 
governance (González-Enríquez 2009). As mentioned above, until 2017 the number of arrivals 
in Spain was lower than in Italy or Greece. The EU relocation mechanism has proven a largely 
uninfluential remedy. Data updated on 31 October 2018 show that only 1,359 migrants resettled 
in Spain, whereas this country had committed to accept 15,000-19,000 (European Commission 
                                                 
36 See https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/risk_Analysis/Annual_risk_Analysis_2017.pdf  
37 Decree-Law 113/2018 
38 Decree-Law 53/2019 
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2018; Alcalde & Portos 2018). The conservative governments led by Mariano Rajoy (2011-16 
and 2016-18), while occasionally defining international protection as a moral duty for Europe, 
refrained from accepting the assigned quota on the grounds that Spain was supposedly ‘satu-
rated’ by undocumented immigration. The Minister of the Interior Jorge Fernández Díaz op-
posed the mechanism from the very start of the negotiations, claiming that it could work as a 
‘pull factor.’ 
Such a restrictive approach was even more apparent in the case of border patrol. Ceuta 
and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves surrounded by Morocco and the Mediterranean Sea. Being 
such sensitive ‘frontline’ areas, they have been heavily militarized over the decades so as to pre-
vent immigration, notably from Sub-Saharan Africa. The migrants that succeed in illegally cross-
ing the border are systematically subject to the practice of ‘push-backs’ (devoluciones en caliente), 
meaning that they are forcedly brought back to the Moroccan territory. Introduced by the left-
wing Cabinet Zapatero I and pursued with continuity by the successive governments, push-
backs have been legalized by the Cabinet Rajoy I in 2015, thus becoming a pivotal policy instru-
ment for the management of the ‘refugee crisis’ (for a detailed account, see Garcés-Mascareñas 
2016: 323-7; CEAR 2017: 25; 2018; AIDA 2019). 
Opponents claim that the summary expulsion of people with no assessment of their 
eligibility for asylum protection and health conditions is evidently in contrast with international 
laws. In 2015, Amnesty International and the CEAR (Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado 
– Spanish Refugee Aid Commission) submit almost 95,000 signatures to the parliament for ab-
rogating the law and the then-European Commissioner of Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks, asked 
the government for explanations. However, the European Commission endorsed push-backs in 
May 2016 (Arango et al. 2016: 22). This style of border management—based on the cooperation 
with neighboring countries’ authorities and the conditionality of development funds to ‘repatri-
ation’ agreements—has been vaunted as a ‘best practice’ by the Rajoy governments, which ad-
vocated its replication in other sensitive frontline areas across the continent. As shown by some 
scholars, the governance regime adopted in Ceuta and Melilla has indeed worked as an ‘experi-
ment’ later replicated at the Greek-Turkish and the Italian-Libyan borders (see for example Ga-
brielli 2017). 
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As reported by Arango et al. (2018), the socialist government led by Pedro Sanchez (2018-
2019) pushed for some incremental policy changes in a less restrictive direction, both at a sym-
bolic and a substantive level. The case of the Aquarius—a search-and-rescue vessel charted and 
operated by the NGOs SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders—attracted extensive 
media coverage in June 2018. After rescuing 629 migrants in the Central Mediterranean, the 
Italian and Maltese governments denied the vessel to disembark. Spain then allowed it to dock 
in the port of Valencia. Also, the new Spanish executive approved two laws39 that expanded the 
resources allocated to the assistance of asylum-seekers and refugees and re-established the uni-
versal access to the national health system for any migrant, regardless of administrative status 
(see above). 
Even though the number of arrivals to Spain has been quite limited until 2018, the con-
dition of asylum-seekers has represented a crucial challenge for Spanish municipalities. As Sec-
tion 7.4 will show in detail, this is largely the result of the deficient national system of interna-
tional protection, named SAI (Sistema de Acogida y Integración – Reception and Integration 
System)40. Spain’s asylum policies, in fact, left high numbers of asylum seekers without any form 
of protection, especially in the case of migrant who completed an integration programme and 
then became undocumented (receiving a negative response to their asylum application) and new-
comers without access to state services (before starting their application). These problems have 
heightened since 2018, when Spain became the main destination for migrants landing in south-
ern Europe (cf. Figure 4.2). 
As compared to Italy and most European countries, however, immigration remained 
more at the periphery of the Spanish debate during the 2010s (Arango et al. 2015: 21; Garcés-
Mascareñas 2016). The long-standing absence of relevant radical right parties from the electoral 
arena has surely played an important role in this scarce politicization (Alonso & Kaltwasser 
2014). While this ‘Spanish exceptionality’ has come to an end in 2018, when the far-right Vox 
(People) has made its electoral breakthrough at the regional level, Spaniards still have a largely 
positive view of immigration and do not consider it as a major policy problem. The increase 
number of arrivals in 2018 has not substantially changed such favorable attitudes (Arango et al. 
2018).  
                                                 
39 Royal Decree-Law 6/2018 and Royal Decree-Law 7/2018. 
40 Gobierno de España, Ley no. 12, 30 October 2009. 
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All in all, Italy and Spain have both coped with relevant challenges related to the recep-
tion and integration of forced migrants. Major global transformations and flaws in multi-level 
governance have ‘flowed downstream.’ Global migration, restrictive immigration management, 
lack of inter-state cooperation, and poor national asylum governance are all factors that lie out-
side the competency of local authorities, but turned out to be critical questions for policy-makers 
at the city-level, who have been forced to ‘pay the bill.’ As Section 7.2 will contend, the predict-
ability of increased arrivals from the Global South, as well as their stabilisation over time, make 
the notion of a ‘refugee crisis’ largely misleading. Rather, what has occurred is a crisis in the gov-
ernance of migration. In turn, this can be interpreted as a more profound crisis of democratic 
legitimacy in western Europe (Castelli Gattinara 2017). The next section precisely focuses on the 
role of Italian and Spain local governments, both in general terms and with specific regard to 
immigration. 
4.4 Local government in Italy and Spain 
Overview of local governance 
The prominence of Italian and Spanish subnational institutions has grown over the last decades. 
In Italy, the republican form of government established in 1946 was markedly centralized, but 
profound processes of decentralization have been undertaken since 1970, when Regions were 
established. This trend has sensibly accelerated in the 1990s, especially after the grand corruption 
scandal named Tangentopoli (Bribes City) and the electoral breakthrough of the LN, which had 
regionalists claims at the top of its agenda. Nowadays, the Italian state is a quasi-federal one. 
Numerous reforms have increased the relevance of municipalities (comuni), cf. Cotta & 
Verzichelli (2007); Bobbio (2005). Most notably, the direct election of mayors (sindaci) was in-
troduced in 1993. Mayors appoint and revoke the members of their cabinet (assessori) without 
the approval of the municipal council (consiglio comunale), whose role is mostly limited to the pas-
sage of major strategic policies, such as the approval of the municipal budget. This shift boosted 
the prerogatives, the visibility, and the popularity of the member of municipal governments – to 
the detriment of councils and political parties. Mayors of large cities are prominent political fig-
ures, whose carrier often reach the national stage before or after the local one. 
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 As for Spain, the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s marked the 
end of a highly centralized organization of the state. The 1978 Constitution establishes three 
territorial tiers of government, namely the central government, the regional tier (Comunidades 
Autónomas – Autonomous Communities), and the local tier. Also, decentralization has gone hand 
in hand with the creation of the welfare state (cf. Gallego & Subirats 2011). The Spanish institu-
tional system is often described in terms of ‘asymmetric regionalism’, meaning that Autonomous 
Communities enjoy different degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis the central state—a provision aimed 
at recognizing the plurality and the specificities of national identities that coexist in the Spanish 
territory. The territorial cleavage is a long-standing feature of the Spanish society, which period-
ically resurge with extreme intensity, as in the case of the major institutional-political crisis driven 
by the confrontation between Catalan pro-independence forces and the central state during the 
2010s (see for example Barrio et al. 2018). 
According to the Spanish constitution, municipalities (ayuntamientos) are the basis of the 
territorial organization of the state, and the first level of the citizens’ participation in public affairs 
(cf. Tomás 2017: 246). Directly elected councilors compose the municipal council (pleno) and 
elect, in turn, the mayor (alcalde). The indirect election of mayors is then a major difference with 
the Italian system. One key implication is that, when electoral forces do not obtain the absolute 
majority of seats in the council, they may seek to forge post-electoral alliances, for example in 
the form of coalition or minority governments. Yet, since the late 1990s, various reforms have 
gradually increased the power of Spanish mayors and their executives, as well as the autonomy 
of large cities (Zafra Víctor 2003: 107-8; Rodríguez Álvarez 2010: 88; Tomás 2017). Also, in 
2006, the cities of Madrid and Barcelona were given special regime as the largest Spanish cities. 
 
Local governments and immigration policy 
Zooming in to the realm of migration, in both the countries immigration policy lie under 
the jurisdiction of the central state. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is also mirrored in the inter-
governmentalist character of EU migration governance, in fact dominated by the executives of 
member states, especially their security-oriented components. The role of Italian local govern-
ments is limited to the management of critical social problems and humanitarian emergencies 
related to immigration—especially in interaction with prefectures (prefetture – the local branches 
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of the Ministry of the Interior) and police headquarters (questure). Also, national authorities con-
sult their local and regional counterparts for defining the three-year programmatic plans of im-
migration control and the yearly quotas regulating the inflow of foreign workers (Castelli Gat-
tinara 2016: 64-65). It is worth noting, however, that the power of mayors in the field of law-
and-order has been sensibly extended through the Security Packages approved by the Cabinet 
Berlusconi III (see above). The Ministry of the Interior and municipal governments can set 
agreements which attribute relevant responsibilities and resources to local administrators for 
dealing with urban law-and-order. 
As for Spain, the Constitution establishes that the central state has «exclusive jurisdic-
tion» over immigration policy.41 Yet local authorities have much greater competences in this area 
as compared to their Italian counterparts. The registration of residency in the municipal census 
(padrón) is a pre-condition to access basic welfare provisions and—following the new Foreigner 
Law of 2004—also to initiate individual regularization procedures (arraigo, i.e., ‘rooting’, see 
above). In turn, regularized immigrants are entitled to claim family reunification. Municipalities 
are in charge of registering immigrants in the census and drafting the individual reports required 
to apply for regularization. These procedures, while formally of an administrative nature, de facto 
give wide discretion to local governments. They may opt for enacting inclusive practices, for 
example registering immigrants of no fixed abode—then granting them access to basic social 
provisions—and drafting favorable reports to enhance their prospects of regularization. Restric-
tive practices can be also enacted, although the registration of undocumented immigrants is 
mandatory in any case. In sum, municipal competences have crucial implications in terms of 
legal status, welfare access, and immigrant rights at large (for a detailed review, see Garcés-Mas-
careñas 2014: 5-6).  
 
Local governments and immigrant policies 
 As for integration policies, it should be first noted that Italian and Spanish sub-national 
authorities are pivotal components of national welfare systems. Following long-standing pro-
cesses of decentralization, local authorities have become the most relevant tier of government 
                                                 
41 Article 149.1.2 
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for the implementation and delivery of social policies. Migration policy is no exception. As al-
ready mentioned, local governments have often been at the forefront in coping with immigration 
as an emerging societal transformation. The legislative voids of central authorities incentivized 
local administrators to introduce innovative policy solutions then transposed at the national 
level. On the other hand, the Great Recession and consequent austerity measures sensibly en-
hanced their dependence on the central state and the pressure for providing welfare services in 
a context of shrinking resources (cf. Del Pino & Pavolini 2015). 
 As for Italy, the competences of regional and local governments in the area of immigrant 
integration were made explicit in the 1998 Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione (articles 34-46). These 
include employment, health, education, housing, and civic participation. Regions were in charge 
of implementation and to craft, in cooperation with municipalities, integration programs to be 
funded through the National Fund for Migration Policies (Caponio 2014: 8-10). However, the 
2001 federalist reform attributed full autonomy to regions in the field of social policy—including 
immigrant integration—and thus in prioritizing areas of welfare intervention. As mentioned 
above, the National Fund for Migration Policies was merged into a broader National Social Fund 
(sensibly curtailed following the Great Recession). Consequently, nowadays municipalities enjoy 
large rooms for maneuver in integration policies, but their enactment is contingent upon the 
financial resources that central authorities allocate to regional ones for social policies and, within 
such framework, to the funds that regional governments allocate for integration policies (Castelli 
Gattinara 2016: 64-5; Campomori & Caponio 2016). 
 The division of competences is very similar in Spain. Over the decades, national policy-
makers have concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on border control and immigration 
management—to the detriment of integration policies. In addition to this approach to national 
policy-making, it should be considered that Autonomous Communities detain most of the pre-
rogatives in the field of welfare, most notably health, education, employment, and housing (Gar-
cés-Mascareñas 2014: 6-8; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 307-15). As a result, immigrant integra-
tion fall into the areas of competence of regional and local authorities—which have filled in for 
the voids of central ones. Some regions and cities have represented ‘avant-gardes’ in the formu-
lation and implementation of these policies. As Chapter 6 will show, this is especially the case 
for Catalunya and Barcelona, which have produced their first integration plans in 1993 and 1997 
respectively. The first substantive integration plan (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración – 
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PECI) was adopted at the national level in 2006, but regional and local governments kept on 
covering the lion’s share in defining the policy objectives and instruments. As Garcés-Mascare-
ñas (2014: 7) put it, «the PECI should be understood as a national framework in which to fit a 
posteriori (partly through budgetary allocation with a total of about 200 million euros a year) the 
policies that were already in operation at regional and local levels».  
 Last, asylum policy should be treated separately. In both the countries, asylum rights are 
an exclusive prerogative of the central state. This is established by both the Italian (articles 10 
and 117) and the Spanish (articles 13 and 149) Constitutions, which are also shaped on interna-
tional laws on asylum protection. In Italy, the ordinary system of asylum reception is based on 
the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior, municipalities, and civil society organizations. It is 
widely considered as an ‘avant-garde’  precisely because of its polycephalic governance structure. 
The downsizing of this system in 2018 by mean of the ‘Security Decree’ will likely marginalize 
local governments in asylum governance. Yet the impacts of this policy cannot be fully assessed 
at the moment of writing. For instance, major implementation stalemates have been caused by 
both courts and municipalities. The Italian ‘emergency’ system, instead, lies in the full jurisdiction 
of central authorities, which can set up reception centers without consulting municipal govern-
ments (for a detailed overview, cf. Campomori 2018: 432-3). The role of Spanish local govern-
ments, instead, is virtually non-existent, as the central state is fully in charge of national asylum 
policies. 
 Overall, Italian and Spanish local governments play a decisive role for migration policy—
especially in the realm of immigrant policies. In Spain, municipalities enjoy greater autonomy 
when it comes to immigration policies, as they can drive regularization and family reunifications 
procedures. As for asylum policies, instead, Italian municipalities have more extended preroga-
tives as compared to their Spanish counterparts. Lastly, it shall be noted that local governments 
are de facto in charge of dealing with urban issues even when laying outside of their jurisdiction. 
This is especially the case for undocumented immigrants, as municipalities often take the re-
sponsibility of their integration on a ‘voluntary’ basis. Spanish local governments have greater 
rooms for maneuver in this respect, as they must register irregular residents in their municipal 
census – a procedure that grant access to basic welfare provisions. 
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4.5 Milan and Barcelona: Key sociological features 
Both Milan and Barcelona are post-industrial, relatively affluent global cities with a highly diverse 
population (see also Section 3.2). Milan was part—with Turin and Genoa—of the so-called ‘In-
dustrial Triangle’ of modern Italy and then a fundamental motor of the country’s economic 
development, especially since the aftermath of the World War II. Departing from this produc-
tion model, however, the city accomplished a transition towards a service-oriented economy 
over most recent decades. These societal transformations went hand in hand with two different 
waves of migration (cf. Foot 1999). The first one occurred in the 1950s-1960s, and mainly con-
sisted of Italians from southern regions seeking employment in the industrial sector. The post-
industrial shift corresponded to a second wave of migration from abroad since the 1970s. Yet, 
the settlement of foreign-born residents became considerable and diversified in the 1990s. 
Developments in Barcelona were similar in many respects. The city emerged as a large 
industrial center at the end of the 19th Century. Throughout the following decades, economic 
growth was sustained by the settlement of a large immigrant community coming from rural 
Catalunya and the rest of Spain. In the wake of a second economic boom driven by the service 
economy, growing numbers of foreign immigrants—from both the rest of Europe and the 
Global South—started to settle in the city since the early 1990s. The prevalent sectors of em-
ployment among foreign immigrants in the two cities are domestic caregiving, catering, manu-
facture, and self-employment in food and ethnic services (for more details, see Caponio 2014: 
7-8; Castelli Gattinara 2016: 66-8; Garcés-Mascareñas 2014: 3-4; Morén-Alegret et al. 2016). 
Figure 4.3 shows the number of foreign-born residents in the two cities. In Milan, resident 
immigrants represent approximately one fifth of the total population (275,818 foreign-born res-
idents on 1,378,689 inhabitants in 2018), which means that the city hosts the second largest 
foreign community in Italy (after the capital city of Rome). The three most sizeable nationalities 
are Filipinos, Egyptian, and Chinese. Altogether, they account only for the 41% of the total 
foreign population, a figure highlighting the diversified, multicultural character of immigration 
in Milan. The local government further estimates the presence of approximately 30,300 undoc-
umented immigrants who face precarious conditions in terms of employment status, housing, 
and labor integration (Comune di Milano 2012: 33). Milan also hosts one of the largest Muslim 
community in Italy (approximately 40% of the foreign-born population, cf. Bombardieri 2011). 
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Barcelona, with its 301,626 foreign-born residents (18.5% of the total population in 
2018), has a highly diverse immigrant population, too. As compared to Milan, however, the quota 
of Europeans is far more considerable. The three largest foreign communities are the Italian, the 
Chinese, and the Pakistanis, which together account for the 23.6% of the foreign-born popula-
tion. Another difference with the case of Milan owes to the possibility for undocumented immi-
grants to register in the municipal census of Spanish cities. In the case of Barcelona, the numbers 
reported in Figure 4.3 thus include also this part of the immigrant population. A study released 
in 2017 estimates that 54.6% of immigrants in Catalunya are undocumented.42 
 
Figure 4.3. Foreign-born residents in Milan (1979-2018) and Barcelona (2000-2018). 
 
Source: respective local government statistics. 
 
The diverse ethnic composition of the Milanese immigrant population is among the fac-
tors explaining the low levels of spatial segregation, as the concentration of single ethnicities in 
restricted urban areas becomes less likely. Specifically, the vast and scattered semi-peripheral 
neighborhoods are those preferred by migrants for their settlement, also because of the availa-
bility of vacant apartments (usually ill-kept but affordable) and the concentration of the elderly 
needing domestic caregiving in such areas (Mingione 2009; Borlini et al. 2008). Barcelona, too, is 
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Barcelona: % of foreign-born residents (right axis)
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characterized by low levels of ethnic segregation across the urban territory. The city increasingly 
shows segregation patterns, but this is mostly due to gentrification processes driven by high-skill 
workers rather than ethnic factors (García Lopez et al. 2017). Barcelona has been defined as a 
‘superdiverse’ city (Morén-Alegret et al. 2016: 94-5) due to the great variety of religions, lan-
guages, cultures and socio-economic statuses stemming from several waves of migration. The 
native population itself is linguistically and culturally diverse (Catalan and Castilian-Spanish are 
co-official languages). The strong civil society organizations of the city—and especially its long-
standing tradition of neighborhood associations—greatly smoothed the social integration of 
newcomers (ibid.: 96). 
4.6 Conclusion 
Italy and Spain became immigration countries very rapidly and in relatively recent times. They 
turned into multicultural societies between the 1970s and the 1990s as a consequence of similar 
‘pull factors’—including their geographical position, labor market, and national legislation. As in 
the case of other South European countries, policy-making has been traditionally characterized 
by scarce planning capacities and driven by emergency logics. In face of growing, unplanned 
numbers of newcomers, central authorities management persistently shifted between restrictive 
measures (producing massive undocumented immigration) and ‘exceptional’ regularizations (for 
coping with it). The securitarian character of EU migration policies played a role in driving these 
policy outcomes, too. Integration policies were gradually introduced since the 1990s—foremost 
due to bottom-up pressure coming from ‘pioneer’ sub-national governments. 
 Immigration became a contested topic in the late 1990s, when political parties began to 
politicize immigration for pursuing electoral rewards. But while in Spain this happened only amid 
rare crucial junctures, such as humanitarian crises, Italy experienced a securitarian crescendo since 
the early 2000s, with immigration ranking high in the political agenda and being systematically 
conflated with law-and-order issues. These governance arrangements and political trends ap-
peared most forcefully in the 2010s, amid the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, with sheer numbers of 
forced migrants reaching European shores from the Global South. The rudimentary framework 
of national asylum policies, the highly restrictive character of EU migration governance, the rise 
of anti-immigrant forces, and the spread of moral panic concurred to produce humanitarian 
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crises in localities of transit and settlement, foremost national frontiers and densely populated 
urban areas. 
 Within this framework, regional and municipal governments have been at the forefront 
in coping with immigration as an emerging societal transformation, filling in for the voids of 
central authorities and sometimes driving policy change beyond their local contexts. The com-
petences of local governments are limited in the case of immigration policies, which traditionally 
under the jurisdiction of national governments – although Spanish municipalities can interfere 
with centrally-defined provisions to a significant extent when it comes to individual regulariza-
tion and family reunification procedures. As for immigrant policies, regional and local authori-
ties, in partnership with civil society organizations, play a decisive role in designing and imple-
menting integration programs, yet in a context of financial austerity and jurisdictional subordi-
nation. Milan and Barcelona well-symbolize these societal and political changes. In the wake of 
their transition to post-industrial economy, large and diverse immigrant communities have set-
tled there over the last decades. As the next chapters will show, these two cities have been im-












































Exclusionary policies and social movement 
outcomes: Milan, 2006-2019 
 
 
«[W]hen Pisapia became the mayoral candidate of the center-left, all the associations of mi-
grants, antifascists, antiracists started playing an active role in electoral campaigning. […] 
Pisapia won also thanks to a base of supporters that was not “his own” base, but which was 
strongly looking for a change». 





The city of Milan went through major political upheavals over the last decades. Conservative 
and anti-immigration parties uninterruptedly led the city government in the 1993-2011 period. 
Over the 2000s, within the context of a securitarian escalation in Italian politics, the city govern-
ment enacted policies aimed to exclude specific sections of the immigrant population and ethnic 
minorities—including the undocumented, Romani families, and Chinese shopkeepers—from 
various rights and benefits. The victory of a center-left coalition at the 2011 local elections, how-
ever, put an end to the long-standing hegemony of right-wing forces and marked important 
changes in terms of migration policy and politics. This chapter examines how Milan’s pro-im-
migrant movement contributed to the production these outcomes during its various life phases, 
moving from a condition of strong repression and marginality to become a vocal and yet fragile 
player in city politics. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the actors, the processes, and 
the contents of local migration policies since their origins in the 1970s to the present days, point-
ing out the continuities and discontinuities in the approach of local incumbents. The emergence 
and main characteristics of the Milan’s pro-immigrant movement are recounted in Section 5.3. 
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Next, Section 5.4 traces a link between mobilization and local exclusionary policies. It shows 
that, in face of particularly hostile conditions, social movements have been able to shape policy 
outcomes only to a limited extent and by means of a highly contentious strategy. The chapter 
then focuses on the role of pro-immigrant activists in favoring the electoral victory of the left-
leaning parties in 2011 and the consequent dismissal of most exclusionary policies by new local 
incumbents (Section 5.5). These latter have acted as ambivalent allies of social movements, on 
the one hand elevating them to a position of legitimate stakeholders in local policy-making, and 
on the other hand granting limited benefits to their constituencies. Last, Section 5.6 summarizes 
the main findings and bring them into dialogue with the theoretical framework of the study. This 
allows us to elaborate preliminary statements on social movement outcomes in the case of local 
exclusionary policies. 
5.2 Local migration policy-making in Milan, 1980s-2010s 
From the origins to the Moratti’s administration: Pushing immigrants at the margins 
In the 1970s-80s, the first policy responses to foreign immigration were provided by Catholic 
charities, which arranged basic facilities—such as shelters and canteens—across the Milan’s ter-
ritory. At that time, immigration was prevalently addressed as a matter of extreme deprivation 
and marginality, with public institutions playing a limited role in service provision (Artero 2018: 
120). However, soon thereafter, other actors began to organize in immigrant associations—fore-
most by Eritreans, Egyptians, and Iranians—and trade unions, which formed a committee 
named Coordinamento Migranti in 1985 (cf. Caponio 2014: 10-12). These groups put forward an 
alternative frame focused on welfare equality, political participation, and the recognition of di-
versity. The municipality proved very receptive toward such demands. In the second half of the 
1980s, a Municipal Consultative Committee and a Foreigners’ Centre were set up for enabling 
immigrants’ participation in urban governance and delivering a range of social policies (e.g., 
housing), later funded through the national framework of the ‘Martelli Law’ (see Section 4.3). 
 Yet this governance model rapidly showed deficiencies. Immigrant associations proved 
unable to effectively represent their constituencies and lacked expertise in service delivery (ibid.). 
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Also, administrative irregularities and petty crimes occurred in various municipal facilities, at-
tracting widespread media attention. The reception center located in Via Corelli well-epitomized 
the lacunae of local migration policy-making at that time. As reported by the historian John Foot, 
 
«[v]ia Corelli quickly became the symbol of the failure to deal with the immigrant housing 
problem. By 1991, the center was seriously over-crowded, the prefabs were not being main-
tained and there were constant reports of violent incidents. The law also required that such 
housing should only be provided for a maximum of six months, so the need to periodically 
evict all Via Corelli’s inhabitants created a situation of fear and police intimidation (in reality, 
the occupants stayed for an average of three years). […] In April 1993 the site was described 
as a ‘powder-keg’ and ‘unmanageable’. The original decision to contract out the management 
of the centers to co-operatives had proved disastrous in the Corelli case, as they were unable 
to keep any kind of control over the inhabitants» (Foot 1999: 163).  
 
 The growing tensions linked to immigration were soon politicized by the local far-right. 
The closure of Via Corelli became a key promise in the electoral program of Marco Formentini 
(LN), who eventually became city mayor in 1993. His victory broke the long-standing hegemony 
of the Milanese center-left, which had governed the city since the end of World War II. Also, 
amid the collapse of the Italian party system, this election sealed the national breakthrough of 
the LN, which took over the administration of the largest municipality of northern Italy. Part of 
Formentini’s success indeed owed to his law-and-order narrative on immigration. As an expert 
put it, the core of his message was «we will erect a wall around the city to keep the stranger out» 
(M2). 
 The image of ‘Fortress Milan’ was corroborated by the adoption of an assimilationist 
approach to integration, thus fully refraining from previous administrations’ multicultural poli-
cies. The closure of most controversial reception centers went hand in hand with the exclusion 
of immigrant associations from policy-making, which were substituted by Catholic organizations 
as legitimate stakeholders (cf. Caponio 2010a). Most notably, the vice-president of the Italian 
Voluntary Movement—an influential faith-based association—was appointed as head of the de-
partment for social services in 1995. Such a reshaping of the policy network was consistent with 
an emergent policy frame that viewed immigrants as needy individuals to be assisted rather than 
collective actors involved in urban governance. 
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 At the center of this new policy network was the Foreigners’ Office, whose civil servants 
gained a substantive discretionary power in managing the migration-related municipal budget. 
Service delivery was contracted out to (mostly Catholic) third sector organizations, which also 
gained substantive influence in autonomously designing policy interventions. These included 
basic housing facilities, vocational training, and language courses for most vulnerable immi-
grants, such as refugees and trafficked woman, while cultural integration was basically disre-
garded. In the words of a long-standing third sector figure, 
 
«Milan has […] a strong administrative apparatus that has always enacted policies beyond politics 
– especially over the years of right-wing incumbents. Proclaiming the enactment of some 
policies was not convenient for those political parties but, with a certain pragmatism, […] 
civil servants were allowed, de facto, to develop a set of social interventions» (M10, emphasis 
added).  
 
Conservative parties led the local government until 2011 and maintained a continuity in 
terms of migration policy-making. The Moratti’s administration (2006-2010), however, showed 
some peculiarities in this respect. Most notably, the city government embraced a harsher anti-
immigration discourse, especially spurred by some visible political figures, such as Riccardo De 
Corato (vice-mayor and member of AN) and Matteo Salvini (leader of the LN’s group in the city 
council). Immigrants and ethnic minorities—especially the undocumented and the Romanies—
were described as criminals guilty of a ‘security emergency’ and as a threat to the cultural identity 
of Milan. 
This resulted in a competitive dynamic between governing parties and a ‘race to the bot-
tom’ in terms of political discourse. Although mayor Moratti generally took less aggressive 
stances as compared to De Corato and Salvini, she also tended to chase her allies in the field of 
anti-immigration politics. For instance, the most right-wing exponents of the local government 
organized a demonstration in favor of ‘legality’ on 26 March 2007.43 By deciding to join the 
march, the mayor further legitimized their law-and-order stances. In the following days, Matteo 
                                                 
43 See La Repubblica Milano, 6 April 2017, ‘Tutti i nemici di Letizia Moratti in campo. E i tre motivi di una strana guerra’. 
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Salvini succeeded in transferring €400,000 of the municipal budget from social policies to the 
security department.44 
Several exclusionary policies were indeed carried out during those years. These targeted, 
first of all, undocumented immigrants. These latter were already banned from most social ser-
vices (cf. Caponio 2014: 14-5), but Moratti’s administration enacted further restrictions. For in-
stance, seniority criteria based on official residency for accessing public housing were introduced 
and the children of undocumented immigrants were excluded from municipal kindergartens.45 
Moreover, these immigrants were intensely targeted by local police forces in public spaces, and 
most notably in public transports. When found with no valid residence permits, migrants were 
forcedly accompanied to local police headquarters.46 Opposition parties accused incumbents of 
«repressive exhibitionism» while one interviewee defined these practices as «mere mopping-up 
operations» (M17). In the words of an immigrant activist, being an immigrant in Milan in those 
years meant 
 
«living with the police that could ask you for the residence permit in any moment. If you were 
caught on the tram with no ticket you were in real troubles, and if you had no permit you 
could easily end up in an immigrant detention center» (M15).   
 
The Chinese community was affected by ethnic profiling, too. Conflicts of space alloca-
tion between Italian residents and foreign shopkeepers escalated in the Milanese Chinatown, 
located in via Paolo Sarpi, a central neighborhood with a high concentration of Chinese retailers. 
While this immigrant community lamented the unfair and systematic issuing of fines by local 
police, native-born residents were discontent with the high concentration of foreign shops. The 
municipality established a negotiating table that eventually relocated several Chinese stores to 
the city outskirt, as Italian residents had demanded (cf. Mingione 2009: 232-3). Contention over 
ethnicity and space was even more severe in the case of Roma families precariously settled in 
unauthorized camps—a pattern of segregation that is common in Italian cities. These commu-
nities have been repeatedly targeted by far-right protests and violence (Salvini himself launched 
‘weekly patrols’ in many camps of the city), intense stigmatization by media outlets, and local 
                                                 
44 See La Repubblica Milano, 3 April 2007, ‘“Vince la Lega, la Cdl taglia i fondi destinati alle politiche sociali’- 
45 See https://www.aduc.it/index.php/notizia/milano+circolare+niente+asilo+figli+immigrati_96194.php 
46 See La Repubblica Milano, 30 May 2008, ‘Campi sgomberati, vigili sui tram. Scoppia la polemica immigrati.’ 
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authorities’ repression. The municipality adopted a hardline approach, refusing to acknowledge 
the Roma community as a legitimate stakeholder and implementing several evictions as a strategy 
of repression and (unsuccessful) deterrence (cf. Sigona 2008; Vitale 2008).  
It has to be noted that these exclusionary local policies were enacted in the context of a 
securitarian crescendo at the national level (see Section 4.3), which also resulted in the delegation 
of security competences to local authorities. City governments and the Ministry of Interior 
crafted ‘Security Pacts’ for the allocation of exceptional resources, most often employed to cope 
with migration-related issues. Milan’s city council approved the Patto per Milano Sicura (Pact for a 
Safe Milan) on 18 May 2007 (cf. Castelli Gattinara 2016: 65). 
 The analysis of official policy documents adds further nuance to this account. The Piani 
di Zona (Area Plans) are the most relevant policy tools for the planning of social policies in Italian 
municipalities. Normally they are prepared every three years and also provide for the inclusion 
of non-institutional actors in policy formulation and implementation (Catalano et al. 2015). The 
first Area Plan approved by Moratti’s administration (2006-2008) is indeed characterized by an 
assimilationist frame (cf. Comune di Milano 2006). The assistance of most vulnerable individuals 
is combined with a law-and-order approach to ‘social deviances.’ Integration is justified on an 
individual basis, as long as this path is strictly compliant with local laws and ‘values.’ Most nota-
bly, the policy document repeatedly points at immigration as a problem, for instance blaming 
the Roma population of being responsible for urban crimes (p. 33), setting the prosecution of 
undocumented immigrants as a priority (p. 43), and interpreting inter-ethnic marriages as a social 
threat (p. 55). 
Strikingly, however, the Area Plan 2009-2011 has a much more liberal understanding of 
migration and diversity (Comune di Milano 2009). Although references to the ‘traditional family’ 
and ‘Christian values’ are present, the social and cultural integration of foreign communities is 
introduced as a new policy principle—especially when it comes to school integration and support 
for second-generation immigrants. Policy analysts have interpreted such a shift as a consequence 
of the city’s international branding strategy in view of the 2015 World Fair (cf. Caponio 2014: 
18). This also brought to some tentative steps for (re-)including foreign communities in local 
governance. One of the interviewee was among the experts appointed for mapping immigrant 
associations in the city, designing calls for public financing, and arranging a series of meetings 
with the leaders of these organizations. In her words, «the administration’s idea was to get in 
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touch and support these groups so as to construct an ‘intermediary body’ to interact with» (M6). 
Yet these interactions were not eventually institutionalized and ‘native’ Catholic associations kept 
on bearing the lion’s share of integration policies. 
In sum, after a first phase of fragile multiculturalism, Milan’s local government turned to 
a much stricter approach to policy-making in 1993, when conservative and anti-immigration 
parties took over the city hall. Exclusionary policies—including welfare-chauvinist provisions 
and deliberate ethnic profiling and segregation—became the hallmark of the Moratti’s admin-
istration (2006-2011). By conflating law-and-order into immigration issues and deploying a harsh 
nativist rhetoric, the most right-wing component of the governing coalition ultimately domi-
nated agenda-setting dynamics. This also entailed a media-savvy strategy that included protest-
oriented actions, such as street demonstrations and vigilantism. An assimilationist approach pre-
vailed in the realm of integration policies, with extremely needy individuals deemed the only 
ones deserving assistance. The predominance of Catholic third sector organizations as policy 
designers and service providers was mirrored in the marginality of immigrants’ associations, alt-
hough some tentative steps toward their incorporation were made since the late 2000s, as a 
consequence of the city’s international branding strategy in view of the 2015 World Fair. 
 
The center-left in office: Toward a partial integration of immigrants into the urban life 
 Immigration and diversity were of the thorniest topics during the 2011 local electoral 
campaign. The main candidates were the mayor Moratti—seeking second term with her con-
servative and anti-immigration coalition—and Giuliano Pisapia, a leftist civil rights lawyer who 
won the center-left primaries as an ‘underdog’ (see Section 3.2). Pisapia’s political platform 
openly embraced multiculturalism by declaring immigrants as fully-fledged members of the Mil-
anese community and openly refuting the migration-criminality nexus. Policy proposals included 
the establishment of a one-stop office delivering migration-related services, the promotion of 
immigrants’ voting rights in local elections, and the building of the first Milan’s Mosque—a long-
standing demand of the local Muslim community. Conservatives fiercely criticized Pisapia for 
his allegedly ‘naïf’ and soft approach to immigration and claimed the goodness of the restrictive 
approach adopted till then. Center-right campaign rhetoric was particularly harsh and frequently 
resorted to alarmist tones, falsehoods, and ethnic discriminations (cf. Castelli Gattinara 2016: 
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100). For instance, chief competitors were accused of yearning to transform Milan in a ‘gyp-
syland’ (zingaropoli). The center-left eventually won the electoral race and Pisapia became city 
mayor on 1 June 2011. 
 The shift toward multiculturalism was evident when it comes to the discursive side of 
policy-making. Pisapia’s administration broadened the boundaries of the ‘Milanese identity’ so 
as to include many of those excluded until then—notably ethnic and immigrant minorities (Ar-
tero 2018: 121). The 2012-2014 Area Plan and its successive amendments put great emphasis on 
the recognition of social rights and cultural diversity (Comune di Milano 2012; 2015). When 
publicly presenting the 2012 policy document, the new Deputy Mayor for Social Policy, Pier-
francesco Majorino, recognized undocumented immigrants as legitimate members of the com-
munity and declared that their children «have been considered a bothersome background noise 
for too long» (Majorino 2012: 3). In addition to the already existing social interventions (i.e., 
basic assistance for extremely deprived or vulnerable individuals, cultural mediation, vocational 
training, and schooling, cf. Comune di Milano 2009), the 2012 Area Plan introduced a new set 
of priorities, such as immigrants’ political participation, health-related provisions, and the estab-
lishment of an ‘Immigration Center’ (i.e., one of the flagship initiatives of the center-left electoral 
campaign). 
Moving from ‘talk’ to ‘walk’, policy outcomes under the center-left administration were 
mixed. Among the first public acts of Pisapia as mayor of Milan, in July 2011, was to prevent 
local police from checking travel documents and residence permits on public transports. An-
other post-electoral initiative was to oppose the decision of the Italian government of re-opening 
Via Corelli as an Immigrant Detention Center, widely known for the extremely poor living con-
ditions of inmates. In 2014, following extensive negotiations with central authorities, the munic-
ipality succeeded in reconverting this facility into an accommodation center for asylum-seekers 
who were massively transiting through the city since the previous year. Policies in favor of forced 
migrants were possibly the most relevant ones enacted by the new administration and will be 
treated separately in Chapter 7. 
In addition to these highly visible and symbolic decisions, the administration enacted a 
range of provisions aimed at the long-term settlement of immigrants. The RaggiungiMi project 
(Join Me)—funded by the Ministry of Labor and based on the cooperation of multiple institu-
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tional actors—was launched for facilitating family reunification procedures and providing psy-
chological assistance to recently-settled family members (cf. Caponio 2014: 15). The access of 
these migrants to educational services—especially language courses—was favored through a 
website47 that achieved relevant results in its first two years of operation (116 schools involved, 
33,000 visualizations, 500 daily contacts, 7,000 emails received and replied, cf. Comune di Milano 
2015: 15). 
Other relevant initiatives targeted second-generation immigrants. The GLab office was 
set up to provides information on education, employment, and naturalization opportunities. 
Also, the municipality launched an initiative named Una finestra sui tuoi diritti (A Window on Your 
Rights) for favoring the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants’ children. According to the 
Italian law, those born of immigrant parents on the national territory, once they turn 18, have 
one year to apply for citizenship. Once this time window is closed, 10 more years are necessary 
for a successful application. The municipality thus started to contact all eligible subjects, as many 
are not familiar with, or aware of, such procedures. After one year since its launch, the number 
of naturalized children in the city increased by 39% (Costa and Sabatinelli 2017). 
 However, the Pisapia’s administration was also marked by relevant policy gaps and fail-
ures. The Immigration Center—a prominent electoral promise and policy priority of new in-
cumbents—was, in fact, never established. A less far-reaching infrastructure—the Centro delle 
Culture Migranti (Center of Migrant Cultures)—has been established instead (Comune di Milano 
2015: 15-6). Originally, the one-stop office was indeed intended to gather all immigration-related 
services ‘under one roof’ so as to ease both user access and back-office coordination (Comune 
di Milano 2012: 144). The plan thus required relevant actors involved in multi-level governance 
(e.g., municipal and regional authorities, police forces, third sector organizations) to strengthen 
cooperation. Such exchanges, however, proved rather difficult. One local public official claimed 
that «the confrontational attitude [of the Deputy Mayor of Social Policies] had obstructed many 
possible collaborations» (M14). Another civil servant reported that 
 
«[i]nter-institutional cooperation was the greatest ambition [of the Immigration Center]. The 
project eventually consisted in gathering all the municipal offices dealing with immigrantion 
                                                 
47 See https://milano.italianostranieri.org/  
 99 
in one seat. […] [c]ompared to the original plan, the outcome has been a bit disappointing 
or, at least, different from the expectations» (M16).   
 
 Another case in point is immigrant political participation. On the one hand, the admin-
istration sought to transform the Area Plan from a «bureaucratic fulfilment» to «an opportunity 
for […] jointly defining the meanings, the decisions, and the interventions» of municipal welfare 
(Majorino 2012: 1). The new Area Plan indeed pointed at the enlargement of policy networks to 
broader ranges of participants—especially NGOs—as a new «inspiring principle» of urban gov-
ernance (Comune di Milano 2012: 10). The document was actually prepared on the basis of 
several public venues occurred in the previous months (ibid.: 14-5) and through the establish-
ment of a permanent deliberative arena, named FTS (Forum del Terzo Settore – Forum of Third 
Sector Organizations, ibid.: 95). As a leading third sector figure put it, «the method of the 
Pisapia’s administration consisted in engaging the city in conversation and establishing new 
bridges» (M18). 
 Such an enlargement of the policy network, however, barely concerned immigrant asso-
ciations. Local incumbents involved these actors as partner organizations of the 2015 World 
Fair—as the Moratti’s administration also did—by establishing the Milan World City Forum. 
However, no further structures for participation in policy-making were built. Lacunae are evident 
also in the case of religious diversity and cultural recognition. In 2012, the municipality estab-
lished an official register of religious organizations in the city (Caponio 2014: 18-9), but more 
far-reaching interventions were absent and, most importantly, the electoral promise of building 
a Mosque was not delivered. In sum, beside a greater discursive emphasis on political and cultural 
inclusion, no substantive policy changes were achieved by the new local incumbents. 
 Finally, Pisapia’s administration was marked by a sharp discursive change in local migra-
tion policy-making. Multiculturalism was openly embraced, to the detriment of previous assim-
ilationist approaches, and migration-related issues largely ceased to be conflated into security 
ones. A set of new initiatives were launched to enlarge the rights of immigrants, especially when 
it comes to second-generation ones, family reunification procedures, and forced migrants. Also, 
more democratic forms of policy-making were allowed by involving a plethora of new actors in 
the design and the delivery of social interventions. Yet the administration was also characterized 
by major policy failures, most notably the missed establishment of the Immigration Center and 
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the first Milan’s Mosque, as well as the scarce inclusion of immigrant associations in urban gov-
ernance—substantially in line with the previous administrations’ trajectory. 
5.3 The emergence of pro-immigrant activism in Milan 
Immigrant activism in Milan started blooming in the 1970s, mainly with a focus on homeland 
politics. Yet, as foreign communities became more sizeable, activist groups increasingly mobi-
lized on issues related to their context of settlement. This was the case, for example, of the 
Eritrea Popular Liberation Front and the Eritrea Liberation Front, which gradually turned into 
advocates of Eritrean workers’ rights (cf. Caponio 2005: 938-40). With further immigrant asso-
ciations mushrooming and politicizing—foremost the Egyptian and the Iranian—the 
Coordinamento Migranti emerged in 1986 as an umbrella organization aimed at affecting urban 
politics (see above). 
A fully-fledged pro-immigrant movement eventually emerged in the late 1990s, concom-
itantly with the breakthrough of immigration as a contested policy issue on the national stage. 
As recounted by one longtime activist, 
 
«I began to focus on migration with a ‘movement approach’ in 1998. Participation had been 
feeble ‘til then […] In 1998, an antiracist committee began to gather […] virtually every group 
mobilized over migration in the city, as all were deeply shocked by […] the establishment of 
the CPTs [i.e. immigrant detention centers]. […] That was a true turning point. I can date 
back to that moment my decision to get involved. Dealing with immigration really began to 
mean dealing with politics at large» (M7). 
 
Not by chance, the first relevant contentious actions of the movement concerned the center of 
Via Corelli—whose purpose of use was converted from reception to detention and expulsion 
precisely with the Law 40/1998. As reported by John Foot, «huge barriers were built around the 
area which was referred to as a ‘concentration camp’ by protest groups» (1999: 164). 
 The Global Justice Movement (GJM) played a decisive role in both the upscaling and 
the latency of the city’s pro-migrant movement over time. As an activist put it, «[the 27th G8 
Summit in] Genoa meant a lot to us, because that repression first affected the organization at 
the global level and, in the next years, let’s say after [the social forums in] Florence, […] also at 
 101 
the national and the city levels» (M7). The ‘embeddedness’ in the GJM—often defined as a 
‘movement of movements’—is also reflected in the variety of organizations involved, which 
range «from Catholics to the social centers» (della Porta & Mosca 2007: 9). Milan’s pro-immi-
grant movement, in fact, consists of two co-existing souls, one more radical and contentious—
including left-wing trade unions and welfare associations, radical left parties, squatters, and sec-
tions of immigrant associations—and the other more moderate and ‘institutionalized’—basically 
consisting of progressive faith-based associations. Such a dual identity relates, more broadly, to 
the industrial history of the city and its traditional solidarity networks (cf. Casaglia 2018; Mem-
bretti & Mudu 2013). 
In the account of another longtime activist and trade unionist, the «interweaving between 
a culture of rights and a culture of solidarity» originated from already existing networks commit-
ted with issues that gradually became related to migration—such as the condition of prisoners, 
homelessness, poverty, and employment (M23). In her own words, that was 
 
«a slow process of  relationship-building that did not directly depart from immigration. […] 
[L]ittle by little, as the immigration phenomenon grew, the idea of making policies, of acting, 
began to take shape […]. We did our first reflections on best practices of integration and, 
eventually, reached out for institutions for demanding their intervention» (M23). 
 
 This also points to another feature of Milanese pro-migrant activists, namely the engage-
ment in both social volunteering and political activism, which is referred to as «the cement» of 
Milan’s activism (M23). Healthcare, legal assistance, social housing, vocational training are prom-
inent instances of welfare services that are both provided and advocated by civil society organi-
zations. These two repertoires of action are mutually interdependent. Non-state actors, in fact, 
enact practices of ‘welfare from below’ as a response to state failures or tightening policies. As 
an expert put it, 
 
«immigrants have a body. […] [Those] excluded from official policies get sick, need a place 
to sleep, to eat, they might want to learn Italian, find a job, and get regularized. Restrictive 
policies create greater rooms for civil society in responding to such concrete needs» (M1). 
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Simultaneously, she added, these bottom-up responses are «implicitly political.» Direct 
social actions have produced a capital of legitimacy and credibility when engaging in political 
claim-making (cf. Zamponi 2017). This process is well-described by one spokesperson of an 
activist organization with long-standing experience in providing welfare services for undocu-
mented immigrants (see also Ambrosini 2015: 122-5): 
 
«[Our organization] is mainly engaged in pragmatic initiatives, and this is a form of pressure 
on the municipality in itself. By delivering roughly 15,000 medical examination per year, we 
necessarily interact with the municipality and—in a rather contentious manner—with the 
Region. We are in asylum reception centers, in the jails, we work with sex workers in the 
streets, we access dismissed areas. These activities are channels of influence by themselves. […] 
We speak by doing» (M7, emphasis added). 
 
In a similar fashion, the leader of a faith-based association asserted that her organization «does 
politics through services» (M10).  
 The Milan’s pro-immigrant movement—while multifaced in its composition and reper-
toire of action—has been typically characterized by the relative marginality of immigrant activ-
ists. Numerous scholars studied immigrant associations and immigrants’ political participation 
in the city (e.g., Caponio 2005; Pilati 2012; Caselli & Grandi 2011). Most of these studies point 
at these associations as highly fragmented (most often on an ethnic basis), poorly structured and 
resourceful, and scarcely able to interact with institutional players. As mentioned above, the mu-
nicipality indeed tended to interact with more experienced, native-led, mostly faith-based civil 
society organizations, which acted as partners of administration and ‘indirectly’ represented im-
migrant interests. Being hardly recognized as relevant stakeholders, the intermediation of au-
tochthonous organizations indeed proved crucial for influencing urban governance, especially 
in times of closed political opportunities (Morales & Giugni 2011; Pilati 2012). In the next par-
agraphs, the dynamics of interaction and the outcomes of pro-immigrant activism will be ana-
lyzed by focusing on specific contentious policy arenas. 
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5.4 Mobilizing against exclusion: Social movement outcomes in face of hos-
tile conditions 
This section explores how activists can affect anti-immigration policies by focusing on the ex-
clusionary provisions enacted by the Moratti’s administration. During these years, pro-immigra-
tion mobilizations were characterized by highly conflictual interactions, extreme ideological dis-
tance, and virtually no rooms for compromise. Activists described these years as a «black hole, 
our darkest hour» (M23) and lamented to be «never accepted as a counterpart—and this is why 
we used to take the streets to put our claims forward» (M19). A public official agreed with this 
view, stating that «no dialogue has ever taken place, there was too much ideological divergence» 
(M14). However, she added, protest groups often had the role of signaling urgent societal prob-
lems: 
 
«Because of their pressure, their role of ‘goads’, [social movements] always had an almost 
positive role […] Their contestation […] denoted a genuine concern for the city and indicated 
where urban critical problems were heightening. With hindsight, free of emotional reactions, 
I can say that contestation […] has always been useful for soliciting the municipality and the 
police—that means, institutions—to take a stance and intervene» (M14). 
 
Collective actions were generally oriented at opposing unwanted policy decisions or pre-
venting even less desirable outcomes to occur. One common strategy was resorting to court 
litigations. For instance, a Moroccan undocumented woman—with the back-up of solidarity 
activists—filed an appeal at the Court of Milan to oppose the exclusion of her child from mu-
nicipal kindergarteners (see above). The judges declared the municipal ordinance as discrimina-
tory in 2008, one year after its adoption, on the following grounds: «minors in Italy cannot be 
considered as irregularly staying and therefore they cannot be excluded from the provision of a 
public service they have the right to benefit from» (cf. Delvino & Spencer 2014: 20). 
 On certain occasions, the repertoire of action was more confrontational and included 
risky demonstrations, such as hunger strikes and occupations. This was often the case when 
unauthorized Roma camps were coercively cleared. As one activist recalled, «we resorted to pas-
sive resistance each time a camp was evicted, we were there to at least ensure compliance with 
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human rights—especially of children—during the operations» (M17). On 31 October 2007, fol-
lowing the eviction of a camp located in Via Donigi and the consequent expulsion of its inhab-
itants from the municipal dormitory of Via Ortles, a group of Romani families remained home-
less. Subsequently, a group of activists occupied the office of Marolina Moioli, Deputy Mayor 
of Social Policies. The episode had wide media resonance also thanks to Franca Rame—a fa-
mous Milanese actress, then-member of the Italian parliament—who publicly supported the 
protest. Romani families were eventually relocated in the Ortles center, a municipal dormitory, 
until definitive solutions were found.48 One activist recall that day in detail: 
 
«I was in front of the City Council with the moms and the kids. […] Franca Rame was walking 
nearby while going to a television studio for an interview and jokingly told me: ‘C., why are 
you always making messes around?’, so I explained her the situation. Then she called the TV 
studios and told them to come there, and so they did. […] She was very media savvy. At that 
point [the mayor] Moratti called Moioli and told her […] to solve the problem before things 
get worse» (M23). 
 
 Another instance of radical action was the occupation of Torre Imbonati—a smokestack 
of a dismissed factory located in Milan’s northern outskirts—on 6 November 2010. Inspired by 
a similar mobilization that was taking place in the city of Brescia (cf. Cappiali 2016), undocu-
mented protesters targeted the Cabinet Berlusconi III for the exceptional regularization imple-
mented in the previous months (so-called sanatoria, cf. Chapter 4). They criticized the limited 
scope of this measure—addressed to domestic workers and caregivers only—and the bureau-
cratic burden on eligible subjects. The prospect of regularization indeed pushed many immi-
grants to do whatever in their means for a successful application. Frauds proliferated under such 
circumstances, with undocumented migrants becoming easy prays of false information and prof-
iteers. As a trade unionist working on migrant rights put it, amnesties are «absurd limbos in 
which anything can happen and which testify the failure of the law» (M3). 
While opposing this measure—referred to as a ‘swindle-act’ (legge truffa)—protesters also 
put forward demands concerning citizenship and political rights, such as the expansion of inter-
                                                 
48 La Repubblica Milano, 1 November 2007, “Rom Sfollati Occupano il Comune”. 
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national protection, the conferment of Italian citizenship to second-generation immigrants, vot-
ing rights for those residing in the country for at least 5 years, and easier procedures related to 
residence permits.49 Protest banners summarized such demands with slogans as «We are not 
illegal, we are the new citizens» and «Amnesty for all».50 The group self-proclaimed as Comitato 
Immigrati (Immigrants’ Committee). 
Activists found the support of several allies. Assorted groups—including radical left par-
ties, base unions, welfare associations, and progressive Christians—expressed solidarity by 
camping at the base of the tower and organizing many other protests in the city. Also prominent 
political and religious figures endorsed the occupation—further boosting the media resonance 
around such an extreme action. Giuliano Pisapia, then-candidate for mayor, declared: «I consider 
this demonstration as a relevant moment […] to oppose the anti-immigrant politics propagated 
by the mayor Moratti in Milan and by Berlusconi at the national level.»51 The protest had its 
momentum and succeeded in obtaining a bargaining table with the local prefecture, which was 
keen to accommodate at least some of the protesters’ demands (cf. Camozzi 2011: 38-40). 
 The mobilization, however, was also marked by relevant pitfalls. Conflictual interactions 
unfolded not only vis-à-vis national and local incumbents—with the vice-mayor De Corato de-
fining the action as «a seizure of the whole neighborhood» and urging for the deportation of 
undocumented protesters—52but also within the movement itself. Internal splits owed to the conflict 
between immigrant activists and their ‘native’ allies, accused of patronizing decision-making and 
illegitimately profiting from the protest’s visibility.53 As political self-determination was at the 
core of immigrants’ claim-making, this conflict proved especially acute. One immigrant activist 
recalled that «the struggle for immigrants’ leadership within the antiracist movement had been 
extremely tough» and eventually «broke up the Comitato» (M19). 
 Its initial success notwithstanding, the protest indeed failed after 28 days of occupation. 
Activists did not succeed in setting up a univocal strategy for negotiation with the prefecture and 
                                                 
49 See https://immigratiautoorganizzatimilano.blogspot.com  
50 See https://milano.corriere.it/milano/notizie/cronaca/10_dicembre_2/imbonati-torre-carlo-erba-immigrati-ciminiera-finita-
protesta-1804294571002.shtml  
51 See https://milano.corriere.it/milano/notizie/cronaca/10_novembre_8/immigrati_imbonati-1804121406527.shtml  
52 See https://milano.corriere.it/milano/notizie/cronaca/10_dicembre_2/imbonati-torre-carlo-erba-immigrati-ciminiera-finita-
protesta-1804294571002 
53 See https://immigratiautoorganizzatimilano.blogspot.com/2011/01/bilancio-via-imbonati.html  
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the occupation gradually became less viable due to harsh weather conditions and the deteriorat-
ing state of health of occupiers. Authorities did not accommodated any of the demands and also 
deported one of the undocumented protesters as soon as the demonstration was concluded. 
One interviewee defined the protest as a «major failure» and pointed at the so-called ‘Powerful 
Ally’ dilemma as outlined by James Jasper (2015: 20). In fact, 
 
«Italian supporters exploited immigrants, their problems, and their demands, as ‘spearheads’ 
in their own battles. [...] [They] have used and damaged them. […] Immigrants need some-
body’s support to mobilize, but these supporters have their own agenda, which does not 
necessarily overlap with migrants’ one» (M1). 
 
A unionist working on immigrant rights agreed with this view and stated that deportable immi-
grants have been «instrumentalized» and «irresponsibly used as cannon fodder» (M3). 
 In a nutshell, activism has been highly conflictual and barely influential in the case of 
anti-immigration local policies. In face of a denied access to institutional channels of policy-
making, mobilizations were prevalently of a disruptive kind and oriented toward ‘resistance’ and 
‘damage limitation.’ Some gains were obtained when opposing the exclusion of immigrants’ chil-
dren from municipal kindergartners—a decision that the administration was forced to with-
drawn—and when trying to mitigate the most detrimental consequences for evicted Romani 
families. These outcomes, however, could only be achieved by means of  extreme, highly visible 
actions of ‘last resort’ (e.g., hunger strikes and illegal occupations) or venue-shopping strategies 
(e.g., court appeals). Importantly, mobilization even led to remarkable and unintended losses, 
such as the deportation of undocumented activists. Such weaknesses were further exacerbated 
by the fragmentation of the movement itself, which suffered from acute internal conflicts over 
the ethnicity-paternalism nexus. 
5.5 Necessary, unreliable allies: Sympathetic political elites favoring and ob-
structing the success of social movements 
The electoral victory of Pisapia marked a shift from a minimalist and technocratic understanding 
of local welfare toward a more expansive and participatory model. As for migration, local in-
cumbents took a leadership position in advocating pro-immigrant politics and incorporating new 
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demands in their policy agenda. This approach greatly differs from Moratti’s, with blame-
avoidant politicians staying ‘in the shadow’ and delegating integration policies to non-elected 
actors—foremost civil servants, appointed experts, and service providers. As mentioned above, 
the center-left administration indeed enlarged the policy network beyond the existing ‘inner cir-
cle’ of Moratti’s privileged, mostly Catholic partners. 
Progressive civil society organizations positively received such political and policy rever-
sals. One third sector figure stated that «the Moratti’s main concern was not doing an inch more 
of what was strictly necessary, […] while the new government’s approach is ‘we are interested in 
whatever is social’» (M5). In the words of a civil servant, «there has been a shift from a model 
based on the mere provision of services to a participatory one—both in the implementation and 
the formulation of policies. […] We would have never done what we have done for immigrant 
integration without the fresh participation of civil society» (M8). 
The FTS was the highest expression of such a renewed model of urban governance. This 
policy venue replaced the so-called tavoli di lavoro, i.e. technical working groups. As recounted by 
one activist, «under the Moratti’s administrations these working groups were slightly more than 
symbolic; games were made outside. We used to attend them just to know what was ‘brewing 
up’» (M7). According to the head of a third sector organization, these venues were 
 
«nothing more than expert meetings. They did not involve the city at large on a political and 
cultural level. […] [a]t that time, shedding too much light on what was going on it was not 
appropriate, at least in the sector of immigration, being so politically sensitive. […] The FTS 
has been a platform for putting innovative ideas on the table, which the administration has 
sometimes took charge of» (M10). 
 
Similarly, a key figure of the FTS stated that «[the Moratti’s administration] used to send us the 
Area Plan and, the day after, hold a meeting saying ‘you have 30 minutes for your comments, 
now or never’». Differently, he described the FTS as «a state of mind more than a policy venue» 
(M18). 
 Within the context of this different style of policy-making, social movements benefited 
from a greater access to institutional spaces. This outcome has to be interpreted also as a conse-
quence of the 2011 local electoral campaign. Pisapia’s candidacy was indeed endorsed by a wide 
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range of progressive supporters, including activists on the radical left. The prospect of moving 
beyond a hostile political season galvanized diverse groups into supporting the center-left elec-
toral platform. Pro-immigrant organizations—as an expert put it—«were waiting for the election 
of Pisapia as water in the desert» (M2). One activist confirmed that «there was a strong push for 
the victory of Pisapia, because [the previous administration] had put forward a disgusting way 
of doing politics; this is why an alliance emerged within a previously fragmented landscape of 
social activism» (M23). Similarly, another activist recounted that «when Pisapia became the 
mayoral candidate of the center-left, all the associations of migrants, antifascists, antiracists 
started playing an active role in electoral campaigning. […] Pisapia won also thanks to a base of 
supporters that was not ‘his own’ base, but which was strongly looking for a change» (M19). 
 Perceiving the opening of favorable political opportunities, previously unconnected 
groups were thus incentivized to engage in alliance-building so as to affect local migration policy-
making (Steil & Vasi 2014). The Milanese center-left was capable of taking the political leadership 
of this activist base and crafting a large and cohesive coalition around a progressive political 
vision (Liu et al. 2010). By granting access to existing policy venues, and by establishing new 
ones, local incumbents ‘rewarded’ their supporters so as to consolidate their political consensus 
(Hutter et al. 2019). 
 Substantive gains, however, have been quite limited for pro-immigrant activists, espe-
cially during the first years of the Pisapia’s administration. Many interviewees perceived policy 
changes to be more symbolic than concrete and lamented that their greater access to decision-
making did not translated into remarkable results—an outcome that might be defined as ‘access 
without influence.’ In the words of one unionist working on migrant rights, «I see grand decla-
rations of principle, I see the will of weaving a different narrative, but […] [Majorino] should be 
more concrete in his daily activities, otherwise it’s quite useless» (M3). In the account of another 
interviewee, the change of color of the city government did not ensure any ‘easy win’; rather, 
gains were achieved through a sort of ‘confrontational cooperation’: 
 
«The victory of Pisapia […] didn’t help much from a concrete point of view. But, at least, we 
finally engaged in a dialogue with the municipality. Our relationship consisted in keeping on 
pressure on the city government, but it was not a friendly relationship. […] Our tactic was to 
wrest some promises and then keep them accountable on that. So it is not easy» (M19). 
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 However, more substantive gains were achieved following the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ 
and the election of Beppe Sala as city mayor in June 2016. As Chapter 7 will show in detail, in 
fact, the city government has extensively cooperated with urban social movements while coping 
with an unprecedented humanitarian emergency in the city, especially in the 2014-16 period. This 
crucial juncture opened further rooms for cooperation, with pro-immigrant activists seizing the 
moment to broaden their demands beyond the case of asylum-seekers and refugees. 
The most significant instance concerned the issue of registration in the municipal census. 
Far from being a mere bureaucratic question, in Italy residenza is a pre-condition to access as-
sorted basic services, including healthcare, social housing, and income support schemes (e.g., 
Gargiulo 2017). No One Is Illegal (NOII)—an activist network emerged amid the ‘refugee cri-
sis’—staged a number of protest events in June-July 2017 demanding the registration of all sub-
jects devoid of (1) fixed abode, (2) ‘regular’ abode (i.e.. living in illegally occupied buildings), and 
(3) residence permit. The Italian law recognizes the right of residence to the first category only, 
but many local governments do not comply with this provision either. This was also the case of 
Milan’s. Activists thus urged the city government to both conform with and move beyond national 
provisions. Specifically, they claimed 
 
«the immediate respect for the civil rights related to the registration in the municipal census 
and the extension of these rights to the entire citizenship, meaning […] whoever is habitually 
resident in the Milanese territory, without discrimination of nationality».54 
 
These rights should be ensured by «establishing fictitious residence address [residenza fittizia]». 
This provision would represent «a first step to make Milan more similar to ‘sanctuary cities’, such 
as Barcelona with its local ID cards» (see Chapter 6).55 
 Some of these demands were accommodated.  Following an official meeting with NOII’s 
activists on 25 July 2017, the municipality launched a project named Residenza-Mi that settled 
four fictitious residence address across the city.56 Residence rights were then guaranteed to not 
                                                 
54 See https://www.facebook.com/notes/nessuna-persona-%C3%A8-illegale/la-residenza-anagrafica-e-un-diritto-ne-
gato/400247753703301/ 
55 See https://www.facebook.com/events/486304245094760/ 
56 See https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/02/19/news/senzatetto_milano_sportelli_residenza_fittizia-219551691/  
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only subjects devoid of fixed, but also those with no ‘regular’ abode—thus derogating the Decree 
Law 47/2014. The provision, however, did not include undocumented immigrants. In launching 
the project, the deputy mayor Majorino embraced many activists’ claims by declaring: 
 
«Residence registration is an essential condition to access a set of basic services. We thus want 
to make sure that everyone benefits from the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, first of 
all the access to healthcare through the National Health System». 
 
The receptiveness of the city government—as one activist put it—«has astonished 
the antiracist movement» (M15). One NOII’s spokesperson recounted the interactions 
with the municipality as follows: 
 
«I still don’t fully get why they made this political choice, because the national Democratic 
Party has taken a totally different path. Perhaps precisely because of their relative isolation 
vis-à-vis national counterparts, […] the mayor and Majorino have shown a degree of open-
ness that is unique for nowadays’ institutional politics. […] We had formal meetings with top 
politicians and high-ranked civil servants – something I was very surprised of – especially on 
the topic of the municipal census. We discussed, exchanged documents, they read them, told 
us what was feasible and what was not, made promises and kept them. They accepted all our 
requests, except for the registration of undocumented migrants—something that the munic-
ipality can’t do anyway, but which is an important question of principle for us. If they ac-
cepted this too, that would really be a lot. In sum, we’re having exchanges that were not there 
before, and I find it very useful and productive» (M7). 
 
 While largely positive for the pro-immigrant movement, this achievement of this out-
come sheds light on two interrelated factors that can obstruct the responsiveness of local gov-
ernments to demand-makers. First, multi-level governance plays a decisive role in shaping such 
interactions at the city-level. One public officials involved in the meeting with activists referred 
that 
 
«some demands are mostly idealistic. […] If there is an availability from the side of the central 
government, the prefecture, and the police, then we can do something, otherwise it’s impos-
sible. […] Our job is also to let people understand which are the responsibilities of each 
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institution, so that they don’t miss the target. I know it’s simpler to talk with us and Majorino, 
but most of what we can do is to mediate […] with the prefecture and the police. We can’t 
do more, for instance changing the laws» (M13). 
 
As the PD deepened its restrictive positions while leading the Italian government (2013-2018), 
the rooms for progressive local policies became narrower. Yet, this also incentivized Milan’s 
local government to employ ‘unconventional means’ to pursue its policy objectives, in some 
cases even overstepping its jurisdictional boundaries. 
 The second aspect concerns what can be referred to as the ‘legality-legitimacy nexus.’ In 
the case of the municipal census, the gap between movement demands and policy responses 
ultimately depends on the legal limits faced by institutional players. These latter are part of insti-
tutional arrangements that set the scope of what they can legitimately do. As one expert put it, 
«local institutions have merely administrative functions, so they must respect national and re-
gional laws. They can’t imagine a sort of ‘independent republic’» (M2). Social movements, in-
stead, are not submitted to such institutional rationales (cf. Verhoeven & Bröer 2015). They 
consider social justice as a higher priority than compliance with the law. In Milan, the activists 
interviewed referred to these different logics as ‘the legal divide’ (faglia della legalità) and perceived 
it as the ultimate limit to their success. 
 In the words of a movement spokesperson,  
 
«In our view, legality is either possible or doesn’t exist—and if it doesn’t exist we simply don’t 
care. Since here in Italy you cannot legally settle, we use the term ‘impossible legality.’ We 
discussed this with the municipality, but most [of public officials] are embedded in a very 
‘legal’ culture, by which what is legal is legitimate, and all the rest stays outside. The problem, 
however, it’s that everything stays outside. Therefore, there’s a debate across Italian municipal-
ities about the huge difficulties of delivering welfare services to subjects that are not legally 
entitled to. They are half a million people on the Italian territory, at least. […] We have less 
conflicts with the administration when it comes to asylum-seekers. Why? Precisely because of the 
‘legal divide.’ Asylum-seekers are legally entitled subjects. But what about other marginal sub-
jects? People with no income and residence permit. This is the ‘legal divide’ and makes all the 
difference» (M7, emphasis added). 
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Consistently, a public official refers that «the harshest conflicts occurred with […] stakeholders 
that prioritize (what they claimed to be) the defense of rights over the respect of rules that public 
administrations must necessarily comply with» (M8). 
 In sum, the 2011 election of Pisapia as Milan’s city mayor opened new opportunities for 
pro-immigrant mobilizations in the city. The center-left administration promoted a more inclu-
sive vision of urban citizenship and a more participatory model of policy-making, marking a 
significant shift from the approach pursued by the previous conservative incumbents. The pro-
spect of political change incentivized pro-immigrant activists to mobilize already during the 2011 
local electoral campaign. When it comes to policy-making, however, outcomes were mostly lim-
ited to a greater access to decision-making procedures but scarce substantive benefits for move-
ment constituencies. This scenario changed following the 2013-17 ‘refugee crisis.’ Activists were 
able to establish meaningful ties with local political elites, which were induced to register subjects 
with no fixed or regular abode in the municipal census. While partly successful, the struggle over 
municipal registration also epitomized the limits experienced by social movements when relying 
on institutional allies. These latter are normally anchored to a legally-bounded notion of rights 
entitlement, whereas social movements advocate a universalistic vision of urban citizenship, 
based on the principle of membership upon residency. Sympathetic political elites thus appear 
essential and yet unreliable partners in the accommodation of activists’ demands. 
5.6 Conclusion: Arenas and mechanisms of social movement outcomes in 
the case of exclusionary policies 
The city of Milan experienced important political changes over the last decades. Conservative 
and anti-immigration parties took over the city hall in 1993 and remained in office until 2011, 
when a center-left coalition won the local electoral race with the back-up of many progressive 
civil society organizations. Such a shift was mirrored in drastically different frames and contents 
of local migration policies. The chapter examined the role of pro-immigrant activists in the pro-
duction of these outcomes, with a specific focus on their opposition to local exclusionary poli-
cies. This section wraps up the main findings and bring them into dialogue with the theoretical 
framework of this study (Section 2.5). 
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The approach of the Moratti’s administration (2006-2011) to migration-related affairs 
can be summarized in terms of hardline exclusionary policies, assimilationism, and highly selec-
tive access to decision-making processes. Far-right governing parties—namely the LN and AN 
—crafted a corrosive discourse on migration and ethnic diversity, framing foreign-born residents 
as an economic, cultural, and security threat. Their discourse ultimately prevailed in agenda-
setting dynamics and was translated into assorted exclusionary policies. 
The children of undocumented immigrants were barred from municipal kindergartners, 
immigrants were policed in public spaces on an ethnic basis for the sake of detention and de-
portation, Roma communities living in unauthorized camps were systematically evicted, and sev-
eral Chinese shopkeepers were forced to resettle in the urban outskirt. Moreover, on the grounds 
of an alleged nexus between immigration and security issues, a considerable share of the munic-
ipal budget was reallocated from social welfare to law-and-order provisions. Not by chance, anti-
immigration politics was concomitantly escalating at the national level, too. 
 The Moratti’s administration moreover adopted an assimilationist, minimalistic, and 
technical approach to integration policies. Access to integration services—including housing, 
vocational training, and language course—was normally granted only to most vulnerable indi-
viduals and immigrant communities were included in policy-making only to a limited extent. 
Catholic third sector organizations bear the lion’s share in the realm of policy formulation and 
service delivery and migration governance ultimately unfolded in restricted and specialized insti-
tutional venues. 
How did social movements affect these policy changes? Pro-immigrant activists only 
achieved marginal benefits when opposing exclusionary policies. In some instances, the city gov-
ernment was forced to dismiss some of its initiatives. The ban on the children of undocumented 
immigrants from kindergartners was abolished roughly one year after its adoption because of a 
court judgment—spurred by an activists’ initiative—which found it unconstitutional. Also, a 
group of homeless Roma families were settled in municipal housing facilities following an illegal 
occupation of municipal offices that was endorsed by prominent, highly influential allies. In 
other circumstances, however, collective action went to the detriment—rather than benefit—of 
the immigrant population. This was the case of the Torre Imbonati’s occupation. The protest 
targeted the Italian executive for the tight conditions imposed to undocumented immigrants for 
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their regularization and demanded the expansion of citizenship and political rights. After attract-
ing considerable support from assorted allies and protracted media attention, the demonstration 
was eventually unsuccessful and even led to the deportation of one insurgent. 
The mechanisms at play can be summarized as follows. In face of a very unfavorable 
balance of forces in the city politics arena (i.e., hostile political elites), alliance-building mechanisms 
could be activated only on an occasional basis and by resorting to highly contentious actions, 
including illegal occupations and hunger strikes. Moreover, activists faced major obstacles in 
activating brokerage mechanisms in the civil society arena, which was dominated by faith-based 
associations having strong ties with local powerholders. The emergence of controversies over 
paternalism and ethnicity between potential allies have marginalized pro-immigrant activists even 
further. The difficulty of building a solid pro-immigrant coalition at the city-level eventually im-
peded the activation of meaningful upscaling mechanisms in the multi-level governance arena, with 
the exception of rare, successful strategies of venue-shopping (e.g., court appeals). In sum, col-
lective action was barely influential and prevalently driven by a logic of ‘damage limitation.’ 
This scenario has changed following to the victory of left-leaning parties at the 2011 local 
elections – an institutional outcome that was indeed buttressed by social movement themselves. 
The Pisapia’s (2011-2016) and Sala’s (2016-present) administrations marked a considerable shift 
from the previous model of local migration governance. Local incumbents promoted a more 
inclusive vision of urban citizenship and rejected the immigration-criminality nexus. They dis-
mantled some extant exclusionary policies and expanded the array of municipal integration pol-
icies, for instance in the realm of family reunification (RaggiungiMi), education, and access to 
citizenship rights (Una finestra sui tuoi diritti). Yet policy pitfalls were evident too, including the 
failure to deliver relevant electoral promises and the protracted exclusion of immigrant associa-
tions from main governance processes. 
 The expansion of these social rights went hand in hand with the establishment of a more 
participatory governance model, foremost through the FTS, a newly-established institutional 
venue that could be accessed by a wider set of civil society organizations at the stage of policy 
formulation. This meant a significant change as compared to the highly technical and selective 
governance arrangements operating until then. Fully refraining from the previous blame-
avoidant policy style, local incumbents—and above all the Deputy Mayor of Social Policies—
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took a leadership position and crafted a large and cohesive coalition around a pro-immigration 
political vision. 
Again, these outcomes are explained by the dynamics unfolding in three arenas of inter-
action. Brokerage mechanisms in the civil society arena intensified amid the 2011 local electoral 
campaign. The ties between pro-immigrant became stronger over time as activists perceived the 
opportunity to tap into influential allies for introducing their demands into the institutional space 
after a long period at the margins of the scenes. While having more radical stances as compared 
to parties on the mainstream left, social movements understood the importance of moving be-
yond a highly repressive political season and mobilized in support of the Pisapia’s candidacy for 
mayor. Over the following years, a fully-fledged pro-immigrant alliance was crafted in the city 
politics arena. By expanding the governance network and establishing new policy venues, left-
leaning local incumbents gave activists the chance to participate at policy venues where their 
voice could be finally heard. Yet, aside from these procedural gains, more substantive benefits 
were hardly achieved. 
These ambivalent dynamics culminated with the battle over the municipal census. As this 
bureaucratic procedure grants access to several welfare provisions, social movements demanded 
the registration of all individuals with no fixed or regular abode. Following several protest events 
and negotiating sessions, local incumbents accommodated this request by establishing fictious 
residence addresses. Yet, they refused to register undocumented immigrants residing in their 
jurisdiction. This procedure is, in fact, prohibited by the Italian law under any circumstances. 
The city administration refrained from breaking these rules, as this would have implied over-
stepping its the boundaries of their competencies. Social movements thus had limited leverage 
to activate upscaling mechanisms in the multi-level governance arena and eventually failed in ensuring 
the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in the municipal census. As the next chapter will 
show, the support to the undocumented has been at the core of policy-making in Barcelona—a 
policy outcome that can be explained with a more profound link between activists and local 





Policies in support of undocumented immi-




«We don’t forget who we are and why we are here». 
(Ada Colau, Mayor of Barcelona, 24 May 2016) 
 
«Here in Barcelona there are many groups that speak in [our] name […]. We decided to 
organize ourselves and speak with our own voice». 





Spain’s anti-austerity protests of the early 2010s paved the way to the participation of social 
movements at many municipal elections. City-level coalitions—the so-called candidacies of 
change (candidaturas del cambio)—spread across the country to access institutions and deliver social 
change ‘from the inside.’ The Barcelona’s city government is a prominent instance. Since May 
2015 it has been led by a platform coalescing movements and parties on the radical left (BeC). 
Protesters began ruling the local administration headed by the city mayor Ada Colau, formerly a 
leading activist of the Spanish housing movement. 
If Milan was an excellent ground for studying the challenges of social movements to 
exclusionary provisions, Barcelona allows us to unveil their impact on policies of totally opposite 
sign. More precisely, the city has been as a spearhead of the battle for the rights of undocumented 
immigrants in Spain and beyond. To drive policy change, the city government and social move-
ments have systematically resorted to ‘governmental activism’ (Verhoeven & Duyvendak 2017), 
meaning that they joined their forces in contentious actions aimed to oppose and transform 
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Spain’s citizenship regime. These cooperative exchanges allowed pro-immigrant activists to 
achieve successful and meaningful outcomes—but not without contradictions. The case of a 
‘rebel city’ led by left-wing radicals is indeed so exceptional that poses more general questions 
on the opportunities and limits of a social movement taking office within a national-capitalist 
context. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. First, an extensive account of local migration pol-
icy-making from its origins until the present days is presented (Section 6.2). Although Barcelona 
and Catalunya have an enduring legacy of inclusionary policies, it is shown how the BeC’s ad-
ministration has further expanded and radicalized them. Section 6.3 recounts the emergence and 
main features of Barcelona’s pro-immigrant movement and explain why the city has represented 
a fertile breeding ground for the flourishing of this activist network. Next, the chapter sheds 
light on the issue of social movement outcomes (Section 6.4). It shows how the inclusionary 
provisions enacted to support undocumented immigrants have to be interpreted as a by-product 
of intensive cooperative dynamics between activists and local officials. These strategic interac-
tions, however, were far from immune to internal conflicts. The ‘dark side’ of governmental 
activism is thus explored in Section 6.5 by focusing on the plight of Barcelona’s street vendors—
mostly West African undocumented immigrants who formed a very vocal collective to counter 
deprivation and police repression. The city government has hardly alleviated these grievances, 
breeding contestation from various fronts. Section 6.6 summarizes the main findings and bring 
them into dialogue with the theoretical framework of this study. 
6.2 Local migration policy-making in Barcelona, 1990s-2010s 
From the origins to the Trias’ administration: Barcelona as an intercultural city 
The municipality of Barcelona began engaging with migration policy-making in the late 1990s, 
when the number of foreign-born residents in the city was close to zero. The first policy strat-
egy—named Pla Intercultural (Plan for Interculturality)—was adopted in 1997 and established the 
backbones of Barcelona’s approach to migration and diversity, namely the equality of rights and 
opportunities for all city residents, regardless of their administrative status, and the recognition 
of diversity as an intrinsic quality of the city. 
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The blueprints and programs crafted in the following years built upon these basic pillars 
and further specified key policy precepts. For instance, equality of rights and opportunities was 
deemed to be pursued through the ‘mainstreaming’ approach to integration (normalització), mean-
ing that generalist provisions should be preferred to immigration-specific ones, where appropri-
ate. Also, it was established that all aspects of urban governance had to become diversity-sensi-
tive (so-called ‘transversality’) and that civil society had to be directly involved in policy-making. 
In sum, the municipality of Barcelona gave rise to a particularly inclusive model of urban citi-
zenship and pioneered migration policy-making in the Spanish context and beyond. 
 The peculiarities of this governance model become apparent when it comes to concrete 
administrative practices. As explained in Chapter 4, the registration in Spanish municipal cen-
suses (empadronamiento) is a condition for accessing assorted basic services, including healthcare, 
housing, and education. Also, since 2004, undocumented immigrants registered in the census 
for at least three years are eligible for regularization—provided that they are ‘socially rooted.’ 
Municipalities are in charge of assessing these conditions, as they prepare the reports on social 
integration, as well as the housing reports related to family reunification procedures. Hence, far 
from being mere administrative executors, municipalities enjoy remarkable rooms for maneuver 
not only in the delivery of integration policies, but also in the implementation of immigration 
laws, with major implications for the inclusion or exclusion of foreign-born residents. 
Given such prerogatives, the municipality of Barcelona normally took a very accommo-
dative stance, for instance by registering residents with no fixed abode in its census and adopting 
a flexible interpretation of the conditions related to regularization procedures (knowledge of the 
Catalan language) and family reunification procedures (housing reports). 
 The main municipal structure providing integration services in the city is the SAIER 
(Care Service for Immigrants, Emigrants and Refugees), a one-stop office established in 1999, 
funded by the city government, and outsourced to civil society organizations. Services are freely 
accessible to any resident and include psychological assistance, legal counselling, labor market 
orientation, and reception services for newly-arrived immigrants. The relevant departments in 
local migration policy-making are the Immigration Department (within the larger Department 
of Citizen Participation, Solidarity and Cooperation), the Office for Religious Affairs, and the 
Office for Non-Discrimination (both within the Department of Civil Rights). 
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An additional institutional unit is the CMIB (Consell Municipal d'Immigració – Municipal 
Immigration Council), which is aimed at the involvement of civil society organizations in the 
governance of migration (Però 2007). Since most of non-EU immigrants in Spain are devoid of 
voting rights, the mission of the CMIB is primarily intended as a ‘participatory counterbalance.’ 
Precisely for this reason, the share of ‘native’ organizations admitted in this venue cannot exceed 
the 25% of the total. 
 The inclusive model of urban citizenship promoted by the municipality has to be con-
textualized within its broader regional framework. The Autonomous Community of Catalunya, 
too, launched its first integration programs in the 1990s—well in advance of central authorities 
(see Section 4.3). The Catalan government’s approach to migration-related issue also focuses on 
the equality of rights to be achieved through ‘normalization’ and the recognition of diversity. As 
summarized by Gebhardt, 
 
«[s]temming from its predominant understanding as a minority nation with its own lan-
guage, Catalonia has a particularly ambitious policy agenda also in the field of immigrant 
integration where it leads more comprehensive and directive policies towards immigrants 
than any other autonomous community» (Gebhardt 2016: 853). 
 
These governance arrangements have been mirrored in the local politics of immigration. In fact, 
all political parties in Catalunya—except the conservative PP—have formally refrained from 
exploiting migration-related issues for the sake of electoral competition (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2008). A similar agreement was made also by parties in the Barcelona’s city council 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona 2010). 
Hence, the accommodative policies enacted in the region have to interpreted in the light 
of such a consensual political landscape. Indeed, in the case of Barcelona, migration policies 
were first crafted when the socialist PSC was in office (1979-2011), but the policy agenda re-
mained basically untouched when the conservative CiU took over the city hall in 2011. In the 
account of interviewees, intercultural policies are «part of the city’s DNA» (B2) and this also 
owes to the continuity ensured by civil servants, that have «instructed each politician on how to 
approach the issue» (B1). 
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Migration policy-making under the BeC’s administration: Barcelona as a ‘quasi-sanctuary’ city 
Given this departure point, the BeC’s city government has sought to deepen, rather than 
deviating from, pre-existing trajectories. As a long-standing administrative figure put it, «the hard 
core of previous policies, their main concepts, remained the same» (B15). In a similar vein, one 
elected official asserted that 
 
«Barcelona’s migration policies have always been quite advanced and inclusive, regardless of 
the political color of the incumbents. The focus hasn’t changed that much. […] We took a 
more radical stance to support migrants’ demands, but we didn’t reject anything of what has 
been done before» (B19). 
 
The enhancement of prior policies mainly concerned three domains, namely the condition of 
undocumented immigrants, cultural and religious diversity, and asylum protection. The latter 
represented the greatest challenge for the new city government. The BeC’s electoral victory was 
indeed concomitant with the peak of the European ‘refugee crisis’; hence, a new policy area was 
de facto inaugurated as a consequence of this structural transformation. Barcelona’s asylum poli-
cies will be treated separately in Chapter 7. 
 As for undocumented immigration, the municipality fully embraced the inclusive model 
of urban citizenship already in place at both local and regional level—so as to radicalize it further. 
The plight of irregular residents became—in the words of one public official—«the utmost pri-
ority» (B15). The most important and comprehensive policy document adopted in this realm is 
entitled ‘Government Measures to Favor Regularization and Prevent Supervened Irregularity’ 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona 2017), with €581,252 earmarked for the 2017-18 period (ibid.: 41-2). 
It first provides a critical understanding of EU and Spanish immigration laws, which are deemed 
responsible for «institutionalizing» irregularity through their own restrictions (ibid.: 10-8). The 
role of cities is then emphasized as decisive to transform «illegal foreigners» into «residents with 
an irregular status» and secure «full citizenship rights» to all (ibid.: 20-7). As explained by one civil 
servant, «an official document—approved during the plenary session of the municipal council—
frames irregularity in positive terms. This is extremely innovative. Normally, in this domain, you 
do many things but without explaining them» (B15). 
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The strategy for materializing these principles consisted in interpreting Spanish immigra-
tion laws as progressively as possible, yet without breaking them. As recounted by one elected 
official, 
 
«[w]e are categorically opposed to the Foreigner Law—and we took a clear stance on that. 
However, municipal employees must execute several administrative procedures for its appli-
cation. […] Thus, without changing any article, we sought to change things by enacting a 
rights-based [garantista] interpretation of the law and by possibly modifying its inherent guide-
lines» (B16). 
 
As eloquently summarized by another public official, «we stretched the Foreigner Law like a 
chewing gum» (B11). 
To this end, the municipality implemented five action guidelines aimed at (1) securing 
universal access to municipal services; (2) smoothing regularization procedures; (3) detecting and 
preventing ‘supervened illegality’; (4) preventing detentions and expulsions; (5) driving policy 
change at Spanish and EU level. Each of these guidelines comprises a set of concrete adminis-
trative practices. One of the most significant measure is related to the municipal census, as the 
administration sought to minimize street-level bureaucrats’ discretion in registering individuals 
with no fixed abode. One public official reported that roughly 8,000 new residents «emerged» 
throughout 2017. In her estimation, roughly 99% of actual city residents were included in the 
census at the end of that year (B19). 
With respect to regularization procedures, the administration resorted to Barcelona Activa 
(the municipal unit responsible for economic development) for implementing individualized 
plans for employment (plans d’ocupació). Irregular immigrants are hired in cooperatives funded by 
either third-sector organizations or the municipality itself for a 12-month period, at least. Ac-
cording to the national law, in fact, a one-year job contract and a two-year period of residence 
are sufficient conditions to apply for regularization. This measure was tested in a pilot project in 
2017 to be scaled up in the following years. 
The issue of local ID cards (document de veïnatge) is another—possibly one of the most 
controversial—provision adopted by the city government. This measure is aimed at preventing 
expulsion proceedings and/or confinement in Immigration Detention Centers (CIEs). In legal 
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terms, it was justified on the grounds that national laws do not forbid local administrations to 
release complementary identification papers for the sake of affecting juridical procedures (ibid.: 
37-8). By adopting a principle of proportionality, in fact, courts normally assess the existence of 
family, working, and social ties when formulating their judgments, possibly opting for economic 
sanctions instead of expulsion when such ties are deemed sufficiently strong. According to the 
expectations of the local incumbents, the ID card is going to be regarded as a proof of integration 
into the urban community. Ultimately, this would minimize the odds of an expulsion order. 
The document can be requested by every adult immigrant settled in Spain for at least one 
year and registered in the municipal census for at least six months. When submitting their request 
to municipal offices, applicants are asked to present any available evidence of their social bonds 
(e.g., language skills, professional trainings, economic conditions, civic engagement). 
As argued by Kaufmann (2019), these local bureaucratic membership policies are imple-
mented as a solution of last resort in the case regularization is not a viable option (see also de 
Graauw 2014). As the implementation phase started in September 2017, its effectiveness cannot 
be assessed at the time of this study. Yet municipal officials showed confidence in this regard. 
As one of them put it, «we are not in the situation of US sanctuary cities […] that have the 
chance of not complying with national immigration laws, […] because the Spanish state is much 
more centralized. But we can still interfere with the application of its measures» (B16). The ten-
sions across levels of government is well-described in the account of another official: 
 
«This is really an experiment, the first initiative of this kind in Spain. […] I believe it’s the 
most a local government can do within the framework of the national law. Its approval was 
burdensome from a juridical point of view, because you need to defend yourself with a pleth-
ora of argumentations. The PP filed an appeal against the administration, contending that 
this is a competency of central—rather than municipal—authorities. We rebutted that the 
document merely testifies people’s residency, which is something local. […] [T]hus, judges 
are free to take it into account or not. […] I think the measure is [legally] ‘bulletproof.’ […] 
The central state could file an appeal against us through the State Attorney, but it didn’t. So 
the document is legal and […] [has] a legal effect» (B15). 
 
The measures reviewed thus far were formulated and implemented within the interstices 
of supralocal provisions. However, the local administration also sought to move beyond these 
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boundaries by overtly opposing its national counterparts. The dispute over the CIE located in 
the Barcelona’s Free Zone is a case in point. 
Seven CIEs are established over the Spanish territory. These are situated in areas where 
the immigrant population is large (Barcelona, Madrid, Murcia, Valencia), as well as in border 
regions where unauthorized crossings are most often attempted (Algeciras, Las Palmas, Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife)—cf. Figure 6.1. This geographical pattern is indeed reflected in the individual 
conditions that make migrants susceptible of confinement. In fact, detainees are: (1) undocu-
mented immigrants who settled with no residence permit or experienced ‘supervened illegality’; 
(2) migrants intercepted while seeking to access the Spanish territory illegally (for whom deten-
tion is often considered as a ‘customary’ stop-off point along their migration route); (3) immi-
grants who concluded a period of penitentiary detention. All inmates are accommodated in the 
same structures, regardless of these different backgrounds. Since the translation of the EU ‘Di-
rective of Return’ into national law (see Chapter 4), their internment can last up to 60 days.  
 
Figure 6.1. CIEs in Spain, 2017 
 
Source: González Beilfuss (2017: 306) 
 
Extant reports point at the poor living conditions in these centers—although considera-
ble variations in terms of quality standard exist between them. Healthcare, psychological support, 
cultural mediation, and other provisions are generally scarce. Physical contact between detainees 
and visitors is prohibited. Dormitories are poorly furnished, sometimes devoid of bathrooms 
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and locked from the outside. The existence of holding cells and the misuse of force by security 
personnel has been also recounted. Moreover, reporting on these centers is a daunting task due 
to their opaque administrative arrangements and poor accessibility (for a detailed overview, see 
for example Morán et al. 2012; González Beilfuss 2017). 
Critics of the CIEs not only resort to humanitarian arguments, but also to juridical ones. 
The detention on administrative rather than criminal grounds is deemed unconstitutional, be-
cause people are detained for ‘what they are’ rather than for ‘what they have done.’ The Foreigner 
Law57 asserts that these centers do not have a penitentiary character and should provide assorted 
social, legal, cultural, and healthcare services. Paradoxically, however, living conditions in the 
CIEs are generally worse as compared to ordinary penitentiary centers precisely because of their non-
penitentiary character, as they are not supposed to conform with the minimum requirements into 
force for criminal prisons. Finally, CIEs are criticized for their practical ineffectiveness, as only 
a minority of detainees are ultimately ‘repatriated’ (e.g., 47.77% in the 2011-2016 period, cf. 
González Beilfuss 2017: 311) 
 The Barcelona’s CIE is criticized on similar grounds. Systematic violations of detainees’ 
rights were reported, including the confinement of minors—a practice deemed illegal by the 
Ministry of Interior itself (see for example Fundación Migra Studium 2016; 2017). Since its es-
tablishment in 2006, three people died in this center (Idrissa Diallo, Mohammed Abagui, and 
Alik Manukyan) and inmates repeatedly resorted to hunger strikes for protesting against their 
living conditions. While all Spanish CIEs are chronically overcrowded as compared to their ‘the-
oretical capacity’, this problem is especially severe in the case of Barcelona where, at times, the 
actual number of detainees was almost ten times the available seats (212). Relatedly, the share of 
‘repatriations’ on the total number of detainees is low and decreasing year by year (cf. Figure 6.2). 
This is due to the fact that most of detainees are undocumented and originally from Sub-Saharan 
African countries, with which bilateral re-admission agreements are rare. 
The Barcelona’s city government embraced a particularly contentious stance for con-
fronting this situation. The resolution of closing the CIE was first inserted in the BeC’s electoral 
platform and reaffirmed by Ada Colau on 20 June 2015 (World Refugee Day), soon after her 
appointment as city mayor, during a public venue held in front of the center. The first official 
                                                 
57 Article 60. 
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act is dated 24 November 2015, when the city council demanded the Barcelona’s CIE not to be 
re-opened (the center was shut down from November 2015 to July 2016 following a judicial 
order commanding the execution of renovation works intended to cease the violation of detain-
ees’ fundamental rights). This decision was approved by both left-wing and Catalan nationalist 
parties and endorsed by assorted social organizations—whose joint action was referred as a 
«common front». The Catalan regional parliament also passed an analogous resolution. 
 
Figure 6.2. Barcelona’s CIE, number of detainees (left axis) and share of deported detainees (right axis), 
2011-16. 
 
Source: González Beilfuss (2017) 
 
 The leading figure of this policy process was Jaume Asens, Deputy Mayor of Citizen 
Rights in the BeC’s administration, who crafted a strategy for closing the CIE through an ad-
ministrative expedient. The city council indeed issued a closure order on 7 July 2016 based on 
two main legal loopholes: (1) the center’s operating license was dated 1992, meaning that it was 
released before the CIE was established and thus did not conform with its actual institutional 
purposes; (2) fire services did not comply with essential safety requirements. Importantly, the 
fulfilment of such legal requirements are under the municipal jurisdiction. 
As Asens put it, «such black holes have no place in a city of rights. […] It is our responsi-
bility, and thus our obligation, to request the corresponding operating license and the compliance 
with safety regulations» (emphasis added). Also, he claimed that «nobody, not even the Ministry 
of Interior, is exempt from complying with the municipal legislation», while also announcing 
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Ministry did not filed any appeal against the municipal order—which then came into legal ef-
fect—but it also refrained from complying with, in fact keeping the CIE operational. Subse-
quently, the city government initiated a legal proceeding against the Ministry. Since September 
2017, the dispute is carried out at the Supreme Court of Spain, which is in charge of settling such 
cases of inter-institutional conflict. In sum, by overturning the ‘hierarchy’ of institutional com-
petencies, the BeC’s administration ultimately transformed law enforcement into a political bat-
tleground. 
As anticipated, initiatives on diversity have also been of utmost importance. Again, Bar-
celona already had a strong record in this field, but the new administration have considerably 
expanded and radicalized pre-existing arrangements. 
This is apparent in the case of religious diversity. Although the Office for Religious Af-
fairs was first established in 1999, related municipal initiatives remained quite limited until 2015 
(cf. Garcés-Mascareñas 2014: 24-5) and the 2010 Interculturality Plan intentionally refrains from 
dealing with religious affairs (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2010). The appointment of Lola López 
as Commissioner for Immigration, Interculturality, and Diversity gave new impetus to such a 
policy domain. 
During her municipal mandate (2015-19), López—then-Director of the Barcelona Cen-
ter of African and Intercultural Studies and life-long antiracist activist—prioritized religion as a 
fundamental human right and religious diversity as an essential component of interculturality. 
Religious festivities and events were supported by providing access to municipal and other public 
spaces and by sponsoring a series of initiatives named Celebrem Barcelona—thus making these 
celebrations fully-fledged city festivals. As for ethnic minorities, the administration celebrated 
the Gitano community for the first time on 8 April 2018 (International Romani Day), for in-
stance placing the Romani flag on the façade of its building, while initiatives against the discrim-
ination of Roma people were first launched in 2019. 
Also, the city government launched the first anti-discrimination plan to fight islamopho-
bia in 2016 (Pla Municipal contra la Islamofòbia). In this realm, the No Tinc Por (I’m Not Afraid) 
demonstration was especially significant. Co-organized by the city government and local activists 
in response to the ISIS terrorist attack of 17 August 2017, the march aimed at averting the spread 
of a xenophobic, anti-Muslim rhetoric. Also, an inter-religious and inter-convictional mourning 
event was organized the day after the attack. Local incumbents framed these events in terms of 
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opposition to terrorism, racism, and war, ultimately preventing the emergence of a securitarian 
discourse constructed on the antagonism between ‘us’ (i.e., civilized western natives) and ‘them’ 
(i.e., extremist Muslim immigrants)—cf. Garcés-Mascareñas 2018. While actors on the extreme-
right sought to politicize the event in such terms—also resorting to physical violence—such 
reactions were marginal and promptly neutralized by larger counter-mobilizations.58 
One key example of anti-discrimination measures is the Xarxa BCN Antirumors (Anti-
Rumors Network), which includes hundreds of associations and individuals with the aim of 
countering stereotypes and canards that target minorities. Launched by former local incumbents, 
the BeC’s administration further empowered this platform. One public official highlighted how 
this «is now more agile, less bureaucratic, with a greater clout of grassroots groups, which have 
more capacity for leadership and self-organization» (B15). As recounted by one local incumbent, 
«the anti-rumors workshops that we are now setting up are not simply anti-racist; they even 
adopt an unequivocal postcolonial approach. Postcolonial activists are involved and I believe 
that we cannot get more to the roots than that» (B19). 
In the realm of postcolonialism, other relevant initiatives were aimed at remodeling ur-
ban spaces, as in the case of the Antonio López’s monument, located in the namesake square. 
Antonio López—first president of the Hispanic-Colonial Bank and the Compañía Transatlántica—
was a 19th-century Spanish businessman who engaged in slaves trade between Africa and Cuba. 
On 3 March 2018, the statue was removed in a public celebration and a participatory process 
was launched for retitling the square (most likely with the name of Idrissa Diallo, a 21-year-old 
Guinean migrant who died in the Barcelona’s CIE in 2012). During the venue, Gerardo 
Pisarello—then First Deputy Mayor of Barcelona—declared: 
 
«The removal of the statue of Antonio López responds to a citizens’ demand. […] Colonial-
ism and slavery are among the worst things that we humans have done. […] This is a restor-
ative act for all the people who feel offended for these crimes of ‘lese-humanity’. Also, it is 
an act of recognition for the Barcelona we want—a free city».59 
 
                                                 
58 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/opinion/barcelona-attack-catalonia-unity.html  
59 See https://www.elsaltodiario.com/colonialismo/retirada-estatua-esclavista-antonio-lopez-barcelona  
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From the perspective of municipals officials, all these initiatives had the purpose of 
«making diversity […] consubstantial with the city […] and recognizing each community as a 
legitimate part of it» (B15). Also, they are intended to produce a diffusion effect towards other 
localities and geographical scales. As recounted by another official, 
 
«I believe that what has been accomplished in the city is very important. […] And this needs 
to come from the city-level, not the country-level. But clearly cities can be contagious. […] 
Barcelona has the capacity of breeding diffusion processes. It takes time, years. But crafting 
craft a political discourse within the institutions, civil society, universities, and so forth is 
crucial. The pride of being an open, intercultural, inclusive, left-wing city can spread else-
where» (B19). 
 
 In sum, the governments of Barcelona and Catalunya pioneered policy-making in sup-
port of immigrants in Spain and beyond. Since the 1990s, their approach to migration and di-
versity has been based on two basic pillars, namely the equality of rights and opportunities for 
all city residents, regardless of their administrative status, and the recognition of diversity as an 
intrinsic quality of the city. The BeC’s local administration expanded these pre-existing arrange-
ments further. First, the plight of undocumented immigrants became an utmost priority. The 
city government relied on a right-based interpretation of national laws so as to favor regulariza-
tion procedures, stop deportations, and prevent ‘supervened illegality.’ In some instances, juris-
dictional boundaries were even overstepped, as in the case of the newly-issued local ID cards 
and the attempted closure of the city’s Immigration Detention Center. Second, local incumbents 
broadened the notion of interculturality so as to include the religious domain, especially when it 
comes to the fight against islamophobia. Overall, the governmental agenda of BeC has been 
characterized by radical stances, aimed at promoting a model of urban citizenship based on hu-
man rights, and often in contrast with the provisions of central authorities. This governance 
model was enacted through an intense cooperation with social-movement activists—as the next 
sections will show. 
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6.3 The emergence of pro-immigrant activism in Barcelona 
In many respects, Barcelona has been an optimal breeding ground for the flourishing of pro-
immigrant activism. The city’s insurgent mood is indeed rooted in a centuries-long history (e.g., 
Bazurli & Castaño Tierno 2018). In the 19th century, while becoming Spain’s most important 
industrial center, the city saw the rise of strong socialist and anarchist movements. It also has 
deep-seated republican values and was a bastion of resistance to Francisco Franco during the 
1936-39 Spanish Civil War. The transition from his four-decade dictatorship to democracy in 
the late 1970s further sharpened this political identity. 
The asociaciones de vecinos—grassroots movements popping up in countless neighborhoods 
to help drive the transition process—spread across Spain, producing a particularly strong legacy 
in Barcelona. These neighborhood committees built very strong ties with local incumbents since 
the first municipal election in 1979 (cf. Section 3.2). Also, they historically had a decisive role in 
smoothing the settlement of newcomers, catalyzing their participation, and averting the rise of 
ethnic conflicts—in the case of both Spanish and foreign-born immigrants (Morén-Alegret et al. 
2016). These structures of political opportunities and dense solidarity networks ultimately ex-
plain why immigrant activism is markedly intense in the city (Morales & Giugni 2011). 
 Migration-related mobilizations became visible in the early 2000s. In the aftermath of 
2000 Spain’s general elections, over 100,000 immigrants became undocumented due to a new 
restrictive immigration law enacted by the PP-led Spanish government (Organic Law 8/2000, 
cf. Section 4.3). As reported by Però (2007: 279-80), on 20 January 2001, roughly 360 of these 
immigrants—mainly youngsters from North Africa and South Asia—locked themselves into the 
Barcelona’s Church of Santa Maria del Pi. There, they started a hunger strike for demanding 
regularization (which they eventually obtained) and the repeal of the law. The protest then dif-
fused at a rapid pace across other cult places in Barcelona and elsewhere in Spain—mobilizing 
40,000 participants and getting sympathetic coverage by relevant media outlets. Further victories 
were achieved in 2005, when demonstrations in Barcelona and Madrid succeeded in easing the 
conditions for registration in the municipal census (i.e., wider range documents became applica-
ble, see Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011: 305). 
With pro-immigrant activism on the rise in Barcelona, however, conflicts inside social 
movements surfaced too. Spanish NGOs, trade unions, and other civil society actors are long-
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standing advocates of immigrants’ rights; they consistently played a decisive role in both provid-
ing services and driving policy change in this realm (ibid.: 306). Yet, in Barcelona, disagreements 
arose between two fronts: more contentious, less resourceful, migrant-led groups on the one 
hand, and more moderate, publicly funded, (mostly) native-led organizations on the other—a 
dynamic which is indeed recurrent in pro-immigrant activism and other social movement milieus 
(e.g., Nicholls 2013; Cappiali 2016; Beamish and Luebbers 2009; Dixon et al. 2013). 
As shown by Però (2007) in his extensive ethnographic work in the city, such controver-
sies mainly revolved around the CMIB. Supposedly devised to foster immigrants’ political par-
ticipation—especially if devoid of voting rights—radical activists criticized this consultative in-
stitution for being token and ultimately dominated by incumbent politicians and ‘conformist’ 
NGOs (see also Østergaard-Nielsen & Acebillo-Baqué 2016: 12). In Però’s account, ‘insiders’ 
included well-established NGOs such as Cruz Roja, Caritas, and SOS Racisme, large unions (UGT 
and CCOO-CITE), and small-scaled ethnic associations, whereas ‘outsiders’ consisted of assorted 
groups such as squatters, progressive Christians, and (undocumented) immigrants gathered in 
the collectives Papeles Para Todos and Coordinadora. 
A new, intense wave of mobilization occurred in the 2010s. Hit hard by the Great Re-
cession, from 2011 to 2014 Spain saw an impressive series of anti-austerity protests. The 15M/In-
dignados movement emerged in 2011 demanding a deepening of democracy and social justice 
while pointing an accusing finger at political and economic elites. Activists expanded the notion 
of corruption, framing it as a broader crisis of democratic legitimacy due to the collusion between 
public and private interests (e.g. della Porta 2015; Subirats 2016; del Romero Renau & Valera 
Lozano 2016; Bazurli & Portos 2019). 
Within the general call for social justice and democratic renewal, the 15M/Indignados 
movement served as a platform for several issue-specific mobilizations—including migration-
related ones. First, the polycephalic, decentralized networks of activists that sustained that social 
movement at the local level also engaged with struggles over the ‘right to the city’, an idea that 
«emphasizes the interests of all people who inhabit the city» (Kaufmann 2019: 2; cf. Lefebvre 
1968; Walliser 2013). Second, and relatedly, one of the key actor of the anti-austerity mobiliza-
tions was the housing rights movement. In this context, the PAH (Plataforma de Afectados por 
la Hipoteca – Platform of People Affected by Mortgages) emerged in Barcelona in 2009, before 
then spreading across all of Spain (225 affiliated groups in 2015, cf. Subirats 2016: 11). It was 
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among 15M’s most significant organizations because of its large constituency and the significant 
victories it achieved. One of the PAH’s defining features is that «most members are directly and 
profoundly affected by the issues they are protesting about—they have been transformed by 
personal individual circumstances into political activists» (Flesher Fominaya 2015: 471; see also 
Santos 2020). Importantly, immigrants represent a large share of this constituency (i.e., about 
half of PAH’s members). 
The PAH—and thus immigrant activists—played a decisive role for the emergence of 
BeC. Ada Colau was the PAH’s spokesperson up till her candidacy for mayor in 2014 and the 
BeC’s electoral program has been characterized by radical stances when it comes to the plight of 
immigrants. One elected official with a long-lasting record as pro-immigrant activist unpacked 
the nexus between the 15M/Indignados movement and BeC’s administration as follows: 
 
«In Spain we come from intense processes of social mobilization and politicization. The 15M 
is possibly the most impactful among these instances—at least for our political culture. For 
us, the 15M means: ‘we are those from below and we are going to take on those from above.’ 
Therefore, in face of the welfare state crisis, the economic crisis, the housing crisis, and so 
forth, we didn’t allowed to blame immigrants as those responsible; rather, we claimed that 
politicians and bankers should be blamed. Thus, when you point above you don’t point at 
those at your side. This kind of left-wing populism is important. It helps explaining why 
extreme-right movements did not take root in Spain with their discourse. Not even the [main-
stream] right dare to put forward a blatantly racist discourse, or a discourse against the immi-
grant population» (B16). 
 
The interaction between pro-immigrant movements and the BeC-led city government has to be 
interpreted against this background. 
6.4 Governmental activism as a social movement outcome: How activists 
shaped policies in support of undocumented immigrants 
In many respects, the local migration policies carried out by the Colau’s administration can be 
regarded as social movement outcomes. The nexus between grassroot mobilization and policy-
making has been particularly close in the realm of undocumented immigration. The TeC cam-
paign (Tancarem el CIE – We Will Close the CIE) emerged in 2014 upon the initiatives of 
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various groups, ranging from progressive Christians to antiracist and radical-left organizations. 
The death of Idrissa Diallo within the Barcelona’s CIE (see above) sparked moral outrage and 
precipitated mobilization (cf. Morán et al. 2012: 202; Castellà Josa 2015). The TeC campaign, 
moreover, was spurred by similar ones previously launched in other Spanish cities. As recounted 
by one of the initiator, 
 
«[w]e began struggling against the Foreigner Law a long time ago. Occasionally, we also or-
ganized some demonstrations. Then, in 2012, the tragedy of Idrissa came out. […] [I]n that 
moment we said “enough is enough, we need to stop this.” We drew inspiration from the 
movement “CIEs NO – Valencia”, which was already active at that time, and decided to do 
the same. This is how TeC was born. It grew very rapidly, with more and more people getting 
involved» (B28). 
 
The TeC’s repertoire of action is manifold and includes marches, sit-ins, lobbying, litiga-
tions, and events to raise public awareness, often held in front of the CIE itself, in the outskirt 
of the city. In addition, routine visits of detainees by volunteers are of particular importance. 
These visits are not only carried out to give immediate material and moral relief to the inmates, 
but also to collect information on their own conditions—a knowledge base subsequently em-
ployed for building legal cases when their rights are breached, as well as for carrying out dissem-
ination activities (B18). As Spanish CIEs are scarcely transparent in their governance arrange-
ments, the mobilization of such cognitive resources is an essential pre-condition for sustaining 
the whole TeC campaign. 
Faith-based associations bear the lion’s share of these activities. In 2017, the Jesuit Mi-
grant Service (JMS) visited 674 people of 42 nationalities in five Spanish CIEs (including Barce-
lona’s). Also, the Migra Studium Foundation—part of the JMS’s network—releases annual re-
ports on the Barcelona’s CIE. Overall, then, direct social actions and political claim-making are 
intertwined and mutually necessary—rather than mutually exclusive—for mobilization (cf. Bosi 
and Zamponi 2020). This strategy produced significant results, for instance in terms of amend-
ments to internal regulations and successful lawsuits. But the ultimate mission of closing the 
CIE—which gives its name to the campaign—was never accomplished on a permanent basis. 
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The relationship between anti-CIE activists and municipal officials has been intense and 
synergic. TeC was among the first organizations joining the BeC’s platform in 2014; subse-
quently, the closure of the CIE was included in the electoral program. In the post-electoral pe-
riod, too, chief policy decisions were regularly announced during public venues co-organized by 
the administration and TeC activists—including the one held on the 2015 World Refugee Day, 
just after the appointment of Ada Colau as city mayor. Also, the initiative of retitling Antonio 
Lopez Square with the name Idrissa Diallo was based on a TeC’s petition launched signed by 
17,000 individuals and eventually embraced by the municipality. 
Jaume Asens is the political figure that most forcefully symbolizes the interweaving of 
institutional and activists networks. Before being appointed Deputy Mayor of Citizen Rights, 
Asens had a long career as civil rights attorney and was among the most renowned activists of 
TeC and the 15M/Indignados movement. As shown above, his strategy as incumbent has been 
especially confrontational. Drawing on a rights-based interpretation of municipal prerogatives, 
he unilaterally ordered the closure of the CIE and—once central authorities refrained from com-
plying—took the lead of a legal proceeding against the Ministry of Interior. Hence, Asens en-
acted a movement-like strategy from within the municipality. More precisely, the Deputy Mayor im-
ported social movements’ repertoires of action into the institutional space and turned the city 
government into a platform for boosting the legitimacy, the visibility, and the ‘firepower’ of their 
own demands.  
In the account of interviewees, Jaume Asens engaged in such forms of ‘governmental 
activism’ (cf. Verhoeven & Duyvendak 2017) on the grounds of both ideological commitment 
and strategic convenience. As recounted by one civil servant, «[Asens] has a long history as a 
human right lawyer, thus part of his political actions is to press charges through the city council. 
Based on his legal experience, he seeks to exert the power of the municipality for doing public 
accusations» (B15). One TeC’s spokesperson agreed with this view, stating that «[Asens] wants 
to take on the role he had outside [of the municipality] from the inside so as to confront the 
[central] state» (B28). In other words, the city government «acted as a pressure group» vis-à-vis 
central authorities (B2). As one expert put it, «the boundaries between the state and society [at 
the city-level] have become extremely blurred. […] Jaume Asens is an important instance in this 
sense because he is a high-ranked official of the Colau’s administration, and yet still conflated 
with activist networks» (B32). 
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The massive mobilization escalated in the 2010s for Catalunya’s secession from Spain—
the so-called Procés—played a role in producing these outcomes, too. Since 2012, the regional 
government of Catalunya has been led by pro-independence parties that range from the radical 
left to the center-right, galvanized into the common prospect of secession. Strikingly, this coali-
tion also embraced the demand of closing the Barcelona’s CIE. This can be interpreted in the 
light of party competition dynamics. The more conservative component of the governing coali-
tion possibly took such radical pro-immigrant stances for the sake of broadening its electoral 
support among left-wing voters while also articulating a line of conflict between Catalan and 
Spanish authorities. 
While normally considering territorial conflicts as detrimental to the advancement of 
their social policy agenda, social-movement activists ultimately benefited from such a party pol-
itics dynamic, as it broadened popular consensus over immigrants’ rights. Commenting on the 
motion approved by the Catalan parliament to dismiss the Barcelona’s CIE, one TeC spokes-
person claimed that: 
 
«We profited from a juncture of rising tensions between Catalunya and Spain, succeeded in 
putting our issue on the agenda, and obtained a favorable positioning by [regional] institu-
tions. […] Although this didn’t produce any direct consequence, it gave us a significant 
strength, because […] we got a lot of visibility that we couldn’t obtain otherwise» (B12). 
 
Relatedly, in the account of one municipal official, 
 
«I think that, from a discursive point of view […], the Procés stimulated a renewed focus on 
the transformation of society. The attempt [of pro-independence parties] is to attract a more 
leftist social base, also because Catalanism, historically, has always been a bit conservative 
[…]. In the 2000s, [the conservative] CiU voted in favor of the Foreigner Law, but is now 
against the CIE, against border controls, in favor of free movement—so there is a clear hy-
pocrisy here. But I believe this is positive when it comes to migration. The fact that, within 
the framework of the Procés, [the party] was forced to embrace a discourse of tolerance and 
respect, is good in my opinion. […] We never expected anything like this. In Catalunya, a 
common sense on immigration is breeding, and this is much more progressive than in the 
rest of Spain» (B16). 
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The CMIB is another case in point when it comes to the strengthened link between social 
movements and urban governance. As reported above, this consultative institution epitomized 
the conflict between moderate and radical pro-migrant activists and was criticized for being 
dominated by local incumbents and condescending organizations. Under the BeC’s administra-
tion, this fracture at least partly healed. Amid the Great Recession and anti-austerity mobiliza-
tions, radical groups led by immigrant activists became more vocal within the CMIB. In the 
account of interviewees, the new city government ultimately buttressed this ongoing process of 
inner renewal. According to a trade unionist and long-standing member of the CMIB, 
 
«[w]ith Colau in office, I do see a change [in the CMIB]. Beforehand, it was a space where 
[policies] were merely explained. Now it is more participatory. This does not only owe to 
Colau, but also to the changes occurred among participant organizations. The economic crisis 
weakened the clientelist networks [of the CMIB] and a flair for greater participation emerged. 
In the wake of these changes, Colau opted for including smaller, more radical organizations 
[…] instead of the old ‘caste’ of trade unions» (B17). 
 
Such changes within the CMIB are well testified by the proposals formulated to bypass 
the Foreign Law at the local level. This policy debate was first driven by Sindihogar/Sindillar, a 
self-organized trade union founded in 2011, based in Barcelona, gathering both native and im-
migrant women employed as houseworkers and caregivers (B26). In 2014, the CMIB commis-
sioned legal experts to identify the grey areas of the law so as to prevent ‘supervened illegality’, 
prompt regularizations, and ease the conditions of undocumented immigrants—yet without tres-
passing municipal prerogatives (cf. Garcés-Mascareñas 2014: 17; Gebhardt 2016: 855). This led 
to the elaboration of ‘67 proposals to foster the inclusion of immigrants within the framework 
of the Foreigner Law’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2014; 2016). 
The measures adopted by the BeC’s administration in 2017 (Ajuntament de Barcelona 
2017; see above) are, in fact, the fully-fledged transposition of these 67 proposals into legal pro-
visions (B17). One elected official asserted that 
 
«these ideas floated around for a bit, but then were forgotten in a drawer somewhere. […] I 
would say that, to date, we enacted 100% of the [CMIB’s] 67 proposal among those pertaining 
to the municipality—and we even went a little further with the local ID card» (B19). 
 136 
 
In addition, it should be noted that, on 1 August 2016, the CMIB released a manifesto for de-
manding the end of the Spain’s deportation system and the repeal of the EU Directive in the 
field of ‘repatriation’ of undocumented immigrants (Directive 2008/115/CEE)—ultimately en-
dorsing the municipal ordinance to close the Barcelona’s CIE (Consell Municipal d'Immigració 
2016). 
In sum, under the BeC’s administration, the CMIB was significantly reshaped in its gov-
ernance arrangements as compared to the account provided by Però (2007) on this consultative 
institution. Local incumbents sought to alter the balance of power within this consultative insti-
tution by involving other, possibly more representative immigrant associations. The CMIB then 
began to work as a sort of ‘transmission belt’ between grassroots demands and governmental 
measures. 
The city government’s attempt of empowering activist groups was evident also in the 
case of the Tancada (‘Occupation’).60 On 22 April 2018, an array of decolonial collectives—in-
cluding Papeles Para Todos, Sindihogar/Sindillar, Espacio del Inmigrante, and the Popular Union of 
Street Vendors—locked themselves into an abandoned public school (Escola Massana) in the 
city center. Inspired by similar occupations carried out over the 2000s (see above), protesters 
blamed Spain’s ‘institutional racism’ for its discriminatory provisions and put forward 11 de-
mands targeting policy-makers at different levels of government (but overwhelmingly concern-
ing central authorities). These included the repeal of the Foreigner Law and its inherent depor-
tation system, the deletion of restrictive conditions for obtaining residence permits (e.g., a job 
contract of 40 weekly hours lasting at least one year), whose fulfillment became highly implausi-
ble following the economic crisis, as well as the abolition of the citizenship test, deemed non-
sensical by protesters (for example, they pointed at one exam question that required to mention 
the profession of Enrique Iglesias, a Spanish pop-singer). The protest rapidly spread throughout 
other Catalan localities and in Madrid, but also in other spaces of the city, as in the case of the 
church of the Sagrat Cor—a highly symbolic place, where in 2001 the first immigrants’ protest 
in Barcelona took place. 
                                                 
60 See https://racismenstanca.wordpress.com/  
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As for the interactions with policy-makers, the Tancada succeeded in gradually scaling-up 
its mobilization. In the aftermath of the occupation, an assembly elected a negotiating committee 
and met Ada Colau and Lola López, who assured that the city government would have taken 
charge of the (few) demands within its field of competence, i.e., minimizing discretion by street-
level bureaucrats in registering individuals with no fixed above or rental contract, as well as easing 
policing towards street vendors. Shortly after, Quim Torra, president of the Catalunya’s regional 
government, met protesters too. One of Torra’s leading collaborator (B21) asserted that her 
team had at least three meetings with the negotiating committee, which led to the application of 
streamlined procedures for family reunification and access to healthcare services. As for the 
central government—then led by the conservative PP and towards which most of the demands 
were addressed—protesters met Emilio Ablanedo, delegate of the Government of Spain in Ca-
talunya, on 14 May 2014, more than three weeks after the start of the occupation. 
The role of local officials was determinant in activating these upscaling dynamics. First, 
the occupation of the school was enacted with the tacit consent of the municipality, which owns 
the facility. Second, the presence of Ada Colau and other popular municipal officials resulted in 
protracted coverage by media outlets. The demonstration ranked high in the local agenda for 
several weeks, thus enhancing the pressure over, and the opportunity for, political elites of taking 
a stance. Third, Colau personally facilitated the meeting with the Spanish government’s delega-
tion, which was initially reluctant over the prospect of accommodating undocumented immi-
grants as a counterpart at the bargaining table (B16). Albeit these meaningful procedural and 
symbolic gains (i.e., public recognition through participation at policy venues), however, central 
authorities did not make any notable concessions in terms of substantive responses. 
All these instances of mobilization have a common thread. Emanating from an activist 
milieu, municipal officials espoused the demands of grassroots organizations—especially those 
that sustained their electoral platform in the first place. The transposition of these demands into 
public policies was substantiated by enacting concrete provisions to alleviate material grievances, 
as well as incorporating a semantics based on human and social rights into the institutional dis-
course. However, since supralocal (foremost central) authorities have more far-reaching compe-
tencies on immigration as compared to local ones, the BeC’s administration and its activist allies 
deployed a strategy to reduce such a power differential. More precisely, when confronting the 
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Spanish executive, the city government sought to boost (and even to reproduce) social-move-
ment mobilizations by means of institutional resources that activists lack by definition, such as 
legitimacy, visibility, and the rule of law. In turn, social movements backed up these institutional 
actions by igniting public controversy over migration-related issues. One public official with an 
activist background summarized this quid pro quo as follows: 
 
«For changing the framework [of supralocal restrictive policies], somehow we need to amplify 
and go along with the struggles [for immigrants’ rights]. We […] know that the municipality per 
se, its competencies, are not the real battleground. In the city, however, you can generate 
dynamics of strength accumulation and build wide supporting majorities. […] The fact that [the 
municipality] can avert a deportation or a detainment is powerful in concrete terms. But it is 
powerful also in political ones, because you are crafting a local-level legality for defending 
people that are deemed “illegal” by the [central] state» (B16, emphasis added). 
 
In short, with the prospect of enacting a radical policy agenda, incumbents and activists joined 
their forces, as the former embraced the demands coming from below, while the latter legiti-
mised municipal decisions through mobilization—in a process of mutual responsiveness. Gov-
ernmental activism has been a strategy to shape policies in a context of multi-level governance. 
Yet these relationships have been far from immune to conflict. The case of street vendors—
presented in the next section—is powerful in highlighting such controversies. 
6.5 The apple of discord: Street vendors as contentious political subjects 
The emergence of the street vendors union and the response of the municipality 
The topic of street vendors has been among the thorniest one in the administration’s agenda. 
This collective consists of approximately 400 undocumented immigrants, often of West African 
origin and referred as manteros. The manta is the blanket over which street vendors showcase the 
products on sale. It facilitates the escape of migrants when targeted by the Guàrdia Urbana or 
the Mossos de Esquadra (Barcelona’s and Catalan local police), as products can be promptly 
recollected, hidden, and carried away. Most of these street vendors are not formally authorized 
to occupy public spaces and sell counterfeit products of famous fashion brands. Albeit criminal-
ized, this kind of informal subsistence work is among the few viable options for most deprived 
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undocumented migrants (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2015a). Moreover, police prosecution has 
systematically entailed the misuse of force and ethnic profiling (SOS Racisme 2019).  
Street vendors remained silent until 11 August 2015, when Mor Sylla—a 50-year-old 
Senegalese street vendor—died while escaping the Mossos de Esquadra. This event has been a 
turning point, as it catalyzed the politicization of the group. Street vendors created the Sindicato 
Popular Vendedores Ambulantes (Popular Union of Street Vendors) and put forward a set of 
demands, such as the decriminalization of street vending, the end of ‘institutional racism’, and 
the regularization of undocumented migrants as a path toward self-determination. The organi-
zation has attracted considerable public attention and has rapidly become very vocal in the city 
and beyond. 
As one organizer put it, the idea of the union precisely points at role of street vendors as 
«part of the occupational structure of the city» rather than «black, poor, illegal foreigners» – a 
framing strategy thus intended to depict street vendors as «political beings» (B24).  Following 
this reasoning, street vendors have also founded a clothing brand named Top Manta – Ropa 
Legal Hecha por Gente Ilegal (Legal Clothes Made by Illegal People), with the purpose of erasing 
the stigma of illegality and expanding their solidarity network. One of the street vendors’ spokes-
person has provided a detailed account of this process of politicization: 
 
«Here in Barcelona there are many groups that speak in the name of manteros that don’t know 
anything about the history of manteros and have never gone through what manteros are going 
through. […] We decided to organize ourselves and speak with our own voice […], organiz-
ing demonstrations, meeting people that support us, organizing talks, and so forth. But before 
all this, our fellow Mor died three years ago. […] Just after that, we organized a demonstration 
in Barcelona, joined by a lot of collectives, an then we did an assembly to gather the all of us. 
We started to convince the rest of us that we had to organize […]. So we set up this union to 
defend ourselves: if they touch one, they touch all of us». (B23). 
 
Her account is consistent with the extant literature on the urban environment as a catalyst 
of immigrant activism (e.g., Nicholls, 2016; Steinhilper, 2019). The city’s relational qualities have 
helped street vendors to overcome their stigma and weave a network of solidarity. In turn, this 
has enhanced the viability and the scale of claim-making. In fact, she claimed, 
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«[w]e have struggled a lot here in Barcelona. We have organized events in Madrid, in the 
whole country. […] Before the union, no one took care of me, no one wanted to meet me, 
no one knew what my name is. Why? Because the union was not there, no one cared about 
immigrants and street vendors. The media talked about us, but knowing nothing about us. 
Since we have organized, for sure I meet someone in the street telling me: “Hi, L., what’s 
up?”». (B23). 
 
The city government engaged in sustained interaction with street vendors and  enacted 
various measures for alleviating their grievances. First, it has sought to change the behavior of 
the Guàrdia Urbana by issuing new guidelines aimed at minimizing the use of force (the so-called 
‘Circular Víctor Alfa’), launching training programs focused on human rights, and granting career 
advancements to those officials deemed more sensitive to such values. Also, as a guarantee 
mechanism, the internal procedures of the Office for Non-Discrimination have been amended. 
This organizational unit is in charge of reporting and fighting discriminations and hate crimes. 
Conflicts of interest arose when police officers were accused, as they are municipal employees. 
In these cases, therefore, procedures have been externalized to third parties. Moreover, the ad-
ministration has resorted to Barcelona Activa. As illustrated in Section 6.2, since 2017 the city 
government implemented individualized plans for employment (plans d’ocupació) through this 
agency as a path towards regularization. Street vendors were among the first target groups of 
these policy provisions. More precisely, a cooperative named Diomcoop employing 15 street ven-
dors has been established with the purpose of smoothing their labor integration and administra-
tive regularization. 
Yet these policies have been relatively small in scale and their effects are unlikely to be 
visible in the short-term. On the one hand, the street vendors’ union has repeatedly attacked the 
cabinet for not doing enough to materially aid these migrants and merely exploiting their griev-
ances for the sake of consolidating political support. Their contestation reached the apex on 28 
July 2016. While Colau was inaugurating a monument dedicated to the migrants who have died 
in the Mediterranean Sea, some street vendors set up an escrache against her, i.e., a direct action 
aimed at accusing the mayor for her moral responsibilities. On the other hand, police unions, 
shopkeepers, some opposition parties, and mainstream media have crafted a common discourse 
for accusing of the city government for its lax attitude to crime. The media attention on the topic 
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of street vendors has increased dramatically as soon as BeC has become incumbent of the local 
administration (cf. Figure 6.3). In short, the issue of street vendors has often put Colau’s cabinet 
on the defensive, sparking criticism from various fronts. In the following section, the main con-
troversies arisen between activists and the city government will be explored. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Number of articles related to street vendors published on the local editions of La Vanguardia and 
El Periódico (newspapers with the highest circulation in Barcelona) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Behind governmental activism: How solidarity became contested in Barcelona 
As illustrated in previous sections, Barcelona’s public officials and activists have mobilized as an 
unitary player in policy-making processes, especially for confronting the Spanish government. 
Yet, ‘behind the scenes’, deep conflicts have arisen within the alliance. Most of these controver-
sies owe to the abrupt and profound re-definition of roles occurred within activist networks after 
municipal elections. Players have struggled to understand how their position had changed and, 
as a consequence, to find new, consistent, unambiguous identities. In the perspective of various 
activists, some elected officials have tended to take grassroot demands for granted. According 
to A., an activist who felt «disillusioned» for the insufficient involvement of the civil society in 
policy-making, 
 
«[…] some members of the cabinet think that – as they come from social movements – thus 
they are the social movements. But, when you are inside institutions, you are not. The roles 
are different. […] And as an institution, you are expected to sit at the table with those that 












know what my organization thinks. […]  Because there is a difference between inviting me 
as a person that you know and inviting me as spokesperson of an organization […]. It’s not 
a matter of people, but of what people represent» (B12). 
 
In her view, relationships have been much more conflictual with the BeC’s cabinet than those 
led by other parties. In fact, «it is easier to address and receive criticisms when those in office 
are your ideological enemies, […] because you have nothing in common.» 
In turn, disappointment has bred the fear of ‘unintended co-optation.’ Precisely because 
the ties of the city government with the grassroots are so strong, activists have perceived their 
space of autonomy under threat. T., an activist who has intensely cooperated with the city council 
on asylum-related issues, has brought the example of a public event organized by the municipal-
ity, at which she was invited to give a talk. As the topics of the talk had been defined in advance, 
she did not feel completely free of expressing the claims of her group. As she put it, 
 
«[t]hat was a critical moment, not only for us but for many organizations. I don’t think that 
it happened because of a Machiavellian will, but by inertia […]. So we said: “let’s pay attention, 
because we are all close friends, but everyone must stay in their place” […]. We know that 
this is the best government that we could have […], but we are very careful not to be absorbed 
in each other’s space». (B13, emphasis added). 
 
The confrontational repertoire of action of street vendors has been possibly driven by similar 
motivations, being political self-determination at the core of their collective identity. In the 
words of C., the escrache that street vendors organized against Ada Colau was «an important 
breaking point that had to happen» because «that was a way of saying: ‘you won’t create a political 
capital based on antiracism while racism keeps on occurring in the streets’» (B24). 
Strikingly, also those seating in the city government shared similar (self-)criticisms, albeit 
with some different nuances. Interviewees pointed at the difficulty of adapting their own activist 
mindset to the institutional environment. The commitment to single issues and the pursuit of 
short-term victories have been identified as the most detrimental aspects. Amid rising levels of 
media attention and/or protest over certain topics, new incumbents have often felt the pressure 
of providing immediate responses to specific constituencies, also to avoid the ‘charge of treason.’ 
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However, such responses might have jeopardized the implementation of more encompassing 
public policies. One key figure of the cabinet summarized this dilemma as follows: 
 
«As we come from these circles, we struggle in positioning as an institution. […] There are 
certain “tics” […] that are hard to be removed. […] For example, the idea of founding a 
cooperative for street vendors is a mistake […] because we have to do policies for everybody. 
[…] The responses of institutions should not necessarily coincide with movements’ demands. 
Social movements ask for group-specific solutions to group-specific problems. As an institu-
tion, we should solve the cause that originated those problems, but not only for that specific 
group. This is what NGOs or social movements do, but not institutions» (B21). 
 
She also recognized how their attempts of introducing radical demands within institutions could 
paradoxically weaken, rather than strengthen, social movements: 
 
«Curiously, we end up deceiving these movements. They shouldn’t be so close to us, precisely 
for maintaining their challenging power. In other words, as we are so close to most radical 
movements, we are de-radicalizing some movements for an excess of relationship with them. 
We are distorting our institutional function, as well as […] disempowering social movements. 
Even if it seems that we are empowering them for the sake of helping, help is always a form 
of submission » (B21). 
 
Other members of the city government also emphasize the weakness of social move-
ments, but they ascribe this to the absorption of activist leaders in the administrative machine. 
As one public official put it, some sections of social movements have been «beheaded» (B11). 
This has produced problems in terms of urban governance because «there is no dialogue with 
someone powerful, who makes demands, who provokes you, who breaths on your neck, who 
obliges you to do more and more» (B11). This is also recognized by an activist who went back 
to Barcelona precisely to ‘re-fill’ activist networks. As she said, «we had to rebuilt movements 
from scratch. We have spent over two years being too weak to do anything, and this happened 
exactly when we could obtain the most, being our people in the cabinet» (B25). 
Interviewees described pre-existing networks as split in two. The activists more commit-
ted with driving policy change have accessed institutions, while those more radical and identity-
oriented have stayed out. Therefore, the latter have been accused of having «anti-institutional 
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tendencies» (B16), posing «surreal demands» (B11), and having «a naïf vision of what exercising 
power means» (B14). This has produced frustration on both sides of the alliance. In the perspec-
tive of a public official, 
 
«[a]fter all, we’ve put our lives in this, literally. I mean, health, partners, families… we have 
completely abandoned our lives. Therefore, when someone you love […] attacks you because 
of something for which you’ve sacrificed everything, well… that’s a deep sorrow» (B16). 
 
This holds also on the side of activists: 
 
«I believe that, for the first time, we and those in office see things in the same way. […] We 
share a vision of the city as a space where all citizens have the same rights. This is precisely 
why there is more frustration» (B12). 
 
Yet these controversies have not undermined pre-existing relationships of trust. On the contrary, 
the awareness of sharing a common biography has preserved these bonds and smoothed mutual 
understanding. For instance, a PAH’s immigrant activist referred to Colau saying that «she comes 
from here and she had a first-hand experience of what this means» (B29). In a similar vein, one 
public official asserted: 
 
«Personal relationships have saved us from major conflicts many times. As we belong to each 
other, we say: ‘this person in front of me would never cheat on me.’ Of course this lowers 
the tension» (B16). 
 
Mutual understanding has been also driven by the awareness of exogenous constraints. 
First, leading a minority government supported by only eleven of the city council’s forty-one 
members, BeC has been forced to reach agreements with different parties that have obstructed 
most of its flagship initiatives. Second, pro-status quo coalitions (i.e., economic elites, with the 
complicity of mainstream media and some opposition parties) have fiercely opposed the most 
transformative policies in the governmental agenda. Third, Barcelona have experienced far-
reaching societal transformations, magnified by flaws in multi-level governance. Local incum-
bents had to cope with such critical questions, which yet lie beyond their full jurisdiction. Multi-
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level coordination has been especially poor because none of incumbents at the higher tiers have 
been of the same political color (for a detailed assessment, see Eizaguirre et al., 2017; Blanco et 
al., 2019).  
These constraints have been particularly sharp in the case of street vendors. Criminaliza-
tion of informal work, property laws, institutional racism, control of borders, and extreme dep-
rivation are all intersected factors that prevalently lie outside the competency of local authorities, 
but turned out to be critical questions for local policy-makers. Not only higher tiers of govern-
ment, but also local players have imposed severe constraints to policy change. The main oppo-
nents of the BeC’s cabinet—especially police forces, mainstream media, opposition parties, and 
shop-keepers—have exploited the topic of street vendors to start a «cold war» against incum-
bents (B16). 
 The role of Guàrdia Urbana has been especially relevant. Although this police force is 
under the jurisdiction of the city council, the new protocols adopted to ease the repression of 
manteros have been hardly implemented. In the perspectives of interviewees, this has been a con-
sequence of Guàrdia Urbana’s corporativism and the legacy of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship 
among some of its ranks. As one public official put it, «police forces are often alien to the sur-
rounding political reality and administrative structure […]. Thus, when we took office, we had 
to cope with a force that was very reluctant to change and, in certain occasions, blatantly against 
the city government. […] [The police] used to meet us at demonstrations, occupations, I mean… 
on the opposite side. And then, out of the blue, we became their bosses. This might have been 
a nightmare for them» (B16).  
6.6 Conclusion: Arenas and mechanisms of social movement outcomes in 
the case of policies in support of undocumented immigrants 
Barcelona’s government has achieved considerable records in the field of immigration under the 
leadership of BeC—a platform coalescing left-wing parties and social movements. It promoted 
a radical model of urban citizenship that overtly contradicts, and intends to fill in for the lacunae 
of, Spanish immigration laws. This is particularly evident in the case of foreign-born residents 
with an irregular status, who have been supported through massive registrations in the municipal 
census (a pre-condition for accessing integration services) and employment plans (to smooth 
regularization procedures). Also, local officials have sought to undermine Spain’s citizenship 
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regime by issuing local ID cards and seeking to close the city’s Immigration Detention Center 
(CIE). These two measures—both aimed to prevent deportations—were implemented by over-
turning the hierarchy of institutional competencies and ultimately transforming law enforcement 
into a political battleground. 
This policy agenda has been largely drawn on the demands of those social movements 
that buttressed the emergence of BeC in the first place. The closure of the local CIE was the 
core demand of a protest group of which leading figures of the administration were members 
until their election. The ‘67 proposals to foster the inclusion of immigrants within the framework 
of the Foreigner Law’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2014; 2016) were first elaborated by social 
movements and eventually embraced by local incumbents as soon as they took office. Activists 
were also the first to formulate policy proposals in the field of cultural recognition—as in the 
case of the Municipal Plan Against Islamophobia. 
Aside from the contents of policies, the tie between local officials and social movements 
has been especially strong when it comes to the strategies to realize them. Governmental activ-
ism—a particularly intense form of alliance-building based on the ‘division of oppositional labor’ 
between public officials and social-movement activists who share similar objectives and similar 
opponents (Verhoeven & Duyvendak 2017)—has been systematically employed by urban polit-
ical actors. Local incumbents and activists have joined their forces, as the former embraced the 
demands coming from below, while the latter legitimised municipal decisions through mobiliza-
tion, in a process of mutual responsiveness. Jaume Asens and Lola López—lifelong pro-immi-
grant advocates who became leading figures of the local administration—starkly embodied such 
entrenchment of activist and institutional networks. They persistently sought to empower grass-
root organizations while also deploying a movement-style repertoire of actions from within the 
institutional space. Ultimately, governmental activism served as a strategy to shape public policies 
within an unfavorable context of multi-level governance. 
These processes of contentious migration policy-making can be explained by the con-
catenation of different mechanisms in specific arenas of interaction. Barcelona has a long history 
of grassroots mobilizations and a deeply rooted leftist political culture. The massive anti-austerity 
mobilizations of the early 2010s, once faded away, left the legacy of a dense activist network in 
the civil society arena, also in the realm of immigrant rights. Next, social movements took the 
electoral option so as to move their claims from the arena of protest to the institutional space. 
 147 
Rather than building alliances with local political elites in the city politics arena, they have directly 
turned into a political party for competing in local elections (McAdam & Tarrow 2010: 533). 
Once in office, activists profited from a particularly advantageous environment (i.e., the Barce-
lona’s legacy of pro-immigrants politics, the long tail of an intense protest cycle, and the inclu-
sionary discourse crafted by Catalan pro-independence forces) to successfully align policy frames 
and provisions with their own demands. Finally, they crafted a ‘common front’ with local offi-
cials—often former protestors—to upscale political mobilization in the multi-level governance arena. 
This allowed the city government to stretch, counter, and circumvent supra-local policies for 
supporting a section of the population deemed ‘illegal’ from the perspective of the nation-state. 
  However, these alliance-building dynamics have also encountered significant limits. 
Most of controversies have revolved around the misfit between the militant identity of incum-
bents and their new institutional role. Their ties with activist milieus have smoothed the intro-
duction of radical demands within the institutional space, but have also deprived social-move-
ments activists of their raison d'être to some extent. Somehow paradoxically, the responsiveness 
to the inputs coming from below have beget both an empowerment and a replacement of social 
movements. Moreover, the mobilization capacity of protesters has been undermined by the ab-
sorption of prominent movement leaders into the local administration. This switch has made 
activist networks less resourceful, as well as less capable of deciphering and affecting institutional 
dynamics. 
From this angle, findings confirm that the relationship between parties in office and their 
activist base is likely to be conflictual, but not necessarily for the reasons outlined by McAdam 
and Tarrow (2010: 537). In Barcelona, the conflicts between elected officials and protesters were 
not caused by the attempt of the former to appeal to the median voter by moving to the center, 
but precisely for the opposite reason. In fact, the ‘loyalty’ of local incumbents to their activist legacy, 
their mimicking of social-movement strategies, and their sensitiveness to protesters’ demands 
have fueled, rather than tamed, controversies. More generally, the BeC’s electoral victory in 2015 
did represent a major political opportunity for social movements. Yet this was not set in stone 
once and for all. Rather, opportunities have been «reflexively and strategically used and played» 
(Den Hond et al. 2014: 11) by both activists in the street and (former) activists in the city council. 
Their objectives have been re-adjusted throughout long interactive sequences. The divergent 
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expectations of players have partly converted aspirations into frustrations—producing misun-
derstandings and, in some circumstances, contentious dynamics. 
These limitations and controversies appear especially pronounced when it comes to im-
migrant activists, and especially so in the case of the street vendors union. The attempt of the 
city government to embrace grassroot demands has bred an antagonistic reaction from the side 
of this collective, as the wish of not being patronized—by allies and opponents alike—has been 
at the basis of their process of politicization. Relatedly, the confrontational attitude of street 
vendors has been also driven by the lack of far-reaching responses to their grievances. This 
forcefully epitomizes the limits that a local administration on the radical left has to face in a 
national-capitalist context. Property laws, criminal laws, and immigration laws all lie beyond the 
jurisdiction of local governments with limited rooms to maneuver. BeC’s opponents have ex-
ploited these constraints to both put local incumbents on the defensive and prevent the expan-
sion of immigrant rights. 
These limitations notwithstanding, the case of Barcelona’s policies in support of undoc-
umented immigrants demonstrates how pro-immigrant movements are able to drive policy 
change at various spatial scales, well beyond their local realm. As the next chapter will show, 





Asylum policies and social movement out-
comes: Milan and Barcelona, 2013-2019 
 
 
«[T]he political objective [of Barcelona’s asylum program] is to create a municipal counter-
balance to a national policy. […] Multi-level governance does not exist here. Zero. We in-
sisted in talking with the State for two years […] but we obtained a far larger opportunity for 
coordination through the municipal network of Spanish and foreign cities than with the 
central government». 




Amid the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of the 2010s, South European cities have experienced far-
reaching societal transformations, magnified by flaws in multi-level governance. How can urban 
actors cope with such critical questions, which affect their communities and yet lie beyond their 
full jurisdiction? This chapter deal with the question of social movement outcomes in the realm 
of asylum policy-making. Milan and Barcelona are here analyzed together because of the similar 
governance and protest dynamics that unfolded therein. Both the cities have been at the fore-
front in coping with the ‘refugee crisis’ and stood out as leading ‘cities of welcome’ in their 
respective countries and beyond. The chapter will show how left-leaning governments and ide-
ologically sympathetic social-movement activists at the city-level were incentivized to join their 
forces. Alliance-building was a strategy to secure political gains while shaping policies within an 
otherwise unreceptive, hostile context of multi-level governance. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides background information 
and critical perspectives on the European ‘refugee crisis’ and its impact on the cities of Milan 
                                                 
61 A similar version of this chapter has been published as an article: Bazurli, R. (2019) ‘Local governments and social movements in 
the ‘refugee crisis’: Milan and Barcelona as ‘cities of welcome.’ South European Society and Politics, 24:3, 343-370. 
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and Barcelona (Section 7.2). Afterward, Section 7.3 offers an overview of Italy’s asylum policies, 
the response to the ‘crisis’ enacted by the local government of Milan, as well as the patterns of 
strategic interaction between the local officials and social-movement activists in shaping policy 
outcomes. Section 7.4 then presents empirical material on the case of Barcelona in the same 
fashion. Last, Section 7.6 summarizes the main findings and bring them into dialogue with the 
theoretical framework of the study. 
7.2 Not a ‘refugee crisis’: Global migration, EU governance, and the city 
Following the political upheavals that erupted in Northern Africa and the Middle East in late 
2010 (the ‘Arab Spring’), millions of migrants reached Europe or lost their lives trying. Drawing 
on the thesis popularized by Castles (2004), the responses enacted by the EU and its Member 
States can be regarded as ‘policy failures.’ The Dublin Regulation, a key component of the Com-
mon European Asylum System, provides that asylum-seekers should submit their protection 
request in the first country of arrival. This rule has put South European frontline states under 
severe strain, as migrants have been forced to request sanctuary there. In the wake of a ‘domino 
effect’, rising levels of policing at the borders of neighboring countries further exacerbated this 
scenario and de facto nullified the principle of free movement within the Schengen area (Scipioni 
2018: 1368; see also Section 4.2). The image of ‘Fortress Europe’ precisely points at European 
immigration governance as heavily restrictive and security-oriented (Bonjour et al. 2017). 
In other words, if the burden of humanitarian assistance has been much heavier for cer-
tain localities, this did not only owe to their geographical position. Legislative frameworks have 
amplified—rather than tamed—such structural imbalances. The EU and its member states failed 
in sharing the responsibilities of international protection and responded with highly restrictive 
measures (Guiraudon 2018). The ‘refugee crisis’ narrative—framing immigration as a massive, 
unexpected emergency—served to justify such a securitarian approach. Yet the predictability of 
increased arrivals from the Global South, as well as their stabilization over time, make the notion 
of a ‘refugee crisis’ largely misleading. Rather, what has occurred is a crisis in the governance of 
migration. In turn, this can be interpreted as a more profound crisis of democratic legitimacy in 
western Europe (Castelli Gattinara 2017). 
 151 
Hence, humanitarian emergencies have mushroomed in many European localities, which 
found themselves forced to deal with the sudden, sometimes massive arrival of migrants. The 
Municipality of Milan assisted roughly 130,000 asylum-seekers in the 2013-18 period (Comune 
di Milano 2017; 2018). Most reached Milan’s Central Railway Station between 2014 and 2016, in 
the attempt to move toward their preferred destinations in northern Europe (Pogliano & Ponzo 
2017). Because of their short-term stays (5.8 days on average in 2015), they were defined as ‘in 
transit’ (transitanti). Such a pattern changed after 2016, when arrivals sensibly diminished but the 
length of stays increased due to the closing of borders by neighboring countries and the Dublin 
Regulation. Syrians were predominant at the outset of the crisis (78.1% in 2014), while Eritreans 
were the majority in 2015 (58.5%). The nationalities diversified after 2016, with growing num-
bers of migrants from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan (Pogliano & Ponzo 2017: 11-
12). 
The impact of the crisis has been softer in Barcelona, where the municipality assisted 
16,739 asylum-seekers in 2013-18 (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2019). While this figure is much 
lower than Milan’s, there are further aspects to be considered. First, the number of migrants 
seeking international protection has increased dramatically year on year (e.g., 424 in 2013 and 
7,433 in 2018, i.e. +1,653% in five years), saturating the city’s administrative capacities. Also, 
most of these migrants were not in transit, so social provision has been aimed at their long-term 
settlement (differently from Milan, at least until 2016). Recipients’ origins indicate the existence 
of ‘migration crises’ arising outside Africa and the Middle East. In 2018, the five main countries 
of origin were Venezuela (25.3%), Colombia (13.7%), Georgia (11.6%), Honduras (8.9%), and 
El Salvador (6.9%). 
Yet, while they are in the trenches of coping with the ‘crisis’, some European cities have 
catalyzed the contestation of such a governance regime. They have propagated pro-migrant dis-
courses well beyond their own local realms (Mayer 2018)—with Barcelona and Milan among 
those taking the lead. On 18 February 2017, via Laietana—one of the major streets of Barce-
lona—was filled by the largest ever demonstration in solidarity with migrants (with 500,000 par-
ticipants). The protesters’ main slogan was ‘Volem Acollir’ (‘We Want to Welcome’). They tar-
geted the EU for the policies it conducts at its own borders as well as the Spanish government 
for its lack of commitment to asylum-seeker protection. Three months later, on 20 May 2017, 
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Milan hosted a demonstration under the banner ‘Milano come Barcellona’ (‘Milan like Barce-
lona’), in which roughly 150,000 people participated, expressing their own will to welcome mi-
grants. 
 Barcelona and Milan followed a counter-trend compared to many other western sites, 
where anti-immigrant forces are instead gaining support. Even more puzzlingly, such massive 
events have not only brought together activists from civil society—in fact, political leaders in 
the cities’ respective local governments were also among their promoters and spokespersons. As 
the remaining of this Chapter will show, such episodes of ‘governmental activism’ (Verhoeven 
& Duyvendak 2017) were just the tip of the iceberg of a deeper, long-lasting dialogue between 
policy-makers and activists during the ‘refugee crisis.’ 
7.3 The case of Milan 
Asylum policy in Italy 
Until the early 2010s, asylum policy played a minor role within the Italian legislative context and 
was mostly limited to the reception of EU directives. Undocumented immigrants often opted to 
settle by ‘overstaying’ and waiting for mass amnesties, rather than seeking asylum. With the rise 
of the Arab Spring, international protection gained importance as a potential door to entry. 
Hence the administrative system in place rapidly showed its deficiencies (Caponio & Cappiali 
2018). 
 The ordinary instrument for the integration of asylum-seekers is the SPRAR (Sistema di 
Protezione Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati – Protection System for Asylum-Seekers and Refugees), 
which provides a holistic set of services for tackling multiple vulnerabilities.62 In addition to the 
immediate needs to be met, it aims at individual empowerment in the longer-term through ‘In-
dividualized Training Programs.’ The SPRAR also ensures the involvement of local actors and a 
balanced pattern of settlement (small-scale reception centers tied to local communities). For such 
reasons, it is widely recognized as a valuable policy instrument (cf. Comune di Milano 2017). 
Its main flaw, however, is the voluntary implementation mechanism. Municipalities may 
decide whether to apply for the Ministry of the Interior’s public calls. This encourages free-riding 
                                                 
62 In 2018 the so-called ‘Security Decree’ (Decree-Law 113/2018) drastically curtailed the SPRAR. The restriction of asylum protec-
tion has been a flagship initiative of Matteo Salvini, appointed Minister of the Interior on 1 June 2018. 
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by reluctant mayors and an uneven settlement of migrants across the country. Northern Italy—
where Milan is located—is more prone to suffer from such disequilibria, as numerous cities have 
enforced exclusionary policies (Ambrosini 2013b). As one local public official remarks, «[the 
city] suffers from its involuntarily attractive capacity vis-à-vis immigration from other cities» 
(M8). 
 To cope with increased arrivals, in 2013 the Ministry established the CAS (Centri di Ac-
coglienza Straordinaria – Emergency Reception Centres). Such structures were supposed to 
work as an exceptional, short-term solution to complement the ordinary system in cases of its 
temporary saturation. However, they have eventually covered the lion’s share of migrant recep-
tion. Out of the 135,045 of migrants hosted in 2016, 96,701 (i.e., 71.6%) were settled in CASs, 
an increase on the 76,683 in 2015.63 
This ‘ad hoc’ measure shows shortcomings concerning the quality of reception. Contrary 
to the SPRAR, CAS centers are often large-sized, hosting hundreds of guests, and located in 
urban outskirts or other peripheral areas. Beside basic provisions, more sophisticated services 
are largely absent. The role of local institutions is limited, as the Ministry and its local branches, 
the prefectures (prefetture), manage implementation centrally and then outsource services to pri-
vate actors, usually NGOs and hotels. Immigrant rights advocates have persistently denounced 
the CAS model for its insufficient level of service provision, the scarce transparency of decisional 
procedures, the systemic infiltrations of criminal organizations, as well as the risks of ethnic 
conflicts in the areas of reception (e.g., Cittadinanza Attiva 2016; MEDU 2016). The Ministry of 
Interior itself recognized the lack of a permanent, adequate, and uniform system of reception, 
which resulted in a «ordinary emergency» (Ministero dell’Interno 2015). 
 
Milan responding to the ‘refugee crisis’ 
The first crucial juncture for Milan emerged at the outset of the Arab Spring, in 2011, 
when Italy’s central government declared a ‘State of Emergency.’ The situation escalated in 2013, 
when large numbers of migrants started camping in the Central Railway Station. Civil society 
organizations rapidly mobilized to meet the needs of migrants in transit, especially unaccompa-
                                                 
63 See https://www.sprar.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-sulla-protezione-internazionale-in-italia-2017  
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nied minors. They set up a reception point in the station, which was ‘institutionalized’ and re-
named ‘the hub’ by the municipality shortly after. In 2014, more than 50,000 migrants arrived in 
the city, with peaks of almost 1,000 people a day. Rising levels of policing at the Austrian, French, 
and Swiss borders exacerbated this scenario. 
The city government thus came under severe strain and asked the central government 
for support so as to to expand its own administrative capacities. As reported by Pogliano & 
Ponzo (2017), these negotiations produced their first results in October 2013, when the Ministry 
of Interior allocated exceptional resources to accommodate migrants in the city. In spring 2014 
the means of the ‘hub’ were insufficient to deal with increased arrivals. After roughly 6 months, 
in October 2014 the Corelli center—whose aim was the detention and expulsion of undocu-
mented immigrants—was transformed in a reception infrastructure for migrants in transit (see 
also Chapter 5). In July 2015, moreover, the local prefecture provided larger and better-equipped 
spaces. Other lines of negotiation concerned the resettlement of migrants, as well as EU-level 
provisions for more easily granting international protection and relaxing border controls. 
Though the central government was also led by the PD, the Milan center-left administra-
tion’s relationship with it deteriorated. This was sharply exemplified by the framing adopted in 
local policy documents. For instance, one affirms that «Milan, despite its total isolation by the 
national government, has managed an absolutely unparalleled arrival of asylum-seekers» (Co-
mune di Milano 2015: 8, emphasis added). Also, to bring national counterparts to the bargaining 
table, local political leaders have persistently sought to attract public attention on the issues at 
stake. For instance, the city mayor Beppe Sala made national headlines on 19 September 2016. 
In a letter sent to the Italian newspaper ‘La Repubblica’, he emphasized how «Milan is doing 
everything in its means» to cope with the crisis. At the same time, he called on the central gov-
ernment to «ease the huge weight on the shoulders of cities.»64  
Administrative expertise was crucial in realizing the incumbents’ strategy, working ‘on a 
razor’s edge.’ To host the migrants in transit, the municipality resorted to the ‘Apulia Law’,65 
approved for the reception of Balkan migrants in southern Italy 20 years previously. While Italian 
law provides that foreigners must be identified within eight days of arrival, the city government 
                                                 
64 See https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/09/19/news/titolo_non_esportato_da_hermes_-_id_articolo_4575097-
148053885/  
65 Governo Italiano, Decreto-Legge no. 451, 30 October 1995. 
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inverted the interpretation of this rule by  purposely neglecting to identify migrants hosted for less 
than eight days (as was the case for most of them). These ‘gimmicks’ provided a legal cover to 
serve a political purpose, namely allowing people to leave the country before being identified, de 
facto circumventing the Dublin Regulation. A public official commented that the city govern-
ment created «a humanitarian channel, actually not authorized by the central government and 
the EU» (M13). 
Ironically, in June 2015 a municipal delegation was invited to the European Parliament 
to present the virtues of Milan’s reception model amid the ‘refugee crisis.’ In general, actions at 
the international level have been secondary and mostly aimed at legitimizing the city govern-
ment’s choices while negotiating with the Italian executive (Caponio 2018: 2065). On the other 
hand, a municipal official involved in international networks has emphasized the «transformative 
potential’ of these venues and the growing weight of the city within them» (M22). 
 The situation normalized at the end of 2016. Policy documents account for a stable and 
far-reaching urban reception system. 6,011 migrants were hosted in Milan in July 2017 (Comune 
di Milano 2017). Most of them (almost 60%) were accommodated in CAS centers, but one quar-
ter of these slots were directly managed by the municipality via special agreement with the Min-
istry. The rest of the migrants were hosted through the SPRAR (7%), in municipal homeless 
shelters (29.2%), by philanthropic organizations (6.8%), and in centers with a special focus on 
unaccompanied minors (19.1%). Small-scale policy innovations include direct agreement with 
the EU for implementing its relocation mechanism (290 individuals) and partnerships with fam-
ilies hosting migrants at home (9 individuals). 
 
Urban alliances: the Milan model 
The main political figure throughout these events was Pierfrancesco Majorino, Deputy 
Mayor of Social Policies and an exponent of the PD’s left-wing minority. While taking a resolute 
pro-migrant stance, he articulated a line of conflict between Milan as a ‘city of welcome’ and 
national institutions, blamed for the mismanagement of frontiers, the fragile reception system, 
and the lack of efficacy in negotiating at the EU level. Majorino also promoted the idea of the 
Modello Milano (Milan Model) as an Italian ‘avant-garde’ of migrant integration founded on 
cooperation among urban actors. 
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As mentioned, civil society organizations were the first to give relief to migrants in transit 
at the Central Railway Station. The solidarity initiatives that mushroomed in the city were fo-
cused on volunteering rather than political claim-making. Yet they were promoted by groups—
such as faith-based and welfare associations—which had egalitarianism at the core of their val-
ues. Many volunteers moreover understood their humanitarian actions as politically loaded 
(Zamponi 2018; Sinatti 2019). In short, actual or potential constituencies of the center-left were 
mobilized. Local incumbents then chose to ‘ride the wave’, for example coordinating the activi-
ties of volunteers and civil servants at the railway station and inciting further acts of solidarity to 
alleviate the emergency. 
 In the accounts of interviewees, the Deputy Mayor interpreted events at the railway sta-
tion as a window of opportunity to engage in multi-level negotiations while building broad po-
litical support from the grassroots. As an expert put it, «at that moment Majorino realized that a 
positive image of himself could be constructed, at least for his reference constituency» (M1). 
Similarly, a leading third sector figure stresses that «there was a strong push from the city… an 
opportunity that Majorino was smart enough to seize. Without that input from below, what 
happened would not have happened, it was decisive» (M10). A public official agrees with this 
view, stating that «the administration has been able to grasp the call coming from civil society» 
(M13). With respect to the decision of suspending the Dublin Regulation, a social movement 
activist states that «the municipality has felt legitimized by [a] large sector [of the civil society] to 
act at the edge of legality» (M7). 
The city government’s pro-immigrant stance has represented, in turn, an opportunity for 
new, more radical sectors of social movements. Following the prefecture’s decision to set up a 
CAS center at the Ex-Caserma Montello (a former barracks in Milan’s north-western outskirts), 
some inhabitants were involved in unrest. They perceived the arrival of 300 migrants in a sub-
urban area as a threat to social stability. Parties and movements on the far right fueled skepticism 
by propagating a much more political, anti-migrant discourse. The city government adopted a 
strategy of compensation to tackle discontent among less politicized inhabitants, for instance 
boosting public services in the area and responding to the demands of specific families. Smaller 
groups on the far right have been isolated and eventually neutralized. 
These actions have been pursued in conjunction with Zona 8 Solidale (Z8S). This neigh-
borhood committee had two main objectives, namely countering racism by promoting a culture 
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of solidarity and providing a decent reception to migrants through volunteering. Activists ar-
ranged a set of integration services, such as Italian language classes and professional training. 
The overall strategy was to «push the CAS model as close as possible to the SPRAR one» (M17), 
meaning that volunteers added further services to the ones provided through the CAS while 
staying within its legislative boundaries. Also, Z8S organized a party inside the Ex-Caserma on 
2 November 2017. This eased the tension in the neighborhood, as residents and newcomers 
could meet personally.  
Providing voluntary services and obtaining permission for a celebration required exten-
sive negotiations between Z8S and the Milan prefecture. Since prefectures are generally charac-
terized by an extremely closed structure of opportunity, the city government intervened as a 
broker or—as one activist put it—as a «battering ram» (M17). It legitimized Z8S’s demands and 
brought them to the table with a relatively unreceptive powerholder. As recounted by one public 
official, «the Deputy Mayor worked as a sort of ambassador, as a bridge, charging himself with 
bringing certain claims to the prefecture. These events occur in the city, therefore the city gov-
ernment has the duty to intervene» (M16). 
Z8S paved the way for the emergence of a larger social movement named No One Is Illegal 
(NOII) in spring 2017. While adopting a confrontational repertoire of action (e.g. street pro-
tests), NOII sustained a continuous dialogue with the municipality, which has shown a partial 
responsiveness to activist demands, such as extending the city’s SPRAR (the demand was to host 
every migrant in the city through this system; the consequent promise from the municipality was 
to move from 300 to 1,000 slots, and 430 migrants were eventually hosted in such centers in July 
2017). These interactions culminated with the demonstration of 20 May 2017 (see above), which 
was promoted by the city government and most progressive civil society organizations. NOII 
also participated, despite their harsh criticisms of the Ministry of Interior and the PD (governing 
at both the national and the local level). In the words of one activist, «we participated with the 
idea of integrating the municipal platform – which is rather moderate, in our view – by qualifying 
it in a more radical direction» (M7).  
Finally, Milan’s government engaged in negotiations with the Italian executive in order 
to expand its own administrative capacities faced with the ‘refugee crisis.’ Further room for ma-
neuver was attained by non-compliance with national and EU immigration laws. Perceiving a 
pro-migrant mood across their constituency, local political entrepreneurs constructed a conflict 
 158 
between the ‘welcoming’ Milan and the ‘negligent’ upper tiers of government. This strategy gal-
vanized movement activists into pushing the institutional agenda closer to their demands. They 
have exploited incumbents’ receptiveness in order to gain access to otherwise inhospitable policy 
venues. In a self-reinforcing mechanism, growing mobilizations allowed the city government to 
project an image of the city consistent with its political strategy. 
7.4 The case of Barcelona 
Asylum policy in Spain 
In Spain, too, asylum policy has not traditionally played a substantial role in migration govern-
ance (González-Enríquez 2009). As mentioned above, until 2017 the number of arrivals in Spain 
was lower than in Italy or Greece. This owed to multiple factors, such as the tight control of 
borders in Ceuta and Melilla and the country’s distance from the Middle East. The EU relocation 
mechanism has proven a largely uninfluential remedy. Data updated on 31 October 2018 show 
that only 1,359 migrants resettled in Spain, whereas this country had committed to accept 15,000-
19,000 (European Commission 2018; Alcalde & Portos 2018). 
 Nonetheless, the condition of asylum-seekers has represented a crucial challenge for 
Spanish municipalities. This is largely the result of the deficient national system of international 
protection. Once migrants submit their protection request, they can access the SAI (Sistema de 
Acogida y Integración – Reception and Integration System), centrally managed by the Ministry of 
the Interior and outsourced to large NGOs. Inconsistencies emerge at the implementation stage. 
While the verdict on asylum requests takes up to three years, the SAI lasts 18 months (24 for 
most vulnerable individuals). Thus migrants may finish an integration process while their appli-
cations are still pending—possibly becoming undocumented if the request is eventually rejected. 
These legislative voids—as an expert put it—were «eventually filled by cities, almost in a ‘phil-
anthropic way’, as they are neither competent nor funded to fulfil such tasks» (B10). 
An additional problem is the SAI’s geography. Most migrants are lodged in four large 
reception centers located in major Spanish cities. The center is chosen according to the availa-
bility of spaces, regardless of where migrants applied or their pre-existing social ties. Implemen-
tation stalemates have also occurred in the phase before application, as front-offices’ capacity has 
been insufficient for receiving migrants. One activist claims that «the administration is so slow 
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(and, in our opinion, deliberately slow) that [migrants] settle here for three–four months without 
any kind of assistance, often sleeping in the street» (B8). 
In short, local communities have faced issues related to the deficiencies of Spain’s asylum 
governance. This was especially the case with respect to migrants who completed an integration 
programmed and then became undocumented (receiving a negative response to their asylum 
application) and newcomers without access to state services (before starting their application). 
These problems have heightened since 2018, when Spain became the main destination for mi-
grants landing in southern Europe (cf. Figure 4.2). 
 
Barcelona, city of refuge 
 One of the first public acts of Ada Colau as mayor of Barcelona, on 28 August 2015, 
during the most tragic juncture of the ‘refugee crisis’, was to launch the network ‘Cities of Ref-
uge’ (Ciudades Refugio), with the aim of driving policy change at Spanish and European level. In 
the following days, 55 Spanish left-wing municipalities joined the initiative, including Madrid, 
Valencia, and Zaragoza. Also, in September 2015, Colau wrote a letter entitled ‘We, the cities of 
Europe’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2015b). Prepared together with Anne Hidalgo (mayor of 
Paris), Spyros Galinos (mayor of Lesbos), and Giusi Nicolini (mayor of Lampedusa), it de-
nounced the humanitarian emergency in the Mediterranean Sea, calling on European institutions 
«not to turn their backs on the cities, to listen to the outcry coming from them» in their attempt 
to welcome migrants. 
This immediately revealed the importance of building an international network for the 
city government’s political strategy. The city mayor Ada Colau indeed exploited her charismatic 
leadership for promoting the interests of local governments and the rights of migrants far be-
yond the boundaries of Spanish politics. For instance, on 9-11 June 2017, Barcelona hosted the 
1st International Municipalist Summit of Fearless Cities, a global network of progressive munic-
ipalities. The policy roundtable on immigration was introduced by the following statement: 
«While States build walls and fences, cities and towns are welcoming refugees and providing 
spaces of sanctuary to undocumented residents» (Fearless Cities 2017). 
Such an upscaling dynamic was especially important in the confrontation with the Span-
ish central government, headed by the leader of the conservative PP, Mariano Rajoy. In Septem-
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ber 2015, Ada Colau addressed a letter to the prime minister demanding the fulfilment of inter-
national obligations related to asylum protection. A few months later, in March 2016, the city 
government reached a pre-agreement with the mayor of Athens to resettle 100 migrants in Bar-
celona. Although the municipality expressed its own readiness to cover the expenses concerning 
their reception, Rajoy denied his approval. 
 The multi-level conflict with the central state and, to a more moderate degree, with the 
EU, has also been articulated through a policy programmed implemented since September 2015, 
BCR (Barcelona Ciutat Refugi – Barcelona Refugee City). It has been explicitly framed as a plan 
to counter, at the city-level, the holes in supralocal institutions. Its four strategic pillars are (1) 
implementing a stable reception system that operates independently of the central state one; (2) 
boosting services for migrants already settled in the city; (3) promoting civil society participation 
in policy-making; (4) accomplishing actions abroad through a network of cities and NGOs. As 
stated by a member of the city government, 
 
«the political objective is to create a municipal counterbalance to a national policy. […] Multi-
level governance does not exist here. Zero. We insisted in talking with the State for two years 
[…] but we obtained a far larger opportunity for coordination through the municipal network 
of Spanish and foreign cities than with the central government» (B11).  
 
Integration services are implemented through a pre-existing municipal structure, the SAIER (see 
also Chapter 6). Such services also include the Nausica programmed, aimed to support the inte-
gration of extremely vulnerable migrants (143 individuals in 2017) who are not inserted in the 
SAI. 
 As anticipated, the number of asylum-seekers attended by the SAIER has increased from 
424 to 4,405 (+1,653%) in the 2013-18 period, signaling both an increase in municipal funding 
(from €1.5 million in 2015 to €1.7 million in 2016) and the gaps in national legislation, which 
have left a segment of these migrants devoid of assistance. However, the municipality—notwith-
standing its increased engagement in pro-migrant policies—has struggled to keep pace with the 
increased number of recipients. Many interviewees have used the term «overflowing» (des-
bordament) to describe the rapid saturation of SAIER’s capacity during the ‘refugee crisis.’ 
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Barcelona’s social movements and their allies  
 The strategy of Barcelona’s city government has gone hand in hand with that of pro-
migrant social movements. The Stop Mare Mortum (SMM) platform was created in 2015 following 
major events that fueled moral outrage among the public, especially the dismissal of the Mare 
Nostrum search-and-rescue operation (November 2014),66 the death of Alan Kurdi on the shore 
of Bodrum, Turkey (September 2015),67 and the EU-Turkey agreement (March 2016) (see also 
Alcalde & Portos 2018). SMM’s demands especially concern the EU (e.g., opening of safe mi-
gration routes, loosening of border controls, change in foreign and military policies), as also 
exemplified by its protest targets. For instance, a demonstration was staged in front of the local 
seat of the European Commission. 
The relationship with the city government—although not immune to conflict—also fa-
cilitated the accomplishment of major results, both locally and internationally. A spokesperson 
reports that the local-level demands were approved during the plenary session of the municipal 
council and incorporated in BCR. With respect to the international level, she claims, 
 
«we are now very committed to direct actions for creating safe passages to Catalunya. For 
example, we have a project with migrants in Greece. We provided support to more than 300 
of them to access the EU relocation mechanism. We received financial support from and 
exchanged information with Barcelona Refugee City to consolidate this project. When speak-
ing with Greek institutions, […] the support of Barcelona’s city government assured them 
that we could provide a reliable reception» (B13).  
 
 The campaign Volem Acollir (We Want to Welcome), launched by the activist organisa-
tion CNCV (Casa Nostra Casa Vostra – Our Home is Your Home), have also focused on inter-
national affairs and heavily intersected with municipal politics. CNCV was founded by a group 
of Catalan volunteers working in the Idomeni refugee camp (Greece) on 9 May 2016, when the 
momentum of public awareness on such themes was starting to decrease. As a CNCV spokes-
person put it, «in Spain, public opinion was starting to ignore such issues, as it was ‘already past.’ 
                                                 
66 The Italian Navy’s Mare Nostrum search-and-rescue operation had both humanitarian and military purposes. It was replaced by 
Triton, conducted by the EU agency Frontex. As compared to Mare Nostrum, Triton had a more limited budget and a mandate fo-
cused on border control rather than rescue (Caponio & Cappiali 2018: 118-119). 
67 Alan Kurdi was a three-year-old Kurdish migrant who fled Syria with his family and died while moving to Greece. The picture of 
his lifeless body made news headlines worldwide. 
 162 
This was precisely our fear. A window of opportunity had been opened and now it was about to 
shut down» (B8). 
The numerous events organized by the group reached their climax with the massive 
demonstration staged on 18 February 2017, among the largest ever to have taken place in the 
city (see above). The event had an extraordinary resonance (5,383 related articles were published 
in national and international media and it inspired the march held in Milan three months later). 
In addition to groups from civil society at large, all of Catalunya’s political parties joined the 
demonstration (with different degrees of commitment), except the PP, which was ruling the 
central government. 
A competitive dynamic was activated between left-leaning local coalitions (like the one 
governing Barcelona) and the pro-independence parties governing Catalunya, which both target 
Spain’s central government for blame (albeit in different terms). In the same activist’s account, 
«the municipality placed our flag on the façade of its building, and the Catalan government did 
the same on the following afternoon. […] The two institutions, maybe because they are governed 
by such parties, were competing to see who could be closer to us» (B8). 
Both SMM and CNCV, as prominent sectors of urban social movements, enacted an 
upscaling mechanism in which the city government worked as a propagator. Their strategy has 
been based on three consistent objectives, i.e. sensitizing the public at the discursive level, sus-
taining large mobilizations in the streets, and driving policy change. In such a dynamic, the rela-
tionship with the city government has been symbiotic. As one activist put it, 
 
«on one side, the great mobilization of social movements provided an image of the city thanks 
to which Colau could later take a stance clearly shared by a part of the population, and which 
ultimately legitimated the work of the administration itself. On the other side, the municipality 
has had to listen to these mobilizations, to follow the wave by doing certain things, and has 
had to develop an international discourse, that I don’t think would be there without the mas-
sive participation that took place» (B13). 
 
In connection to this, a trade unionist working on migrant rights states that,  
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«the decisions that have a real impact on refugees are not taken in Barcelona, but Barcelona 
can, in some ways, empower a lot of demands. [This] is a megaphone for delivering such de-
mands to those with responsibilities. The confluence of associations, movements, and the 
municipality, makes it possible to transpose and enlarge the demands. It makes a lot of difference 
if our claims are brought to the Spanish parliament by the municipality or by ourselves, and 
here is where we have to converge» (B17, emphasis added). 
 
In a nutshell, the failures of Spain’s asylum governance pushed Barcelona’s government 
to ‘fill the hole’ through a far-reaching policy program, designed to function independently of 
central authorities. Local services have been boosted in order to keep pace with the increased 
numbers of asylum-seekers settled in the city. Urban actors have engaged in international net-
working to bypass the Spanish executive’s unreceptiveness. The cooperation between incum-
bents and urban social movements has been based on reciprocal needs, as they could legitimate 
each other’s choices in supralocal arenas. Yet also other parties have sought to tap into social 
mobilizations for the sake of consensus-building. Pro-migrant sentiments spread in Barcelona’s 
society also thanks to movements’ agency, and political parties thus themselves competed for 
the ownership of it. 
7.5 Conclusion: Arenas and mechanisms of social movement outcomes in 
the case of asylum policies 
The contentious politics of migration has escalated amid the so-called ‘refugee crisis.’ While 
global in nature, such a crucial juncture has produced deep consequences also at the local level, 
as in the case of borders and cities situated along migration routes. The central argument of this 
chapter is that, in a context in which cities experience intense societal changes and governance 
failures that originate elsewhere, ideologically-sympathetic local governments and social move-
ments are incentivized to respond by building urban alliances. The similarities and differences 
across the two cases analyzed allow us to add further nuance to this picture. 
 Both Milan and Barcelona sit at the bottom of a multi-level configuration that penalize 
them in governing migration-related issues. Indeed, unfavorable conditions were imposed by the 
respective central governments. Tens of thousands of migrants reached Milan during the 2010s. 
A deficient national asylum system put the city—especially its central railway station—under 
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unprecedented pressure. The humanitarian emergency however also opened a window of op-
portunity for the Deputy Mayor of Social Policies, who drew a line of conflict between the city 
and the upper layers of government. Remarkable room to maneuver was thus achieved, as testi-
fied by important decisions regarding migrant identification and freedom of movement, as well 
as the central authorities’ concessions. Urban social movements had their momentum too. Local 
incumbents introduced activists’ demands within branches of the central state that would have 
been unreceptive otherwise. In turn, they could capitalize on grassroots mobilizations to sharpen 
their urban leadership. 
Similar dynamics unfolded in Barcelona, where gaps in the implementation of Spanish 
asylum policy left numerous migrants devoid of assistance, either before the submission of their 
asylum request or after a negative verdict. The city government filled this legislative void by 
launching its own program of international protection, Barcelona Refugee City. Also in this case, 
incumbents and activists joined forces, as the former embraced the demands coming from below, 
while the latter legitimized municipal decisions through mass mobilization—in a process of mu-
tual responsiveness. In upscaling the conflict, the development of an international network of 
cities and NGOs has been a critical resource. 
The mechanisms at play can be summarized as follows. Within the city politics arena, local 
governments and social movements have engaged in alliance-building on the basis of emerging 
urban issues and ideological affinity. This made it possible to upscale political mobilization in 
the multi-level governance arena. Urban allies have worked ‘in tandem’, i.e., exchanged their resources, 
for the sake of pressuring (or circumventing) supra-local institutions. On the one hand, parties 
in office—aware of their constituencies’ pro-migrant mood—have overstepped their competen-
cies and converted the ‘refugee crisis’ into an opportunity for consensus-building. On the other 
hand, activists have fed such public sentiments and exploited incumbents’ receptiveness to push 
their demands onto the institutional agenda. Multi-level governance—while constraining local 
policy-making—served as a discursive expedient for constructing a ‘common front’ (i.e. the city) 
and a ‘common enemy’ (i.e. the upper tiers of government). 
Hence, when looking at political alliances, one might argue that belonging to the same 
geographical community is—under certain circumstances—a stronger glue than being inside or 
outside institutions. Lying at the intersection of these two boundaries, local governments can 
both engage in contentious politics (by catalyzing demands from below) and play in institutional 
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arenas. Theoretically, such reasoning echoes the work of Duyvendak & Jasper (2015) on the 
state as a relational entity to be split in different analytical components, e.g. according to geo-
graphical scales. The cases analyzed moreover provide insights on ideology and immigration 
politics at large. They suggest that the left (whether mainstream or radical) can secure political 
rewards by formulating a distinctive, coherent discourse that resonates with the values of egali-
tarian constituencies, rather than conforming to the security-oriented approach of the right (cf. 
Castelli Gattinara 2016: 171-6). 
 When it comes to cross-case differences, EU governance (and other structural factors) 
had divergent consequences for the two cities. Milan became a key stop-off point for migrants 
trying to reach northern Europe. The Dublin Regulation, in conjunction with intensified border 
controls by neighboring countries, created a bottleneck in their routes. The consequences of 
these decisions were faced by many Italian local authorities—including Milan’s. The number of 
migrants reaching Spain was much lower up till 2018. This explains the quite opposite demand 
from the Barcelona government to Spanish authorities, in favor of hosting more migrants in the 
country, e.g., by committing to the EU relocation mechanism. 
 These distinctions can be interpreted as a consequence of differences across the two 
cities in terms of ideological background and impact of the ‘refugee crisis.’ In Milan, the human-
itarian emergency accelerated the construction of a city-level alliance. Ideological affinity is pre-
sent, but the urgency to act was possibly a greater incentive to coalesce. This is particularly evi-
dent when looking at the confrontational attitude adopted by the municipal government vis-à-
vis the central one, even though both were of the same political color. Activists have exploited 
this apparent contradiction, keeping up pressure on the city government and pushing its agenda 
closer to their own demands. Logics of convenience thus prevailed over ideological ones. In 
Barcelona, where the crisis has been relatively softer, the urban alliance seems to be crafted on 
a more ideological basis. The city government—a quite unique experiment of movement-party 











Comparing social movement outcomes 
across contentious migration policies 
 
 
«To explain contentious politics is to identify its recurrent causal mechanisms, the ways they 
combine, in what sequences they recur, and why different combinations and sequences, start-
ing from different initial conditions, produce varying effects on the large scale». 





This research departed with the ambition of theorizing how and under what conditions pro-
immigrant social movements—collective actors that mobilize from the margins of the political 
process—can exert an influence on policy-making at the city-level and beyond. Multiple schol-
arly contributions have dealt with the questions of migration governance and contestation, but 
research on the outcomes of social movements has been lagging behind. Chapter 2 brought 
these different scholarships into dialogue and combined them in a consistent fashion by means 
of a strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approach to contentious politics. Based on the 
empirical findings presented in Part II of the dissertation, I now compare social movement out-
comes across different contentious realms of policy-making, namely exclusionary policies, poli-
cies in support of undocumented immigrants, and asylum policies. This will allow us to extrap-
olate general statements on the mechanisms linking mobilization and policy change. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. First, I zoom in on the arenas of interaction deemed 
relevant for the occurrence of social movement outcomes, namely the civil society arena (Section 
8.2), the city politics arena (Section 8.3), and the multi-level governance arena (Section 8.4). For 
each of these, I will provide a summary of the empirical findings so as to unveil the specific 
causal mechanisms that drove social movement outcomes in the cases analyzed. Next, Section 
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8.5 moves to a higher level of abstraction. It presents general statements on the (sequences of) 
mechanisms that social movements can activate to produce political change, assessing similarities 
and dissimilarities across different contentious migration policies. 
8.2 Civil society arena: Brokers of contention 
When seeking to pose a credible challenge to their targets and to other counterparts, one of the 
main concerns of protestors is to give a semblance of rock-hard unity by constructing a une-
quivocal collective identity. Far from being monolithic, however, even the most cohesive social 
movement is a compound of manifold players in constant negotiation. The establishment of ties 
among them is the product of difficult, laborious, long-lasting brokerage mechanisms that unfold 
within what I refer to as the civil society arena. This latter includes the vast array of non-state 
players at the city-level bearing an interest in the expansion of immigrant rights. Intensive net-
working efforts are essential to immigrant activists, as they can hope to step out of the shadow 
by reaching out to potential allies, building bridges, and drawing on the resources of their broader 
environment (Nicholls 2016: 304). Everyday city life provides them with assorted opportunities 
to this purpose because of the relatively large availability of influential supporters who may mo-
bilize out of a sense of solidarity with a constituency to which they do not belong (della Porta 
2018: 11). 
 Research findings demonstrate how crucial were these dynamics for the emergence of 
pro-immigrant movements in the cities analyzed. In Milan, this process took root in two solidar-
ity traditions, namely left-wing unionism and Christian philanthropy. These networks have been 
historically committed with issues that gradually became related to migration, such as jail condi-
tions, homelessness, poverty, and employment. A fully-fledged pro-immigrant activism arose 
between the 1990s and the 2000s, concomitantly with the breakthrough of migration politics on 
the national stage and the upsurge of the GJM. In Barcelona, too, the emergence of a solidarity 
movement is rooted in a century-long history. The asociaciones de vecinos—grassroots committees 
at the neighborhood-level concerned with urban welfare—played a decisive role in the settle-
ment of both Spanish and foreign-born immigrants, catalyzing their participation and preventing 
ethnic conflicts. More recently, the intense anti-austerity protests Spain witnessed in the early 
2010s served as a platform for several issue-specific mobilizations, including migration-related 
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ones—as in the cases of the housing movement (whose constituency is largely foreign-born) and 
the broader battle over the ‘right to the city.’ 
Another recurrent feature is the importance of direct social action for the pro-immigrant 
movements scrutinized (cf. Bosi & Zamponi 2020). While their recourse to political claim-mak-
ing was contingent on specific external circumstances (e.g., threats and opportunities), mutual 
aid, voluntarism, and similar activities were carried out on a regular basis. However, these two 
kinds of repertoire ultimately appear highly synergic, as if they are the ‘two hands’ of mobiliza-
tion. Direct social actions have kept networks alive in times of latency and served as a source of 
political legitimacy in times of visibility (cf. Zamponi 2017). In Milan, for example, activists per-
ceived their bottom-up welfare activities as means to influence policy-making, in so far they shed 
light on the deficiencies of institutional intervention. Barcelona’s street vendors first organized 
as a mutual aid group, but became more and more politicized as they expanded their solidarity 
network. Moreover, in both the cities, seemingly a-political actions have become increasingly 
contentious in face of retreats of state actors from their responsibilities of humanitarian protec-
tion. This was evident, for instance, in the case of asylum policy-making. NGOs have gradually 
hybridized with protest groups (cf. della Porta 2020), as they (or their individual volunteers) 
began to take part in campaigns in support of forced migrants and against the EU border regime. 
 The ability of players in the civil society arena to craft robust coalitions, however, seem 
heavily dependent on the policy realm they seek to affect. Most notably, activating brokerage 
mechanisms was much more challenging in the case of local exclusionary policies as compared 
to policies in support of undocumented or forced immigrants. Under these circumstances, pro-
test appear ever more risky (e.g., because of the prospect of being deported or subjected to other 
punitive measures). Also, solidarity networks seem more likely to disintegrate in absence of pow-
erful incentives . This was apparent when the Milan’s Comitato Immigrati occupied Torre Imbon-
ati—a smokestack of a dismissed factory—to protest against the Cabinet Berlusconi III’s regu-
larization plan. As internal conflicts over paternalism and ethnicity escalated, insurgents failed to 
craft a coherent strategy to participate at the institutional bargaining table. Their momentum 
faded away and the city government—led by conservative and anti-immigration parties—even-
tually succeeded in repressing them. This finding problematizes the argument that movements 
obstructing policy decisions would have greater chance of success as compared to those seeking 
constructive policy innovations (see Lipsky 1970: 13; Amenta et al. 2019: 452). 
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8.3 City politics arena: The boons and banes of alliance-building 
There are manifold urban players bearing an interest in migration-related affairs. A propitious 
balance of power in what I define as city politics arena is essential for pro-immigrant movements 
to produce successful and meaningful outcomes. Alliance-building is the key mechanism to 
achieve this objective. Civil society organizations need to build ties with sympathetic political 
elites who, in turn, are well positioned to find «the support of native-born elites […] and to 
overcome skepticism among native-born voters» (Steil & Vasi 2014: 1143; see also de Graauw 
& Vermeulen 2016). In spite of their marginality, demand-makers can rely on various strategic 
leverages for motivating powerholders to become part of, and possibly lead, a pro-immigrant 
alliance at the city-level. I argued that these leverages are both political and cognitive, meaning 
that mobilization can make pro-immigrant policies electorally convenient and technically practi-
cable from the perspective of local political elites. 
 The case of Barcelona’s policies in support of undocumented immigrants clearly demon-
strates the importance of these dynamics. The responsiveness to protesters was remarkable in 
this realm. Since 2015, the city government has been led by a movement-party coalition on the 
radical left (BeC). Emanating from an activist milieu, municipal officials embraced the demands 
of grassroots organizations—especially those that sustained their electoral platform in the first 
place. To transpose these demands into public policies, Barcelona’s government not only en-
acted provisions to alleviate the plight of the undocumented, but also incorporated a semantics 
based on human rights and social justice into the institutional discourse. The administration has 
refused to endorse any hierarchical stratification of the foreign-born population and projected a 
vision of the city as alternative site of citizenship, by which all types of resident are deemed 
legitimate members of the urban community, regardless of their administrative status (so-called 
jus domicili; cf. de Graauw 2014). 
In many respects, Barcelona was a fertile breeding ground for the flourishing of these 
ideas and practices of urban governance. This owes, of course, to its long-standing history of 
insurgent city, where democratic forms of policy-making and self-government have been persis-
tently experimented. Moreover, following the massive wave of anti-austerity protests in the early 
2010s, radical claims have moved from the arena of protest to the institutional space, also 
through the emergence of new parties (della Porta et al. 2017). Populist attitudes proliferated, but 
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these were of inclusionary type, meaning that political and economic elites, rather than ethnic 
and religious minorities, were targeted as opponents of ‘the people’ (cf. Font et al. 2017). Similar 
considerations hold for the case of the Catalan pro-independence movement, whose nationalist 
claims are embedded in a broader call for democracy and equality. The radical agenda of the 
Barcelona’s administration has to be also interpreted as a cultural and political outcome of these 
major upheavals. 
 One might argue that Barcelona’s political dynamics are so exceptional that responsive-
ness to social movements is a foregone outcome. In a way, the electoral victory of BeC can be 
ultimately interpreted as a consequence of social movements in itself. However, a very different 
case—that of Milan’s exclusionary policies—highlights the importance of much similar dynam-
ics. The conservative administration led by the mayor Letizia Moratti (2006-2011) adopted a 
hardline approach to immigration, foremost on the initiative of far-right governing parties. Pol-
icy-making revolved around three main axes, namely assimilationism, highly selective access to 
decision-making processes, and the adoption of punitive ordinances that criminalized most vul-
nerable immigrants. Amid this securitarian escalation, which was concomitantly unfolding at the 
national level, the odds for activists to produce successful outcomes were virtually null. They 
adopted a highly contentious, sometimes illegal, repertoire of actions with the purpose of limiting 
the most detrimental consequences of local policies. 
 When Giuliano Pisapia—a leftist civil rights lawyer—became the mayoral candidate of 
the center-left coalition at the 2011 local elections, even the radical sectors of Milan’s movements 
mobilized to support his campaign, galvanized by the prospect of moving beyond a hostile po-
litical season. Once in office, Pisapia’s administration rejected the immigration-criminality nexus 
promoted by its predecessors and framed diversity as an opportunity for the urban community. 
Also, the most repressive exclusionary policies were dismantled and the array of municipal inte-
gration policies were expanded. In pursuing these policy objectives, Pierfrancesco Majorino—
Deputy Mayor of Social Policies—took a leadership position and crafted a large and cohesive 
coalition around a pro-immigration political vision. Social movements welcomed and contrib-
uted to craft these policy changes. Activists felt legitimized as policy actors within newly-estab-
lished participatory venues, but still lamented a scarce sense of efficacy—an outcome that can 
be referred to as ‘access without influence.’ 
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 These outcomes also shed lights on the limits and dilemmas that pro-immigrant move-
ments face when engaging in alliance-building with players in the city politics arena—most no-
tably local political elites. At the root of the struggle for immigrant rights is the refusal of nation-
ally-bounded definitions of citizenship; yet, state players are also the ultimate target of demand-
makers, who urge public officials to at least partly accommodate their claims (e.g., Darling & 
Bauder 2019: 13). Establishing cooperative dynamics with institutional actors bring these con-
tradictions to the fore. In Milan, left-leaning incumbents framed immigration and diversity in 
positive terms, but the ‘hierarchy of citizenship’ to which immigrants are subjected has not been 
put into question. Subsequently, undocumented immigrants have never been considered as po-
tential targets of inclusionary policies, except for residual and ‘unadvertised’ provisions. The 
expansion of immigrant rights has been pursued within the boundaries of a ‘legality’ established 
at higher tiers of government, with limited efforts to push these very boundaries forward. Within 
this context, policy-makers accommodated assorted demands of immigrant advocates, but did 
not endorse more fundamental claims for challenging nationally-bounded definitions of citizen-
ship. Activists referred to this unbridgeable gulf as a ‘legal divide.’ 
 Importantly, disputes between allies have surfaced in the ‘rebel’ Barcelona, too. The pivot 
of controversy has been the difficulty of new incumbents to match their actions with their new 
role. This has bred the fear of co-optation among activists, who have felt the threat of having 
their identity (unintentionally) appropriated and suffered from the absorption of their former 
leaders in the administrative machine. Discontent has been extremely pronounced in the case of 
street vendors, being political self-determination at the core of these immigrants’ collective iden-
tity. From this angle, findings confirm that the relationship between parties in office and their 
activist base is likely to be conflictual, but not necessarily for the reasons outlined by McAdam 
& Tarrow (2010: 537). In Barcelona, the conflicts between elected officials and protesters were 
not caused by the attempt of the former to appeal to the median voter by moving to the center, 
but precisely for the opposite reason. In fact, the ‘loyalty’ of local incumbents to their activist legacy, 
their mimicking of social-movement strategies, and their sensitiveness to protesters’ demands 
have fueled, rather than tamed, controversies. 
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8.4 Multi-level governance arena: Upscaling mobilization 
The governance of migration is dispersed over multiple sites of authority at various spatial scale. 
Yet, the dominant players are central states, as they can reclaim the levers of immigration policy 
to regulate the conditions for being admitted in a national polity. As for the EU, scholars make 
use of the metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’ to describe a «intergovernmentalist view of European 
cooperation as a means for restriction-minded member states to close down their external bor-
ders» (Bonjour et al. 2018: 411). Hence, to affect migration policy-making, social movements 
have to not only craft potent alliances at the city-level, but also to activate dynamics of change 
in the multi-level governance arena. Upscaling mechanisms are crucial to this end. By leveraging 
on the relation density of the urban environment, pro-immigrant movements can «transform the 
local arena into a major front in national immigration battles» (Nicholls et al. 2016: 3). Institu-
tional actors at the city-level, too, can surpass the limits of local politics through mechanisms of 
upscaling, notably through strategies of vertical venue-shopping for bypassing unreceptive po-
litical environments (Sapotichne & Jones 2012: 454-5). 
 Empirical findings demonstrate how social movements and local governments are able 
to activate upscaling mechanisms jointly, i.e., by mobilizing as an unitary player to confront supra-
local institutions. This is apparent in the case of urban asylum policies enacted amid the ‘refugee 
crisis.’ In dealing with a humanitarian emergency whose governance rests in the hand of central 
states, but which ultimately manifests as a critical urban issue, a ‘tandem’ between local incum-
bents and social-movement activists was set in motion in Milan and Barcelona. This strength-
ened their position in a battleground where the balance of power was structurally unfavorable 
to them. On the one hand, parties in office—aware of their constituencies’ pro-immigrant 
mood—have overstepped their competencies and converted the ‘refugee crisis’ into an oppor-
tunity for consensus-building. On the other hand, activists have fed such public sentiments and 
exploited incumbents’ receptiveness to push their demands onto the institutional agenda. In 
sum, alliance-building was a strategy to secure political gains while shaping policies within an 
otherwise unreceptive, hostile environment.  
 These upscaling mechanisms are thus closely linked with city politics dynamics. In multi-
level governance arenas, not only sympathetic political elites can be functional to the objectives 
of social movements, but also the other way around—meaning that their strategic leverage is 
 174 
reciprocal. Activists are able to strengthen their institutional allies by fueling public controversy 
and allocating blame (Hutter et al. 2019), e.g., to the EU and national governments. Also, they 
often have a knowledge of social problems ‘on the ground’ and a sterling reputation among their 
reference constituencies (Mayer 2018). Hence, city governments are incentivized to be respon-
sive toward activists who presumably belong to their constituency and who can provide re-
sources to be invested in higher-level arenas. In turn, social movements are prone to mobilize 
when sympathetic parties are in the city government, as institutional allies can smooth the via-
bility of claims that would remain unheard otherwise. Precisely because they need support from 
above, activists seek to profit from elites’ vulnerability, trying to be perceived as potentially fa-
cilitating or disruptive for institutional goals (Amenta et al. 2010). 
These strategic interactions are well described by the concept of ‘governmental activism’, 
i.e. «governmental players joining forces with non-governmental players in contentious actions 
against policies they want to prevent or redress» (Verhoeven & Duyvendak, 2017: 564). In such 
cooperative dynamics, partners engage in a «division of oppositional labor» (ibid.: 567), meaning 
that they back each other up by combining their respective political expertise. The case of Bar-
celona’s policies in support of undocumented immigrants is particularly illustrative. As men-
tioned the BeC’s administration promoted a radical model of urban citizenship that overtly con-
tradicts, and intends to fill in for the lacunas of, Spanish immigration laws, e.g., issuing local ID 
cards and seeking to close the city’s Immigration Detention Center. For the sake of challenging 
the Spanish executive, local incumbents sought to boost (and even to reproduce) social-move-
ment mobilizations by means of institutional resources that activists lack by definition, such as 
legitimacy, visibility, and the rule of law. Jaume Asens and Lola López—lifelong pro-immigrant 
advocates who became leading figures of the BeC’s administration—starkly embodied such en-
trenchment of activist and institutional networks. They persistently sought to empower grassroot 
organizations while also deploying a movement-style repertoire of action from within the insti-
tutional space. 
8.5 Comparing social movement outcomes: Similarities and dissimilarities 
across contentious migration policies 
Extrapolating from the empirical findings presented thus far, this section aims to formulate gen-
eral statements on how and under what conditions pro-immigrant social movements exert their 
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influence on migration policy-making, locally and beyond. This theoretical exercise has its epis-
temological foundation on strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approaches to the study 
of contentious politics, which have been productively applied to explain the consequences of 
collective action in other policy sectors (cf. Bosi et al. 2016: 11-12). 
By intersecting multiple scholarly contributions, the theoretical framework (Section 2.5) 
identified three concentric arenas of interaction deemed relevant for the occurrence of social 
movement outcomes in the field of migration policy-making, i.e., the civil society arena, the city 
politics arena, and the multi-level governance arena. Each of these tend to correspond to a spe-
cific causal mechanism, i.e., brokerage, alliance-building, and upscaling, respectively. It was ar-
gued that, despite their position of relative weakness position vis-à-vis other players in the arenas, 
social movements can create a strategic leverage by means of these mechanisms, which reinforce 
and concatenate with one another (cf. Figure 2.1). The empirical study has then focused on three 
contentious migration policies, namely (1) exclusionary policies, (2) policies in support of un-
documented immigrants, and (3) asylum policies. As (sequences of) mechanisms tend to recur 
in a regular fashion across various circumstances (McAdam et al. 2001: 13), here I will detect 
similarities and dissimilarities across these different realms of policy-making. A general summary 
is presented in Table 8.1. 
Local exclusionary policies aim to exclude specific, highly politicized sections of the im-
migrant population—such as the undocumented, Muslims, or Romani—from various rights and 
benefits (e.g., Ambrosini 2013b). These provisions often go hand in hand with punitive measures 
against lawbreakers. Examples include bans from collective goods (i.e., welfare chauvinism), po-
licing in public spaces for deportation purposes, and evictions from unauthorized camps. Under 
these circumstances, integration programs may be enacted, but are usually very selective, mean-
ing that support is provided only to subjects that fulfil particular conditions. Overall, these pol-
icies tend to unfold through the prism of national rhetoric (Hopkins 2010) and to divide foreign-
born residents according to criteria of alleged deservingness (Crawley & Skleparis 2018). Pro-
immigrant forces may mobilize to oppose these policies and mitigate their consequences, but 
the responsiveness to their demands tend to be extremely scarce. The production of negative, 
unintended consequences—including repressive backlashes and policy setbacks—is likely, too. 
These outcomes can be explained in light of the limited strategic leverages that activists 
are able to exert in the arenas in which they interact. Exclusionary policies limit the very chance 
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of engaging in political claim-making in so far as they criminalize potential demand-makers. Un-
der these conditions, mobilization becomes very risky. Direct social actions may be preferred as 
these can remain ‘invisible’ and mitigate the detrimental impacts of policy-making. The dominant 
role played by pro-status quo organizations involved in policy-making may obstruct the activa-
tion of brokerage mechanisms in the civil society arena. In addition, the limited prospect of 
change may promt divisive dynamics among potential allies, notably due to their power asym-
metries. In turn, the city politics arena offers limited opportunities for alliance-building. Local 
political elites tend to be hostile towards activists, who can then hope to disrupt institutional 
routines by means of highly confrontational actions. Local elections represent a (rare) oppor-
tunity to affect the political process through the endorsement sympathetic candidates. Also, in 
absence of influential institutional allies, movement have meager chances of accessing the multi-
level governance arena, although venue-shopping strategies can be occasionally deployed, e.g., 
through court appeals to oppose discriminatory provisions. 
On the other side of the spectrum there are policies that aim to support undocumented 
immigrants, either by granting them access to generalist provisions or through specific ones. The 
targets of  policies are deemed ‘illegal’ from the perspective of the nation-state, which normally 
has the monopoly over controlling immigration and regulating citizenship. Within this frame-
work, constitutionally subservient local governments are only allowed to bear responsibility in 
integration policy-making (Penninx et al. 2004; Spencer 2018), i.e., to entitle foreign-born resi-
dents with civil, political, and social rights once admitted in a national polity (cf. Hammar 1985). 
Immigrant rights are, in fact, most often stratified by and dependent on residency status as es-
tablished under national jurisdictions (Bolderson 2011). Local governments can support undoc-
umented immigrants either conforming with the prescriptions of supra-local authorities (e.g, 
through regularization programs that confer national residency status, cf. Kaufmann 2019) or 
contradicting them, as in the case of US sanctuary cities (Gonzalez O’Brien et al. 2019: 4). These 
policies project an image of the city as an alternative site of citizenship, by which all types of 
resident are deemed legitimate members of the urban community, regardless of their adminis-
trative status (cf. de Graauw 2014). 
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Table 8.1. Arenas, mechanisms, and social movement outcomes across different contentious migration policies 
 Exclusionary policies Policies in support of 
undocumented immigrants 
Asylum policies 
Outcomes to be explained    
Main features of policies  Exclusion of politicized categories from 
various rights and benefits. 
 Repression. 
 Selective assimilationism. 
 National rhetoric. 
 Provisions within the boundaries of su-
pra-local policies (e.g., regularizations). 
 Provisions in contrast with supra-local 
policies (e.g., local ID cards). 
 ‘Urban citizenship’ framework. 
 Decoupled policy-making. 
 Provisions within the boundaries of 
supra-local policies (e.g., expansion 
of national provisions). 
 Provisions in contrast with supra-lo-
cal policies (e.g., free movement). 
 ‘Human rights’ framework. 




Very low Low/intermediate Relatively high 
Causal mechanisms    
Civil society arena 
(brokerage mechanisms) 
Fragmented (but not disconnected) 
 
 Obstructive role of pro-status quo civil 
society organizations. 
 Divisive dynamics due to power asymme-
tries. 
 Prevalence of direct social actions over 





 Supportive role of ‘native’ organizations. 
 Importance of legacies of solidarity. 
 Direct social actions and political claim-
making as synergic. 
Cohesive 
 
 Supportive role of ‘native’ organiza-
tions. 
 Importance of legacies of solidarity. 
 Direct social actions and political 
claim-making as synergic. 




 Hostile political elites. 
 Highly contentious interactions through 
extreme actions. 




 Supportive role of sympathetic elites. 
 Importance of cognitive resources. 





 Supportive role of sympathetic elites. 
 Importance of cognitive resources. 
 Electoral incentives. 




 Limited leverage vis-à-vis counterparts. 




 ‘Governmental activism’ as a strategy 
for policy change. 
 Limited rooms to maneuver. 
Accessible 
 
 ‘Governmental activism’ as a strategy 
for policy change. 
 Systematic use of venue-shopping. 
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Social movements play a crucial role in the enactment these policies. The relational den-
sity of cities allows undocumented immigrants to weave extensive networks of solidarity in the 
civil society arena and eventually find the support sympathetic elites in the city politics arena. 
Left-leaning elected officials in the city government may be eager to be accommodate activists’ 
demands for the sake of boosting their electoral consensus and career prospects. Municipal bu-
reaucrats may be incentivized to be responsive, too. They can capitalize on their discretionary 
powers so as to craft inclusionary policies in support of immigrants. To this end, activists can 
provide indispensable and otherwise unavailable cognitive resources. These alliance-building 
mechanisms may push urban players to forge alliances to jointly confront supra-local authorities. 
By means of governmental activism—a particularly intense form of alliance-building based on 
the ‘division of oppositional labor’ between public officials and social-movement activists who 
share similar objectives and similar opponents (Verhoeven & Duyvendak 2017)—they can shape 
public policies within an unfavorable context of multi-level governance. However, since citizen-
ship remains a prerogative of nation-stated, the chance of success are generally limited, at least 
in the short-medium term. 
Last, social movements may exert their influence in the realm of asylum policies. These 
latter are aimed to support migrants who are either settled in, or in transit, through a locality and 
who are seeking protection. Local governments can support them through the levers of national 
policies, perhaps expanding these provisions, or by means of ‘transgressive’ actions, as in the 
case of decisions to locally suspend bans on mobility. These policies are normally justified on 
the grounds of humanitarianism as it is embedded in international laws that guarantee the right 
to international protection to whoever is forced to leave its context of settlement. The dynamics 
of social movement outcomes are similar to those occurring in the case of policies in support of 
undocumented immigrants. The establishment of solidarity networks in the civil society arena, 
the availability of influential allies in the city politics arena, and the possibility of activating up-
scaling mechanisms in the multi-level governance arena appear as the major drivers of change. 
But chances of success tend to be greater in the case of asylum policies, in so far as the category 
of ‘refugee’ is normally perceived as more legitimate and deserving in the eyes of both elites and 





Conclusion: Do social movements matter 
for urban migration governance? 
 
 
«Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will». 





The metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’ points at European migration and asylum policy as domi-
nated by restriction-minded member states with a stark preference for closing down their exter-
nal borders (Bonjour et al. 2018: 411). Although this intergovernmental, security-oriented ap-
proach to immigration has been intrinsic to the process of Europeanization since its inception 
(cf. Guiraudon 2000; Toshkov & De Haan 2013), the European ‘refugee crisis’ of the 2010s 
marked a deepening of pre-existing governance arrangements. As Castelli Gattinara put it, 
 
«[i]nstitutional and mainstream actors have mirrored public anxieties and security concerns, 
endorsing emergency narratives, aggressive policing and militarized border control. Unable 
to engage with citizens’ concerns, they have helped to conflate migration with insecurity, 
creating a fertile breeding ground for xenophobic, populist reactions» (Castelli Gattinara 
2017: 318). 
 
Similarly, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Trump administration deployed corrosive nativist 
rhetoric and enacted a crackdown on immigration, breeding polarization in the US political de-
bate (Williamson 2020)—yet deepening, rather than departing from, the trajectories of its pre-
decessors (cf. Nicholls 2014a). These trends have far-reaching implications for migration gov-
ernance at the local level, too. For the sake of electoral consensus or mere legal subordination, 
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local authorities tend to reproduce, or even amplify, the securitarian and emergency logics in-
scribed in supra-local provisions. 
Compliance, however, is not the only option on the table. Local actors can enact debor-
dering policies and practices (Ambrosini 2018) that derail from the tracks established at higher 
spatial scales. Nonconformist responses are first advocated by pro-immigrant activists. In con-
testing extant border regimes, they urge the state to accommodate their demands, while also 
projecting a vision of the city as an alternative locus of membership, regardless of formally-
granted citizenship statuses (Kaufmann 2019). But do they really matter? This is the grand question 
guiding my scientific endeavor. By intersecting multiple scholarly contributions, and based on 
extensive fieldwork in two large South European cities, this research sought to theorize how and 
under what conditions pro-immigrant social movements are able produce political (and policy) 
outcomes. 
 This chapter, which brings the dissertation in full circle, is structured as follows. Section 
9.2 recalls the main strands of literature on which the research has been grounded (especially in 
the realms of migration studies, social movement studies, and urban studies) and clarify what are 
the contributions to each of them. The main limitations and the avenues for future inquiry are 
critically assessed in Section 9.3, which also advocates the adoption of ‘space-sensitive’ compar-
ative designs in political studies. Conclusive remarks are presented in Section 9.4. 
9.2 Connection with and contribution to extant literature 
Migration studies 
This research draws on (and speak to) the most recent trends in migration studies. Over the last 
two decades, scholars paid growing attention to the local dimension of migration policy-making 
(e.g., Rogers & Tillie 2001; Penninx et al. 2004; Schiller & Çaglar 2011; Caponio & Borkert 2010). 
This ‘local turn’ was driven by two emerging societal trends, namely the relevance of local con-
texts of settlement for the integration or marginalization of immigrants, as well as the autonomy 
of local governments in steering these processes through the levers of policy-making. Scholars 
increasingly detected patterns of divergence across localities even within centralized countries 
(Koopmans 2004; Penninx & Martiniello 2004), with local policy-making ranging from accom-
modative, multicultural programs to punitive and exclusionary provisions. 
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 In more recent years, specialists on migration incorporated a multi-level governance per-
spective so as to account for the assorted state and non-state actors located at different spatial 
scales that concur to shape migration policies (Scholten & Penninx 2016; Zapata-Barrero et al. 
2017; Caponio & Jones-Correa 2018). Precisely because local governments are relative autono-
mous in this realm, local policies may be different from (and even in contradiction with) the 
ones of supralocal authorities. The leeway of local actors may thus result in decoupled policy-
making, i.e., government levels are poorly coordinated and possibly in conflict with one another 
(Scholten & Penninx 2016: 94). 
Municipalities are indeed able to stretch, counter, or circumvent supralocal provisions. 
A borderline case is that of sanctuary cities in the U.S. and beyond. In face of mounting nativism 
in national politics, these localities forbid the inquiry into immigration status or cooperation with 
central immigration authorities within their jurisdictions (Gonzalez O’Brien et al. 2019: 4), e.g., 
by mean of local bureaucratic membership policies (de Graauw 2014). More broadly, sanctuary 
is «a spatial practice of setting a specific territory, location, or building outside the bounds of 
sovereign authority and legal redress» (Darling & Bauder 2019: 8). But before opting for these 
‘rogue’ actions, city officials might support resident immigrants by expanding, but still conform-
ing with, the prescriptions of constitutionally-superior authorities—as in the case of regulariza-
tion programs that confer national residency status on irregular migrants (Kaufmann 2019). 
Migration scholars adopt an agenda-setting perspective for explaining such instances of 
decoupled policy-making (cf. Scholten 2013). Patterns of agenda-setting normally have a strongly 
level-specific character. In contested policy areas like migration, the interpretation of collective 
problems (the «constructivist moment», Guiraudon 2000: 258) is likely to vary depending on the 
tier of government. This can result in divergent policy trajectories across levels of policy-making, 
ultimately breeding inter-institutional conflicts. 
 This research contributes to the literature by focusing on crucial but overlooked drivers 
of local migration policy-making—namely, pro-immigrant social movements (cf. de Graauw & 
Vermeulen 2016). The framing processes of local policy-makers are not only shaped by signals 
descending ‘from above’ (e.g., policy failures that originate from central authorities), but also by 
forces emerging ‘from below.’ Protest is a signal sent by large sectors of the electorate about 
urgent societal problems they care about (Hutter & Vliegenthart 2018: 360). Elites can embrace 
popular causes for electoral opportunism, i.e. playing the role of ‘tribunes of the people’, but 
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also guided by a more substantial ideological commitment (Hutter et al. 2019). Also, responsive-
ness can help parties in power to recover from a crisis of legitimacy (Holdo 2016). If large and 
persistent, protest can even represent an electoral threat, especially when many protesters belong 
to the incumbents’ voter base. Otherwise put, also social movements can act as agenda-setters and thus 
as driving forces of progressive, possibly nonconformist policy-making. 
 These findings shed light not only on social movements as impactful policy participants, 
but also on more far-reaching institutional dynamics unfolding at the local level—and in cities 
especially. City governments are part of both the state and the urban community. This implies a 
complex ‘tightrope-walk’, as they share (and compete for) power with supralocal institutions, at 
the same time as having to respond to possible conflicts and demands emerging from below. 
Local incumbents can find themselves caught ‘between a rock and hard place’ in that they need 
to manage efficiently what they see as critical collective problems (e.g., humanitarian emergen-
cies) while trying to keep consensus among native-born residents and assorted local stakehold-
ers. 
Mayors are positioned at the zenith of these dense and intricated webs of relationships. 
As top elected politicians and local party leaders, they can secure electoral gains by championing highly 
visible policy changes that epitomize the values of their voter base—also in the prospect of 
boosting their personal career (Hughes 2017: 367-9; see also Mullin et al. 2004). Drawing on their 
visibility, and possibly their charisma, mayors are able to set the political agenda and draw policy 
frames in line with their interests and beliefs. Far from being an individual exercise, however, 
the deployment of such strategies is conditional on their ability crafting large and cohesive coa-
litions around a certain political vision—possibly the most influential driver of policy change 
locally (Liu et al. 2010). But aside from political affairs, mayors are also chief executive officers. While 
their power is superior when it comes to agenda-setting as compared to the implementation 
stage (cf. Sapotichne & Jones 2012), they still yield an influence over administrative apparatuses, 
for instance by directly appointing trusted technical figures. Accordingly, this research has shown 
that left-leaning mayor(al administrations) are able to crystalize the manifold magmatic forces in 
support of immigrants that gurgle within the urban political realm, clustering them in a potent—
albeit variably unstable and internally contested—alliance.  
 
Social movement studies 
 183 
 The contentious politics of migration has escalated in western societies (van der Brug et 
al. 2015)—and even more so in the context of the ‘refugee crisis’ of the 2010s. This is the result 
of multiple actors’ mobilizations, within both the electoral and the protest arena, either opposing 
or supporting migrants, diversity, and multi-culturalism (Eggert & Giugni 2015). This study has 
especially focused on urban social movements by and in solidarity with immigrants. Their activists 
«do not only oppose discriminatory discourses and practices, but also attempt to improve the 
fate of immigrants in the countries of residence» (van der Brug et al. 2015: 14). Over the last two 
decades, these instances of collective action have proliferated, initiating «a new era of protest» 
(Ataç et al. 2016) and «a new form of activism on the global stage» (Caraus 2018). 
 The burgeoning literature on pro-immigrant social movements has sought to understand 
how groups at the margins of society can turn into vocal political subjects (cf. della Porta 2018). 
Often materially deprived, socially stigmatized, and devoid of voting rights, immigrants are the 
least likely to become politicized. To solve this puzzle, scholars detected assorted drivers of 
immigrants’ mobilization, including opportunities and threats in the outer environment (e.g., 
Morales & Giugni 2011; Zepeda-Millán 2016; Nicholls 2013), dense networks of supporters (e.g., 
Agustín & Jørgensen 2016; Rosenberg & Winkler 2014), and ‘acts of citizenships’ as break-
through moments (e.g., Isin 2008; Ataç et al. 2016; Caraus 2018). This strand of literature also 
points at the dilemmas that these collective actors normally face, such as the indispensable and 
yet obstructive support of ‘native’ allies, whose solidarity can be driven by paternalistic attitudes 
(e.g., Cappiali 2016; Fadaee 2015). 
 However, in face of a growing literature on the consequences of collective action (cf. 
Bosi et al. 2016), the political (and policy) outcomes of pro-immigrant movements have been 
seldom investigated and remain one of the main blind spots in social movement studies (Eggert 
& Giugni 2015: 168). To fill this lacuna, and based on the seminal work by McAdam, Tilly, and 
Tarrow on contentious politics (2001), this research introduced the notion of ‘contentious mi-
gration policies.’ The adjective ‘contentious’ intends to denote the contested character of migra-
tion policy arenas, as well as to move beyond narrow movement-centered perspectives, i.e., con-
sidering broader patterns of interaction between claim-makers, elites, opponents, and the state 
(see also Ataç et al. 2016: 536). 
 In line with the scant literature on the topic (Steil & Vasi 2014), this research confirmed 
that mobilizations aimed at enlarging immigrant rights are more likely to succeed in influencing 
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policy-making when local powerholders are sympathetic with such demands. Hence, based on 
their ideological affinity, public officials and social-movement activists are incentivized to back 
each other up in enacting pro-immigrant policies at the local level. Yet extant literature neglects 
how such cooperative dynamics unfold in contexts of multi-level governance—a gap that this 
study filled in by incorporating a multi-level governance perspective into the study of social 
movement outcomes. More precisely, it has been shown how the outcomes of pro-immigrant 
activists do depend on the local context in which they mobilize (what I define as the city politics 
arena), but in combination with interactive dynamics unfolding in the civil society arena and the multi-level 
governance arena. 
Therefore, this research engaged with, and argue for, a deeper interdisciplinary dialogue 
between migration studies and social movement studies, as the former underestimated the role 
of activists in shaping the perceptions, strategies, and preferences of policy-makers, while the 
latter overlooked the question of outcomes in multi-level political environments. Moreover, and 
relatedly, this endeavor allow us to bring the state into the study of pro-immigrant movements. 
As mentioned, mobilizations by and in solidarity with immigrants are caught in a plethora of di-
lemmas. Most notably, at the root of the struggle for immigrant rights is the refusal of nationally-
bounded definitions of citizenship; yet, the nation-state is also the main target of demand-mak-
ers, who urge public officials to at least partly accommodate their claims (Darling & Bauder 
2019: 13). By locating the question of responsiveness at its core, this research could explore the 
many facets of this paradox in its complexity. 
 These insights can also travel beyond the realm of immigration and shed light on move-
ment-state relationships at large. The case of Barcelona, with activists on the radical left forming 
a municipal government, is so exceptional that poses more general questions in this respect. 
BeC—quite unique experiment of movement-party coalition—is indeed an offspring of the 
15M/Indignados movement. Amid the Great Recession, the 15M protesters advanced a radical 
criticism of neoliberalism, demanding a deepening of democracy and social justice while pointing 
an accusing finger at political and economic elites. The great intensity of Spanish anti-austerity 
mobilizations was mirrored in the crisis of the established party system, smoothing the rise of 
new parties (della Porta et al. 2017). On the left, this space was subsequently occupied by Po-
demos. BeC was founded precisely to funnel the aspirations of urban social movements into the 
electoral arena. 
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 On the one hand, the Colau’s administration is a clear example of how social movements 
can successfully move from the ‘streets’ to the ‘ballot box.’ With mainstream parties perceived 
as unresponsive to popular demands (Mair 2009), anti-establishment sentiments found expres-
sion in the institutional space, possibly recovering liberal democracy from its crisis of legitimacy.  
Although anarchism and other autonomous movement cultures molded the ‘square movements’ 
of the 2010s to a vast extent, the question of the state was at the core of protesters’ demands, 
which included the restoration of ‘old’ social rights and the regeneration of political institutions 
(della Porta 2015; Gerbaudo 2017). This marked some discontinuities with previous cycles of 
contention—most notably the GJM—in which the state embodied an enemy to be defeated 
more than a structure to be transformed from below. The biographical, cultural, and political 
outcomes that anti-austerity protests are now producing—especially in the realm of electoral 
politics—would support this interpretation. The success of new parties such as Podemos and 
left-wing leaders such as Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders are the long tail of those mobiliza-
tions. In sum, office-holders in the institutions are not inevitably counter-posed to movements, 
but can act as a megaphone for protestors by making their claims more visible and legitimate. 
 On the other hand, the BeC’s administration forcefully epitomized the limits and con-
tradictions of a social movement with radical aspirations taking office in a national-capitalist 
context. This research confirmed how conflictual is the relationship between parties in office 
and their activist base, but not necessarily for the reasons outlined by McAdam & Tarrow (2010). 
Conflicts were not caused by the attempt of the local incumbents to appeal to the median voter 
by moving to the center, but precisely for the opposite reason. In fact, the ‘loyalty’ of local incumbents 
to their activist legacy, their mimicking of social-movement strategies, and their sensitiveness to 
protesters’ demands have fueled, rather than tamed, controversies. Ethnicity bred contestation 
further, as the propensity of the city government to embrace grassroot demands provoked an 
antagonistic reaction from the side of immigrant activists (foremost the street vendors collective), 
as the wish of not being patronized by allies and opponents alike has been at the basis of their 
process of politicization. 
The greatest constraints, however, were of a exogenous nature. While local governments 
normally lack competencies and resources in many areas, multi-level coordination was especially 
poor in the case of Barcelona, as neither regional nor national incumbents were of the same 
political color. Also, pro-status quo coalitions—economic elites, mainstream media, and some 
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opposition parties—fiercely opposed the most radical policies in the governmental agenda (cf. 
Eizaguirre et al. 2017; Blanco et al. 2019). These constraints were particularly sharp in the case of 
street vendors. Property laws and border controls are intersected factors that lie at the core of 
the capitalist economy and outside the competency of local authorities. Also, the city govern-
ment has been confronted with a particularly complex political conjuncture. Most of Colau’s 
term has coincided with the height of the Catalan pro-independence movement, a period of 
growing polarization within the Catalan society, during which the Spain’s executive severely re-
pressed pro-independence mobilizations. BeC has, moreover, faced this difficult situation as a 
minority government supported by only 11 of the city council’s 21 members, forcing it to reach 
agreements with different parties to pass any policy (Bazurli & Castaño Tierno 2018). 
‘We don’t forget who we are and why we are here’ is a solemn resolution that BeC’s members 
are used to recall—and yet obstructed by several adverse conditions. Léon Blum—leader of the 
SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière – French Socialist Party) throughout the 
1920s—distinguished between the ‘exercise of power’ (taking office to prepare the groundwork 
for socialism) and the ‘conquest of power’ (the actual dismantling of capitalism), cf. Sunkara 
(2019). The Colau’s administration has been caught in dilemmas of this kind, with the risk turn-
ing popular aspirations into mere frustration. 
 
Urban studies 
Human mobility is a worldwide phenomenon that has profound consequences in cities of transit 
or settlement. Precisely because immigration is such a paradigmatic urban issue, the findings of 
this research transcend this immediate policy sector and have implications for the study of urban 
politics at large. As  pointed out in recent endeavors to ‘urbanize’ political science (Kaufmann 
& Sidney 2020), the underlying mechanisms of urban policy-making are, in many respects, 
unique when compared to governance processes unfolding in different contexts. As Stone puts 
it, «cities are not the nation-state writ small» (2015: 117). Hence, some grand questions that can 
be answered inductively are: What is distinctive about urban policy-making? What are its typical 
constraints and opportunities? Or, put succinctly, how ‘urban’ is urban policy-making? It is here con-
tended that its defining features are density and multi-scalarity, which briefly denote that cities are 
sites of dense relational networks that articulate over multiple territorial scales. 
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 Urban policy-making is peculiar, first of all, for the collective problems it addresses. Alt-
hough rural communities also face dramatic global-scale transformations, these changes tend to 
concentrate in cities because of the large numbers of diverse individuals living in restricted, often 
overcrowded spaces (cf. Wirth 1938). Urban policy-making is further complicated by multi-level 
politics (e.g., Hooghe & Marks 2003; Bache & Flinders 2004; Kübler & Pagano 2012). The pre-
rogatives of municipalities are generally narrower than—and subordinated to—those of national 
institutions. But because of their propinquity to societal change, local policy makers are those 
‘forced’ to respond, with or without the support of the central state. Such dynamics were appar-
ent in Milan and Barcelona—even more so during the ‘refugee crisis.’ Major global transfor-
mations and flaws in multi-level governance have ‘flowed downstream.’ Global migration, re-
strictive immigration management, lack of interstate cooperation, and poor national migration 
governance are all factors that lie outside the competency of local authorities but became critical 
questions for policy makers at the city level, who have been forced to ‘pay the bill.’ 
However, whereas these are political constraints faced by any local authority, those op-
erating in cities tend to have a superior ‘firepower’ to stretch them, insofar as cities are strategic 
sites for political agency (e.g., Nicholls 2008; Sapotichne an&d Smith 2012). This holds for both 
municipalities and social movements, which can exploit the relational density of cities to shape 
the public agenda and access policy arenas at various spatial scales, far beyond their immediate 
local realms. Urban actors have a strategic toolbox at their disposal for responding to the unfa-
vorable conditions that ‘flow downstream’ by ‘moving upstream.’ This is why cities are often 
‘avant-gardes’ whose experiments may travel to other localities or levels of government, e.g., by 
mean of international networks (cf. Caponio 2018). Interestingly, interviewees had very clear 
these possibility of spreading policy innovations on the global stage. In sum, urban policy-mak-
ing cannot be simply subsumed under the heading of policy making with a local scope. It seems, 
on the contrary, hardly ‘local.’ 
Relatedly, this research shed lights on the importance of cities in projecting a «just, dem-
ocratic, and sustainable future» (Kaufmann & Sidney 2020: 1). Once more, immigration is an 
excellent entry point to unpack these dynamics. Modern states are built on, and seek to monop-
olize, the enforcement of territorial and legal borders. In the ‘age of migration’ (Castles et al. 
2014), however, their sovereign authority is questioned to the core. This challenge comes, most 
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notably, from urban societies. In the Global North, amid ever more restrictive governance ar-
rangements at the central level, cities proved fertile breeding grounds for nonconformist re-
sponses in support of vulnerable and highly politicized immigrants, such as asylum-seekers and 
the undocumented. Importantly, local exclusionary policies proliferated too (Ambrosini 2018; 
Steil & Vasi 2014) and often served as experiments later upscaled at higher tiers of government 
(Steil & Ridgley 2012). These caveats notwithstanding, the case for the city «as a space that chal-
lenges the exclusion perpetrated at the level of the nation-state» (Darling & Bauder 2019: 4) 
remains valid. In the eloquent words of one interviewee: 
 
«The fact that [the municipality] can avert a deportation or a detainment is powerful in concrete 
terms. But it is powerful also in political ones, because you are crafting a local-level legality for 
defending people that are deemed ‘illegal’ by the [central] state» (B16, emphasis added). 
 
These alternative discourses and practices are first conceived and experimented in activist cir-
cles—and possibly embraced and upscaled by local officials later on. Hence, progressive social 
movements may originate at the periphery of power relations, but are able to craft and dissemi-
nate new grammars of democracy in the longer run (cf. Tarrow 2011). 
9.3 Limitations and avenues for future research 
Moving beyond ‘binary’ definitions of migration policies 
The first limitation of this study concerns the definition of migration policies. The research has 
relied on the distinction between immigration and immigrant policies (Hammar 1985). While fruitful 
for analytical purposes, the boundaries between these policy areas are far from neat. Nation-
states regulate the conditions for being admitted in their territory, for instance through the reg-
ulation of citizenship and asylum. The social rights of foreign-born residents are subsequently 
stratified based on their immigration status (Bolderson 2011). From this perspective, then, im-
migrant policy is heavily dependent on immigration regimes. This research has made apparent, 
moreover, how this connection also works the other way around. In Spain, for instance, local 
governments have the authority to register undocumented immigrants in their municipal census 
so as to grant them access to integration programs. Importantly, this registration can also serve 
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as a legal basis for initiating regularization and family reunification procedures (cf. Garcés-Mas-
careñas 2014: 5-6). Future research may delve deeper on the implication of these interdepend-
ences for the strategies and outcomes of social movements. 
 Another ‘dualism’ to be interrogated is the one between inclusionary and exclusionary 
policies. As a recent study points out, 
 
«restriction and integration are conceived not as opposed to one another but as two different 
strategies de- vised by government officials to achieve a common goal: the control of illegalized people 
in their jurisdictions. One strategy, restriction, uses punitive techniques and spectacles to spread 
terror in immigrant communities […]. The other, integration, governs by separating deserving 
from undeserving immigrants and deploying disciplinary methods to normalize the former 
and punitive techniques to repress the latter» (Nicholls 2019: 3, emphasis added). 
 
Future studies may take charge of such a critical perspective to investigate how it is mirrored on 
the relationship between pro-immigrant activists and policy-makers. For instance, it can hypoth-
esized that inclusionary policies are not simply enacted for accommodating the demands of so-
cial movements, but also for co-opting their moderate sectors while controlling more insurgent 
ones.  
  
Causes and consequences of policy-making and mobilization 
Other avenues for future inquiry are related to the determinants of local policies and social 
movement outcomes. Several instances of collective action scrutinized in this research emerged 
on the wake of major ‘watershed’ events. This was the case of the solidarity initiatives that mush-
roomed in the midst of the ‘refugee crisis.’ In Milan, when large numbers of migrants started 
camping in the Central Railway Station, civil society organizations rapidly mobilized to meet the 
needs of migrants in transit, especially unaccompanied minors. The SMM platform was created 
in Barcelona following major events that fueled moral outrage among the public, especially the 
dismissal of the ‘Mare Nostrum’ search-and-rescue operation, the death of Alan Kurdi on the 
shore of Bodrum, Turkey, and the EU-Turkey agreement. In the same city, the TeC campaign 
emerged as a reaction to the death of an inmate, Idrissa Diallo, in the city’s Immigration Deten-
tion Center. Also, the death of Mor Sylla—a Senegalese street vendor—was a turning point for 
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the mobilization of his colleagues. These critical junctures thus seem embedded in extant politi-
cal opportunity structures (cf. della Porta 2018: 5-11). Rather than creating social movements 
from scratch, they precipitated the politicization of networks mobilized on different issues or 
until then focused on humanitarian, seemingly a-political actions (cf. Fleischmann and Stein-
hilper 2017; Zamponi 2018; Sinatti 2019). 
 Strikingly, these turning points played a crucial role in initiating not only mobilization, 
but also policy-making. This finding echoes research on ‘focusing events’ as possible driving 
forces behind agenda-setting (cf. Kingdon 1995). In Birkland’s definition, 
 
 «[a] focusing event is an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably de-
fined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms 
that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is 
known to policy makers and the public simultaneously» (Birkland 1998: 54). 
 
The ‘refugee crisis’ is a highly visible case in point, as it unfolded locally as a humanitarian emer-
gency. Local incumbents could exploit it as a window of opportunity to pursue their goals, 
namely seeking electoral rewards while responding to emerging policy problems. They can ex-
ploit the symbolic power of migration policies in order to discursively intervene in arenas that 
lie beyond their administrative competences (Castelli Gattinara 2016: 4-5). 
 Varying ‘magnitude’ of these focusing events seem to produce different patterns of in-
teraction between policy-makers and social-movement activists. In Milan, the humanitarian 
emergency accelerated the construction of a city-level alliance. Ideological affinity is present, but 
the urgency to act was possibly a greater incentive to coalesce. This is particularly evident when 
looking at the confrontational attitude adopted by the municipal government vis-à-vis the central 
one, even though both were of the same political color. Activists have exploited this apparent 
contradiction, keeping up pressure on the city government and pushing its agenda closer to their 
own demands. Logics of convenience thus prevailed over ideological ones. However, these 
emergency-driven cooperative dynamics possibly became path-dependent, with social move-
ments remaining important voices in policy-making also after the ‘refugee crisis’, as in the case 
of the municipal registration for residents with no fixed or regular abode. In Barcelona, where 
the crisis has been relatively softer, the urban alliance seems to be crafted on a more ideological 
 191 
basis. The city government has also been guided by the prospect of radically transforming EU 
migration governance.  
 Drawing on the work by McAdam & Tarrow (2010) on the relationship between parties 
and movements, in Milan we can recognize a case in which ‘movements polarize parties inter-
nally’, whereas in Barcelona there were ‘movements that turned into parties’, i.e., accessing insti-
tutions through the electoral channel. This is also mirrored on the stages of the policy process 
in which the interactions between urban actors mostly occurred. While implementation is espe-
cially relevant in Milan (e.g., management of the emergency at the railway station, extension of 
national policies through volunteering), agenda-setting is more important in Barcelona (e.g., me-
dia-oriented actions aimed at impacting the Spanish and the EU agendas). Future research may 
further unpacks the role of ‘critical junctures’ or ‘focusing events’ in shaping the political out-
comes of social movements. 
 
South European cities and beyond: Toward space-sensitive comparative designs 
 This study has compared two large, multicultural, relatively affluent South European cit-
ies—Milan and Barcelona. The Italian and Spanish contexts are similar in many respects that are 
relevant for the comparative study of local government, such as the Napoleonic administrative 
tradition, the ‘Southern Model’ of welfare systems, and social spending retrenchment (e.g., León 
& Pavolini 2014). As for immigration, these are countries of recent settlement whose regulatory 
models are likely to produce undocumented immigration, in a pendulum between restrictive 
policies and mass regularizations (e.g. González-Enríquez 2009; Caponio & Cappiali 2018). Such 
weak planning capacities and the logic of emergency that often permeates policy-making have 
put local actors at the forefront in handling immigration.  
This strategy for case selection allowed us to hold constant numerous contextual factors 
at both the country-level (e.g., welfare systems, models of migration governance) and the city-
level (i.e., urban demography, economy, and society). Simultaneously, Milan and Barcelona ex-
press significant variations in terms of local migration policies and political dynamics. The inter-
actions between city governments and social movements could be assessed in their nuances 
thanks to such variations. By means of a strategic-interaction and mechanism-based approach 
to contentious politics, the findings of this research may contribute to theorize the dynamics of 
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social movement outcomes in the field of migration. More generally, they may help to under-
stand how urban actors respond to emerging collective problems in face of highly restrictive and scarcely capable 
governance regimes. 
Future studies may construct more encompassing comparative designs, for instance se-
lecting cases expressing greater variation in terms of multi-level governance. Comparing South 
European cities with others in the Global North is a promising avenue of research. Despite 
different multi-level arrangements in the field of immigration, similar interactions between local 
governments and movements might be at play—as the history of US sanctuary cities seems to 
suggest. However, it is worth investigating whether the responses of urban actors follow differ-
ent trajectories when immigration regimes are still restrictive but yet characterized by superior 
governance capabilities as compared to the South-European ones (e.g., Germany’s). For instance, 
Italian and Spanish municipalities seem eager to overstep their jurisdictional boundaries and in-
terfere with national affairs for enacting ‘remedies form below.’ It may be expected that, within 
more stable governance systems, cities limit their policy-making endeavors within the boundaries 
of their competencies. 
Relatedly, future inquiry may scrutinize more in depth how the leeway of urban actors 
vary depending on different systems of local government (e.g., mayor-council vs. council-man-
ager system). For instance, the Barcelona’s government made significant efforts to support and 
protect undocumented residents within its jurisdiction. Yet, the Spanish deportation system re-
mained virtually untouched in its fundamental mechanisms. This is why Barcelona can be re-
ferred as a ‘quasi-sanctuary’ city (see Section 6.2). The incompleteness of its sanctuary practices 
does not owe, however, to a lack of political will, but to the actual confines of its governmental authority. 
The bargaining power of South European mayors is, in fact, more limited compared to their US 
counterparts, who have greater leverage to locally subvert federal provisions. Therefore, to de-
velop a more general theory of local migration policy-making, the opportunities and constraints 
offered by different institutional arrangements have to be unpacked in their smallest particulars. 
Contrasting immigration with other policy areas in the competencies of local governments (e.g., 
waste management, drug policy, spatial planning) may offer important insights in this respect, as 
it would allow researchers to hold constant a considerable number of contextual factors. 
Finally, another avenue for future research is to compare policies and social movement 
outcomes across local contexts of different sizes and types (e.g., large cities, smaller cities, towns, 
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rural areas, frontiers). As mentioned above, the defining features of cities—namely, the geo-
graphical concentration of numerous and diverse individuals in restricted areas (Wirth 1938)—
have tremendous political implications. The city indeed works «as a relational incubator, facilitating 
complex relational exchanges that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operat-
ing at a variety of spatial scales»  (Nicholls 2008: 842, italics in original). Offering generalizable 
urban comparative insights requires the adoption of space-sensitive comparative designs that take into 
account the distinctive qualities of different geographical settings. Ultimately, this would allow 
us to productively intersect comparative perspectives that are typical for political science (e.g., 
cross-national studies) with ‘cross-spatial’ ones, more in line with the tradition of urban studies. 
9.4 Epilogue 
The political trends unfolding in the context of late neoliberalism threaten the survival of repre-
sentative democracy as we know it (della Porta 2013a; Crouch 2004). The long-lasting economic, 
political, and cultural crises that affect western countries provided ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
the success of populist radical right parties (Caiani & Graziano 2019). These latter intercept, and 
promise to redeem, citizens’ discontent by championing a nativist and authoritarian understand-
ing of social order. Mainstream parties have been eager to chase these challengers in the (often 
unsuccessful) attempt of neutralizing them (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018). As a ‘side effect’, far-
right politics has become accepted by ever broader sections of the public—a process that can be 
referred to as normalization (Mudde 2019). This has a tangible and detrimental impact on the lives 
of many, often vulnerable sectors of society—including immigrants, as well as ethnic and reli-
gious minorities.  
These trends were also apparent in Italy and Spain, albeit with some notable differences. 
Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Minister of Interior in 2018-19 and leader of the far-right Lega, authored 
two ‘security decrees’, in fact aimed at restricting asylum rights and criminalizing foreign-born 
residents and their supporters. Previous left-leaning executives paved the way to this punitive 
approach to immigration, pandering to rightwing anxieties and enacting measures in stark con-
trast to human rights, as in the case of the externalization of border management to Libyan 
militias and smugglers. In Spain, far-right forces remained at the fringes of the political arena for 
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a long time—also due to the success of populist parties of a inclusionary kind (Alonso & Kalt-
wasser 2014; Font et al. 2017)—but ultimately made their breakthrough on the national stage in 
2019. Both the mainstream parties that dominated domestic politics over the last decades (the 
PSOE and the PP) have contributed to enforce a heavily militarized control of frontiers in Ceuta 
and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves surrounded by Moroccan territories. 
Cities have proven to be more hospital environments for immigrants’ integration in face 
of, and notwithstanding, hostile rhetoric prevailing at the national level. One might argue that ‘win-
ners of globalization’—who have increasingly settled in dense urban settings—tend to bear more 
liberal worldviews (Gidron & Hall 2017). Also, immigrants often choose to settle in cities be-
cause of the higher chances of finding jobs and accommodations, accessing social networks, and 
benefiting from anonymity (Kaufmann 2019). This would then explain why cities are more ‘im-
migrant-friendly’ environments compared to other settings. On the other hand, the city is also 
where immigrants more starkly suffer from spatial segregation and where exclusionary practices 
are first experimented. Urban scholars indeed refer to the city as an ‘ambivalent’ spatial setting 
(Enright & Rossi 2017). Within such a contradictory context, the peculiar qualities of urban 
spaces—notably, the availability of dense relational networks extended over an array of geo-
graphical scales—allow immigrants to create bonds of solidarity, craft alliances, and turn into 
vocal political subjects (Nicholls 2016). Hence, if the city emerge «as a space that challenges the 
exclusion perpetrated at the level of the nation-state» (Darling & Bauder, 2019: 4), this ultimately 
owes to immigrants themselves. 
This research has shown that immigrants and their allies do beget political change. Job 
training programs were launched, shelters were arranged, religious diversity was celebrated, bans 
on the children of undocumented residents were abolished, deportations were averted, forced 
migrants were allowed to reach their preferred destination. All these were, more or less directly, 
by-products of collective action. Also, activists and their institutional allies propagated pro-im-
migrant discourses well beyond their own local realms—thus projecting the image of a radically 
alternative social fabric. As cities tend to catalyze and anticipate social change, all these outcomes 
will likely affect the lives of many elsewhere. These victories, however, were far from recurrent, 
definitive, or univocal. Dealing with power carries many risks, contradictions, compromises, and 
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frustrations. But nothing would have been attained without mobilization. In the words of Fred-
erick Douglas—leader of the US abolitionist movement—«power concedes nothing without a 
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